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Abstract
This thesis studies the field of asset price bubbles. It is comprised of
three independent chapters. Each of these chapters either directly or
indirectly analyse the existence or implications of asset price bubbles.
The type of bubbles assumed in each of these chapters is consistent
with rational expectations. Thus, the kind of price bubbles inves-
tigated here are known as rational bubbles in the literature. The
following describes the three chapters.
Chapter 1: This chapter attempts to explain the recent US housing
price bubble by developing a heterogeneous agent endowment econ-
omy asset pricing model with risky housing, endogenous collateral
and defaults. Investment in housing is subject to an idiosyncratic risk
and some mortgages are defaulted in equilibrium. We analytically de-
rive the leverage or the endogenous loan to value ratio. This variable
comes from a limited participation constraint in a one period mort-
gage contract with monitoring costs. Our results show that low values
of housing investment risk produces a credit easing effect encouraging
excess leverage and generates credit driven rational price bubbles in
the housing good. Conversely, high values of housing investment risk
produces a credit crunch characterized by tight borrowing constraints,
low leverage and low house prices. Furthermore, the leverage ratio was
found to be procyclical and the rate of defaults countercyclical consis-
tent with empirical evidence.
Chapter 2: It is widely believed that financial assets have considerable
persistence and are susceptible to bubbles. However, identification of
this persistence and potential bubbles is not straightforward. This
chapter tests for price bubbles in the United States housing market
accounting for long memory and structural breaks. The intuition is
that the presence of long memory negates price bubbles while the
presence of breaks could artificially induce bubble behaviour. Hence,
we use procedures namely semi-parametric Whittle and parametric
ARFIMA procedures that are consistent for a variety of residual bi-
ases to estimate the value of the long memory parameter, d, of the
log rent-price ratio. We find that the semi-parametric estimation pro-
cedures robust to non-normality and heteroskedasticity errors found
far more bubble regions than parametric ones. A structural break was
identified in the mean and trend of all the series which when accounted
for removed bubble behaviour in a number of regions. Importantly, the
United States housing market showed evidence for rational bubbles at
both the aggregate and regional levels.
In the third and final chapter, we attempt to answer the following
question: To what extend should individuals participate in the stock
market and hold risky assets over their lifecycle? We answer this ques-
tion by employing a lifecycle consumption-portfolio choice model with
housing, labour income and time varying predictable returns where
the agents are constrained in the level of their borrowing. We first
analytically characterize and then numerically solve for the optimal
asset allocation on the risky asset comparing the return predictabil-
ity case with that of IID returns. We successfully resolve the puzzles
and find equity holding and participation rates close to the data. We
also find that return predictability substantially alter both the level of
risky portfolio allocation and the rate of stock market participation.
High factor (dividend-price ratio) realization and high persistence of
factor process indicative of stock market bubbles raise the amount of
wealth invested in risky assets and the level of stock market partic-
ipation, respectively. Conversely, rare disasters were found to bring
down these rates, the change being severe for investors in the later
years of the life-cycle. Furthermore, investors following time varying
returns (return predictability) hedged background risks significantly
better than the IID ones.
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Preface
The three chapters in this thesis studies the field of asset price bubbles. In the first
chapter, we develop a theoretical model and show how housing price bubbles can
emerge in equilibrium. The second chapter provides an empirical investigation
into the timely identification of housing price bubbles. In the third chapter, we
examine how price bubbles can influence household asset allocation and stock
market participation rates. The common theme in all the three papers is asset
price bubbles. We start our introduction by citing a historical example of an asset
bubble.
Perhaps the earliest known example of an asset price bubble is the tulip bubble
in Holland that started in 1634 and burst in February 1637. Amid the general
fascination with rare species of tulips among the Dutch, prices on rare tulip bulbs
rose, attracting the attention of speculators. Since the supply of rare bulbs was
severely limited in the short run, and demand sky-rocketed due to the influx
of speculators, prices rose rapidly amid heavy trading. At the bubble’s peak,
a single tulip bulb sold for an equivalent of $60,000 today. Following the Dutch
tulip mania, there have been numerous episodes of boom-bust phenomena in asset
markets. The last decade saw a bubble in the United States housing market.
House prices peaked in early 2006, started to decline in 2006 and 2007, and
reached historic lows in 2012. The collapse of this housing bubble was followed
with widespread mortgage defaults and created a credit crisis which is widely
considered to be the primary reason behind the 2007-09 economic recession, see
Brunnermeier et al. (2012).
These events underscored the importance of financial frictions and their role
in asset price volatility. The financial friction that played a large role in the recent
crisis came from residential and commercial lending activities. A large part of the
lending in current economies is secured through some form of collateral: residential
and commercial mortgages are secured by the mortgaged property itself, corporate
bonds are secured by the physical assets of the firm, and collateralized mortgage
obligations and debt obligations and other similar instruments are secured by
pools of loans that are in turn secured by physical property. The total of such
collateralized lending is enormous: in 2007 at the peak of the housing bubble, the
value of US residential mortgages alone was roughly $10 trillion, see Geanakoplos
and Zame (2014). Not all of the assets of the borrower can be pledged as collateral.
This can be due to several reasons. They can be either because some of the agents
are not participating in the market or because the information is imperfect or
because of institutional frictions such as limited commitment or enforcement, see
Holmstrom and Tirole (2011). The fact that only a fraction of the assets can be
collateralized implies intuitively that this fraction is an important determinant of
borrower-lender dynamics. For a residential borrowing where the collateral is the
stock of house owned by the borrower, this fraction is called the Loan to Value
ratio. Changes in this loan to value ratio influences the availability of credit,
default probabilities and asset prices.
In the first chapter, we attempt to understand these dynamics between the
loan to value ratio, mortgage defaults and house prices. Importantly, we model
how house price booms and busts can arise in equilibrium. The environment of
our model includes an endowment economy with heterogenous agents, similar to
Zhang (1997) and Rytchkov (2014). Agents differ in the level of their discount
factor. We assume two types of agents or households, one type with high discount
factor and the other with a low discount factor. Households with high discount
factor are patient, called as Savers, and in equilibrium will lend to those with low
discount factors, called as Borrowers. Both these household types derive utility
from a durable housing good which is traded intertemporally. To finance the
purchase of housing stocks, borrower households agree to a one period mortgage
contract with the Savers. The stock of borrower household’s housing is secured
as the collateral. The structure of the mortgage contract we study is very close
to that used by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and
Bernanke et al. (1999). We assume that the borrowers are hit by an idiosyncratic
shock to their housing stock after the contract is agreed. Savers (Lenders) can
observe these shocks only if they pay a monitoring cost. Those households who
experienced a bad shock will find it optimal to default on their mortgages while
the households who had a good shock will repay their loans with interest. Thus,
in equilibrium, some mortgages will be defaulted on. The presence of defaults aids
us in analytically deriving an expression for the loan to value ratio. This ratio
is endogenous and depends on the deep parameters and variables which includes
the stock of collateral, the monitoring costs, the realized shock etc. This ratio
measures the net share of housing value that goes to the lenders as repayment.
We restrict our analysis to finding the steady state equilibrium values.
The main contribution of this chapter is to produce a tractable way of analysing
the impact of endogenous loan to value ratio and endogenous defaults that lead
to equilibrium house price bubbles. The approach is simple, straightforward and
can easily be extended to study more complicated dynamics. Our model thus
extend the literature which assume that margin on the collateral is exogenous or
5
rule out defaults, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Coen-Pirani (2005), Santos and
Woodford (1997), Miao (2014) and He et al. (2015). Furthermore, the few stud-
ies that do accommodate both defaults and endogenous margins usually assume
highly complicated theoretical structures in the form of heterogenous beliefs and
incomplete markets, see for example Geanakoplos (2003), Kubler and Schmedders
(2012), Simsek (2013) and Brumm et al. (2015). These models, except for the
two period case, cannot be studied analytically.
We find some important results. Firstly, the endogenous loan to value ratio
and leverage was found to be procyclical in nature consistent with Geanakoplos
and Zame (2014). High leverage is observed under high house prices and low
leverage under low house prices. Secondly, low values of idiosyncratic risk of
housing generates a credit-easing effect boosting excessive borrowing resulting in
a rational price bubble in housing goods. Thirdly, high values of idiosyncratic
risk causes a credit-crunch effect tightening the borrowing constraint restricting
lending and thus lowering house prices. Fourth, the probability of default rises
with declining house prices and increased uncertainty (risk). These results thus
explain the foreclosure crisis observed after the burst of the housing bubble in the
US wherein a substantial portion of mortgages were defaulted on.
Thus in chapter one, we show how endogenous collateral constraints with risk
of defaults lead to housing price bubbles in equilibrium. The natural question
then is how do we identify price bubbles from empirical data. This would then
aid policy makers in designing a priori appropriate lending standards and prevent
financial disasters from occurring.
In our second chapter, we undertake such a task and deal with the identifi-
cation of house price bubbles in an accurate and timely manner. Our focus is
on the United States housing market. Ever since the works of Blanchard (1979),
Blanchard and Watson (1982a) and Diba and Grossman (1988), we know that
identifying price bubbles involves monitoring for any deviation of the asset’s price
from its fundamentals. This is the theoretical definition of a rational bubble, see
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013). As we focus on bubbles in the housing mar-
ket, the fundamentals here would be the rents. The rents are kind of a payoff
accrued to the homeowner and is generally considered in the literature as the real
estate equivalent of stock market dividends, see Himmelberg et al. (2005). As the
dividend-price ratio is a financial ratio for the stock market, we can equivalently
consider the housing rent-price ratio as a financial ratio for the housing market,
see Plazzi et al. (2010). The presence of a unit root in this rent-price ratio would
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mean that the housing price and its fundamentals, the rents, are not moving to-
gether. That is, they do not share a common trend implying the existence of a
rational bubble in the housing market. As argued by Phillips and Yu (2011) the
identification of price bubbles thus involves testing for the presence of a unit root
in the rent-price ratio series.
The application of standard unit root tests to detect rational price bubbles
have had mixed success, see Diba and Grossman (1987), Evans (1991b), Lamont
(1998) and Horvath and Watson (2009). The primary reason for this is that these
tests have low power in differentiating a unit root process with a near unit root
process, see Diebold and Rudebusch (1991). If we represent d as a parameter
that measures the persistence of a series, then d = 1 is a unit root process which
implies the presence of rational bubbles but d = 0.9 is not a bubble process. Such
processes with values of d close to one but not a unit root have a special property in
that they are mean reverting in an extended period of time. This means that these
series although divergent in the short run will eventually return to their mean, in
our case the fundamentals, and thus rejects any bubble behaviour. These type of
mean-reverting but persistent series are called long memory processes, originally
identified by Granger and Joyeux (1980).
In this light, we use long memory models to identify house price bubbles. The
use of these models involve estimating the memory parameter, d. The value of d
indicates the persistence and thus the presence or absence of a rational bubble.
We employ econometric tests in both the time domain, called parametric tests,
and also the frequency domain, called semi-parametric tests, to test the null of
a unit root d = 1 bubble process against a mean reverting d < 1 no bubble
process. This is the first contribution in our chapter as existing literature have
concentrated on using only one of these two methods. Furthermore, more often
these methods have been applied to study stock price bubbles and not housing
bubbles, see for example Koustas and Serletis (2005) and Cun˜ado et al. (2005).
It is well known ever since the work of Perron (1989) and Diebold and Inoue
(2001) that the presence of structural breaks could artificially induce an unit
root. In our context, structural breaks would mean a change in the fundamentals
of the economy. Hence, accounting for such breaks is essential for an efficient
identification of bubbles. We use standard break tests to identify any endogenous
break in the mean and trend in the series and then demean and detrend it to arrive
at an unbiased estimate of the persistence. This forms the second contribution of
our chapter.
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The third contribution involves the use of both regional metropolitan level
data along with the aggregate data. This is motivated by the literature on housing
supply elasticity. As elaborated by Green et al. (2005) and Levitin and Wachter
(2012), housing price appreciation depends to a large extent on its supply elasticity
and furthermore, with changing demographics and geography these elasticities
differ widely. Our analysis thus identifies regional price bubbles along with their
aggregate counterparts. The dataset we use covered the quarterly 31 year time
period of 1982Q4-2013Q4.
Our results extend the literature in multiple dimensions. We first find that
as expected the long memory methods provided better estimates compared to
standard unit root tests. Secondly, the semi-parametric estimates of persistence
were found to be more reliable than the parametric ones. These values were
well above a unit root. Thirdly, when examined for endogenous breaks, one
structural break was observed in all the series. This breakdate, around the year
2003, corresponded with the period of a change in the borrowing standards in
the American credit market, see Glaeser et al. (2013) Once we adjusted for these
breaks, all of the series gave comparatively lower values of persistence. However,
one of the aggregate price series and 8 out of 12 regional series continued to
exhibit unit root tendency. We concluded that there were price bubbles in the
US housing market.
In the first and second chapters, we explicitly deal with asset price bubbles.
While the first chapter explained how endogenous collateral constraints and mort-
gage defaults lead to credit driven housing price bubbles in equilibrium, the sec-
ond chapter provided an empirical study on the timely identification of bubbles in
housing markets. The presence of a bubble indicates some kind of inefficiency in
the financial market, see Fama and French (1988, 1992). If markets were efficient,
prices would never deviate from fundamentals and we would have no bubbles. As-
set bubbles are not the only consequence of an inefficient financial market. Several
puzzling phenomenon observed in the asset pricing literature can be attributed
to these inefficiencies. The well known equity premium puzzle first studied by
Mehra and Prescott (1985) is an example.
In the third chapter, we attempt to resolve two puzzles that are observed in
asset markets that relates specifically to household portfolio choice. These are
the stock market participation puzzle and the asset allocation puzzle. The 2007
Survey of Consumer Finances data reveal that only about 50% of US households
invest in stocks, either directly or indirectly (via mutual funds in retirement and
nonretirement accounts), and participation in European countries is even lower,
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see Bucks (2006) and Guiso et al. (2008). This is called the Stock Market Partici-
pation Puzzle. Furthermore, it has been observed in microeconomic panel income
data by several economists that the few people who do participate in the stock
market hold very little wealth in risky equities. This level of wealth in risky equi-
ties is found to follow a hump-shape through the investor’s life-cycle, see Canner
et al. (1997), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Ameriks and Zeldes (2002). This is
the Asset Allocation Puzzle.
Traditional models in portfolio allocation theory are at odds with these em-
pirical facts. For instance, Merton (1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969), consider
a dynamic portfolio optimization problem in which investors maximize expected
utility through their choice of risky and risk-free investments subject to a wealth
constraint and obtain closed form solutions. Their theory predicts that the share
invested in the risky asset is affected neither by the level of wealth nor by the
consumption decision. In other words, an optimal investor should put 100% of
his wealth in risky stocks, a counter-factual prediction. In fairness, the Merton
and Samuelson results were derived under many restrictive assumptions, including
power utility, independent and identically distributed (IID) returns on the risky
and risk-free investments, the absence of market frictions, the absence of labour
income or any durable goods.
In an attempt to reconcile the theory with the empirical facts, several authors
have relaxed these assumptions. This has been achieved through incorporating
labour income (Bodie et al. (1992), Benzoni et al. (2007)), generalizing pref-
erences (Campbell and Viceira (1999), Gomes and Michaelidis (2005)), making
intertemporal utility non-separable in a durable good such as housing (Grossman
and Laroque (1990), Flavin and Yamashita (2011)) and analysing the effects of
time variation in equity premium (Campbell et al. (2001), Michaelides and Zhang
(2015)). Despite these advances, the puzzles still remain unresolved. One reason
is that the focus on most of these studies incorporate only one or two dynamics,
for example Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) generalizes preference and adds labour
income but abstracts from durable housing and other factors. Importantly, with
the exception of Campbell and Viceira (1999) and to an extent Viceira (2001)
analytical studies are non-existent.
In the third chapter, we fill this gap in the literature and successfully resolve
the two puzzles. We start with a reasonably rich model which is analytically
solved to derive an expression for the optimal asset allocation in risky stocks. We
then enrich the model in a life-cycle context and incorporate all relevant factors
that influences stock market participation and life-cycle asset allocation puzzles.
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The optimization problem is solved with numerical methods and policy functions
are simulated.
Our analytical exercise gave valuable intuition in how and what factors de-
termine the level of wealth invested in the risky asset when the household faces
changes in the investment opportunity set, shocks to the labour income and shocks
to durable housing prices. In this way we extend the seminal work of Campbell
and Viceira (1999) to include durable goods and labour income. This is the first
contribution of our chapter. The second contribution, as stated earlier, is in incor-
porating all relevant dynamics in a rich life-cycle model. Importantly, we extend
the works of Cocco (2004) and Vestman (2012)’s life-cycle portfolio choice model
which has both housing and risky labour income by including time varying re-
turns, Epstein-Zin preferences, a bequest motive and uncertainty of death. Time
varying returns implies that investors in our model can use a factor such as the
log dividend-price ratio to predict future returns. Hence, this can also be called
as return predictability.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, our simulated data
from the theoretical model gave levels of asset allocation and stock market par-
ticipation rates which are very close to the estimated ones from the Survey of
Consumer Finance dataset. In this way, we successfully resolve the stock market
participation and the asset allocation puzzles, respectively. Secondly, we find that
in the presence of housing both the stock market participation rate and the risky
asset allocation share is found to be hump-shaped over the life-cycle consistent
with empirical evidence, seeGuiso and Sodini (2013). This is consistent with other
papers that include housing in the portfolio choice such as Cocco (2004), Yao and
Zhang (2004) and Vestman (2012). We find that housing initiates a crowding out
effect restricting younger liquidity constrained households from market participa-
tion and holding risky stocks.
The third result we find is that portfolio choice and market participation
profiles are significantly different in the return predictability case relative to the
IID case. We find that when returns are predictable from a factor such as the
log dividend-price ratio, the optimal risky share of liquid wealth invested in the
risky asset varies largely depending on the factor’s: realization, persistence and
volatility. High realizations and high persistence of the factor, specifically unit
root or above, substantially shifts up both the risky equity allocated as well as
the rate of stock market participation. Likewise, a huge dip in the factor or
a high volatility suggesting a ”rare disaster” in the economy brings down the
liquid wealth invested in risky stocks. Unlike the bubble scenario, a rare disaster
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such as a market crash was found to have a heterogenous response over the life-
cycle with older and retired households, over the age of 65, being more affected
(adversely). In addition to this, investors under return predictability were able to
hedge background risks, such as labour income or house price volatilities, better.
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Chapter 1
Endogenous Collateral
Constraints, Defaults and House
Price Bubbles
1.1. Introduction
A variety of factors contributed to the global financial crisis of 2007-09. One such
factor was the growing availability of subprime mortgage credit in the mid-2000s
in the United States. Households were able to borrow higher multiples of income,
with lower required downpayments. The onset of the crisis was characterized by
a fall in house prices, an increase in mortgage defaults and home foreclosures.
These events initially affected residential construction and the financial sector,
but their negative effects spread quickly to other sectors of the economy. This
crisis thus underlined the need for economic models to accommodate the financial
sector.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) were the pioneers
in emphasizing the role of the financial sector in a general equilibrium model. The
role of the financial sector in these papers comes from the entrepreneurs (firms)
need of external finance possibly to meet an investment opportunity. They find
that the presence of agency costs mean that borrowing is limited and needs to
be secured by some kind of a collateral. In general, the optimal lending contract
would entail the entrepreneur to pledge a fraction of his assets as collateral. These
studies show that when the collateral goes down in value, so would the amount
that can be borrowed against it. Furthermore, the presence of financial frictions in
the form of these collateral constraint result in amplification mechanisms whereby
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any real shocks to the economy (for instance, productivity) will get multiplied
and propagated to other sectors of the economy.1 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
calls these credit cycles. A problem with this stream of thought, as stated by
Geanakoplos (2003) is that it keeps the loan to value ratio constant. The loan to
value ratio is the fraction of the asset that is collateralized (pledged). Changes
in the loan to value ratio has amplification effects on leverage, asset
prices and the broader macroeconomy.
We can make this statement clear by the following example. Consider the case
of a homeowner (or hedge fund or a big investment bank) who takes out a loan
using a house as collateral, he must negotiate not just the interest rate, but how
much he can borrow. If the house costs $100 and he borrows $80 and pays $20 in
cash, we can say that the margin or downpayment is 20%, and the loan to value
is $80/$100 = 80%. The leverage is the reciprocal of the margin, namely the ratio
of the asset value to the cash needed to purchase it, or $100/$20 = 5. If you are
leveraged five to one and the asset increases or decreases 1%, your wealth goes
up or down 5%. In essence, the borrower is more sensitive to changes in housing
wealth and prices, see Geanakoplos and Zame (2014).
We can formalize this example by specifying a mortgage contract where the
loan to the borrowing agents is secured with the agent’s asset (house) as collateral.
Lt+1 ≤ ψPt+1Ht+1, where 0 < ψ < 1 (1.1)
where Lt+1 is the loans offered to borrowers at time t, Pt+1Ht+1 is the value
of the physical asset, the house, which is collateralized where Pt+1 is the price
of the house and Ht+1 is the stock of house. Importantly, ψ here is defined
as the Loan to Value Ratio (LTV). It is the fraction of the collateral that is
actually pledged. If the borrower defaults, the lender gets this fraction of the
collateral value. It follows then that 1− ψ is the margin, (1− ψ)Pt+1Ht+1 is the
1The key mechanism involves the link between “external finance premium”, the difference
between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal to the firm,
and the net worth of potential borrowers. With credit-market frictions present, and with the
total amount of financing required held constant, standard models of lending with asymmetric
information imply that the external finance premium depends inversely on borrowers’ net worth.
This inverse relationship arises because, when borrowers have little wealth to contribute to
project financing, the potential divergence of interests between the borrower and the suppliers
of external funds is greater, implying increased agency costs; in equilibrium, lenders should be
compensated by higher agency costs through a larger premium. To the extent that borrowers’
net worth is procyclical, the external finance premium will be countercyclical, enhancing the
swings in borrowing and thus in investment, spending, and production, see Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and Bernanke et al. (1996, 1999).
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downpayment and the leverage (ratio) is 1
Margin
= 1
1−ψ . Here we have subsumed
the interest rate on Loans within the variables.2 The main objective of this
chapter is in endogenizing the loan to value ratio ψ. Once the parameter
ψ is endogenized, we then analyse its implications to asset pricing and
default rates. We use the terms margins, leverage, pledgeability parameter and
loan to value ratios interchangeably throughout this chapter. As is clear from the
above example, all of these concepts are contained in one variable, ψ.3
The underlying mechanism that generates the endogenous loan to value ratio
is a one period mortgage contract agreed between a borrower and a lender. In
our study, we assume an endowment economy model standard in the general equi-
librium asset pricing literature such as Lucas Jr. (1978) and Zhang (1997). The
economy is populated with two types of households who only differ in the dis-
count factor. Households with a low discount factor are impatient and are hence
called “Borrowers” and households with a high discount factor are patient and
thus called “Savers” as in Rytchkov (2014). In equilibrium, the saver households
will lend to the borrower households. These households have preferences defined
over a durable housing good. This housing good is traded between the two house-
holds. Thus, the housing good provides both consumption services and also acts
as an investment asset, see for example Cocco (2004) and Iacoviello (2004).
Borrowers use their houses as collateral for mortgages and experience idiosyn-
cratic housing investment shocks. The realized shock is not observable to the
lender. Lenders must pay a monitoring cost to observe borrower’s realized hous-
ing return. This is the agency cost in the contract. Borrowers experiencing low
realizations of the idiosyncratic shock default on their mortgages; Borrowers who
repay their mortgages pay a state-contingent adjustable mortgage rate that is
typically above the risk-free rate. The kind of mortgage contract that we discuss
in this chapter is a one period mortgage contract. The contract is negotiated at
the beginning of a period and resolved by the end of that same period. Borrowers
who are unable to repay their loans, because of some kind of a bad realization of
the shock, will default on their loans. In case of defaults, the borrower will lose
2Quadrini (2011), Miao and Wang (2012) and Miao et al. (2015) consider intratemporal
loans meaning that no interest is charged by the lenders. Unlike these papers, in this chapter
we model loans as intertemporal where the interest rate on loans are predetermined at the time
of the contract agreement.
3In the context of our chapter, as the collateral here is the stock of housing, the appropriate
term is the loan to value ratio. However, it is not unusual in the literature to call this parameter
ψ as a margin, see for example Brumm et al. (2015).
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his collateralized asset. In this way, our model as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
allows for endogenous defaults in equilibrium.
The endogenous collateral constraint is derived from a limited participation
constraint faced by the lenders in the optimal contract. For the structure of the
contract, we follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) and is
based on the costly state verification framework of Townsend (1979). Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) use the contract to understand the
borrowing dynamics at the firm level where the collateral is the capital owned
by the firm. We apply it to the households problem in our context where the
collateral is the stock of house owned by the borrowers. We assume that the
idiosyncratic shock follows a log normal distribution. Following Bernanke et al.
(1999) the cumulative distribution function then gives us the probability or the
rate of default. We derive the endogenous margin or loan to value ratio as a
specific function of the underlying shock distribution. This ratio measures the
net share of the housing value that goes to the lenders for repayment. This
ratio depends on the realized level of the shock, the parameters that affect the
equilibrium value of the shock, the monitoring cost of the lenders and also the
borrower’s housing stock. The implication here is that the loan to value ratio
is endogenous.
The solution to the optimization problem faced by the borrower and saver
households gives us the equilibrium steady state. We quantify the steady state
values by an appropriate calibration of the parameters. We compare and contrast
different steady state equilibrium that arises from different levels of risk. The risk
is captured by the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock. We focus on
three key variables, namely, the endogenous loan to value ratio (which also gives
the leverage ratio), the probability of defaults and house prices. In what follows,
we describe the main contributions and the results obtained from our study.
Contribution and Results. This chapter contributes to the literature in
several ways. The main contribution of this chapter is in modelling a tractable
method of analysing the impact of endogenous loan to value ratio and endoge-
nous defaults that lead to equilibrium house price bubbles. We do this by for-
mulating a borrowing contract secured by the level of housing stock held by the
borrower. Constraints on limited participation added with the presence of idiosyn-
cratic shocks mean that for a specific distribution assumption of the idiosycratic
shock, the collateral constraint can be derived endogenously. This collateral con-
straint gives us the endogenous loan to value ratio which accommodates defaults.
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The equilibrium can then be solved as a standard optimization problem. The equi-
librium conditions are solved to understand the link between house price bubbles,
collateral margins and default rates. Predominant literature in this field either
assume that margin on the collateral is exogenous or rule out defaults, see Aiya-
gari and Gertler (1999), Coen-Pirani (2005), Santos and Woodford (1997), Miao
(2014) and He et al. (2015). Furthermore, the few studies that do accommodate
both defaults and endogenous margins usually assume highly complicated theo-
retical structures in the form of heterogenous beliefs and incomplete markets, see
for example Geanakoplos (2003), Kubler and Schmedders (2012), Simsek (2013)
and Brumm et al. (2015). These models, except for the two period case, cannot
be studied analytically. Also, Models with heterogeneous beliefs (non-common
priors) have the drawback that it is more difficult to conduct a thorough welfare
analysis. It is not clear which beliefs should one assign to the social planner.
We find the following four results in this chapter. Firstly, the endogenous
loan to value ratio was found to be procyclical in nature. As the loan to value
and leverage are the same, we say that the endogenous leverage in our model is
procyclical. High leverage is observed under high house prices and low leverage
under low house prices. Secondly, low values of idiosyncratic risk of housing
generates a credit-easing effect boosting excessive borrowing resulting in a rational
price bubble in housing goods. Thirdly, high values of idiosyncratic risk causes
a credit-crunch effect tightening the borrowing constraint restricting lending and
thus lowering house prices. Fourth, the probability of default rises with declining
house prices and increased uncertainty (risk). These results thus explain the
foreclosure crisis observed after the burst of the housing bubble in the US wherein
a substantial portion of mortgages were defaulted on.
Related Literature. Our chapter is close to the subject of housing bub-
bles, endogenous mortgage defaults and endogenous collateral constraints. We
review some related papers, mainly concentrating on those set in a general equilib-
rium framework. Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Coen-Pirani (2005) and Rytchkov
(2014), are three studies that focus on the effects of collateral constraints on
equilibrium asset prices (housing). While Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) finds that
binding constraints lead to highly volatile asset prices, Coen-Pirani (2005) finds
no effect of the constraint on prices. However, both these papers assume exoge-
nous margins. Rytchkov (2014) considering a continuous time model with two
types of agents endogenizes the margin by assuming it is a function of the state
variable (consumption share) and finds that time varying margin constraints lead
to an increase in the price of the risky asset. Rythckov’s model, however, rules
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out any possibilty of default. Brumm et al. (2015) studies collateral requirements
and asset pricing with default costs and endogenous margins in a rich dynamic
context. Their results reveal that assets with different collateralizabililty possess
different returns, there exists a collateral premium in these assets prices. Their
model is much richer than ours but the approach in which they endogenize the
margins is different. They follow the theory of Geanakoplos (2003) in doing this.4
He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Santos and Woodford (1997), Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001), Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), Miao and Wang (2012)
Jose A. Scheinkman (2013) and Miao and Wang (2014) are some papers that
investigate the possibilty of bubbles arising from borrowing constraints. However,
all of these assume exogenous margins and rule out defaults.
Our chapter is also close to the literature on mortgage defaults with endoge-
nous loan to value ratios. In a recent paper, Campbell and Cocco (2015) study
the mortgage default decision using a partial equilibrium theoretical model of a
rational utility-maximizing household. They solve a dynamic model of a house-
hold that finances the purchase of a house with a mortgage, and must in each
period decide how much to consume and whether to exercise options to default,
prepay, or refinance the loan. They find that the level of negative home equity
that triggers default depends on the extent to which households are borrowing
constrained. As house prices decline, households with tightly binding borrowing
constraints will default sooner than unconstrained households, because they value
the immediate budget relief from default more highly relative to the longer-term
costs. A higher LTV ratio (smaller down payment) was found to increase the
4Stein (1995) is an early work that considered an ad-hoc endogenous loan to value ratio in a
static framework. An alternate interpretation to the margin parameter was given by Holmstrom
and Tirole (2011) who assumed non-pledgeability in that firms (as well as consumers) can count
on liquidating only part of their wealth whenever they need funds. Holmstrom and Tirole define
shortage of inside liquidity as a scenario in which internal funds (profits) generated by the firm
is not enough to meet its next period investment demands. This forces the firm to approach
an external financial intermediary such as a bank for funds. They derive key insights regarding
implications of aggregate shocks to financial market liquidity and explain underlying reasons
behind the sub-prime crises. However, pledgeable income in their work cannot be directly
compared to collateral in this chapter. Collateral can be different from pledgeable income in
many contexts. The value of the assets backing up debt is often higher than the value of debt
(the debt is over-collateralized). This may be because the underlying assets are risky and do not
protect the investor’s claim in all states of nature. Or it may be, because the value of collateral
is worth less to the investor than it is to the borrowing firm. Note that even if the collateral is
worth very little to the investor it can provide proper incentives for repayment of debt as long
as the borrower prefers to repay the debt than lose his collateral and has the means to do so.
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probability of negative home equity and mortgage default. The LTV ratios con-
sidered in this paper are exogenous and furthermore, the housing stock is fixed
and doesn’t change with time.
As far as the structure of the contract analysed in our model is concerned,
it is very close to both Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999).
The key difference from these papers is that our model analyses a mortgage con-
tract and thus the collateral is the housing stock owned by the borrowers. In this
sense, Forlati and Lambertini (2011) comes close to our paper as they too apply
the Bernanke type contract in a housing mortgage context. However, their study
focuses on monetary policy shocks and its implications to risky mortgage defaults
and is thus different from our analysis. One main difference from Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) is that the underlying contract in our model is based on the costly
state verification model of Townsend (1979). In contrast, Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) build on the work of Hart and Moore (1994) and analyze the contract-
ing in an environment in which there is ex-post renegotiation and inalienability
of human capital. The consequence of such a contract is that borrowing is so
tightly constrained by the level of the collateral that default never occurs in equi-
librium. In contrast, our framework is similar to Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) in that default is an equilibrium phenomenon.
Roadmap. This chapter is organized as follows. The following §1.2 describes
a selective review of the literature on rational bubbles, endogenous margins and fi-
nancial constraints. The subsequent §1.3 describes in detail the theoretical model
and defines the equilibrium. The results are reported in §1.4. Finally, §1.5 dis-
cusses the results and §1.6 concludes.
1.2. Literature Review
This section reviews the literature connected with the concepts explored in this
chapter. Our chapter connects endogenous margins in collateral (borrowing) con-
straints with price bubbles. Hence, this literature review starts with the im-
portant studies that connect endogenous margins with price bubbles and later
move towards the concept of a rational bubble and its formation from financial
constraints.
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1.2.1. Endogenous Margins and Asset Prices
The existing literature on endogenous margins and collateral constraints can be
split into two. One that assumes heterogeneity, incomplete markets and defaults
as in Geanakoplos (2003) and the second strand that uses the Value-at-Risk ap-
proach asin Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008). In this section, we describe briefly
the main studies in these fields.
The first major study on endogenous margins and its effect on asset prices was
by Geanakoplos (2003). He finds that variation in leverage has a huge impact on
the price of assets, contributing to economic bubbles and busts. The underlying
assumption behind the Geanakoplos model is heterogenous valuation or beliefs
and incomplete markets. Heterogenous valuations meaning that there is always
a class of buyers for whom the asset is more valuable than it is for the rest
of the public (standard economic theory, in contrast, assumes that asset prices
reflect some fundamental value). Endogenous incomplete markets can arise when
not all the assets are collateralizable.5 These buyers are willing to pay more,
perhaps because they are more optimistic, or they are more risk tolerant, or they
simply like the assets more. If they can get their hands on more money through
more highly leveraged borrowing (that is, getting a loan with less collateral),
they will spend it on the assets and drive those prices up. If they lose wealth,
or lose the ability to borrow, they will buy less, so the asset will fall into more
pessimistic hands and be valued less. In the absence of intervention, leverage
becomes too high in boom times and too low in bad times. As a result,
in boom times asset prices are too high, and in crisis times they are too low.
He calls this behaviour, the leverage cycle, see Geanakoplos (2010) Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008) and Simsek (2013) are some other studies that follow the
same path and analyse leverage cycle and Aymanns and Farmer (2015) uses an
agent based dynamic model to get quantitative results.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) builds a four period model in which the
margin is endogenously determined by financiers who try to limit their counter-
party credit risk.6 They consider three groups of agents: customers and specula-
5This is a key assumption in his model that makes the margins endogenous. See for example
Brumm et al. (2015) for a recent example.
6they do this by linking two liquidity concepts that determine the health of the asset market,
funding liquidity and market liquidity. They define market liquidity as the ease with which the
assets can be traded and funding liquidity as the ease with which investors or traders can obtain
funding. They argue that both these liquidity concepts are interrelated. They define market
liquidity as the difference between the transaction price and the fundamental value, and funding
liquidity as speculators’ scarcity (or shadow cost) of capital.
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tors who trade assets and financier’s who lend speculator’s positions. Speculators
face the constraint that the total margin on their positions xt cannot exceed their
capital Wt: ∑
j
(xj+t m
j+
t + x
j−
t m
j−
t ) ≤ Wt (1.2)
where j is an index used to identify the security, xj+t ≥ 0 and xj−t ≥ 0 are the
positive and negative parts of xjt , respectively, and m
j+
t and m
j−
t are the dollar
margins on the long and short positions respectively. Speculators borrow from
financiers who in turn set the margins such that their counterparty credit risk is
minimized. The financier makes sure that the margins are big enough to cover
their positions’ pi value at risk. For example, margins on a long positions mj+t is
set such that:
pi = Prob(−∆pjt+1 > mj+t |Ft) (1.3)
the price drops (∆pjt+1) that exceed the margin m
j+
t will only happen with a
probability pi. The probability is exogenously chosen to be a small positive num-
ber close to zero such that the financier minimizes its risk from possible defaults
by traders. The financier’s margin depends on its information set Ft. The fi-
nanciers can be either perfectly informed in the sense that they know not just
the fundamental value of the assets but also the aggregate shocks that hit the
market or be imperfectly informed in that they only observe the asset’s prices.
The deviation of the asset’s price from its fundamental value, pht − νjt , is con-
sidered as a proxy measure for the market’s illiquidity. When they assume that
financiers are completely informed, they counterfactually conclude that the mar-
gins are decreasing in times of liquidity crises. Imposing information asymmetry
between the financiers (lenders) and leveraged traders (speculators) makes the fi-
nanciers unable to distinguish between fundamental shocks from liquidity shocks
and thus tighten constraints (higher margins) producing a destabilizing effect on
asset prices.
Both these studies although different in their approach produces qualitatively
similar results. The approach of Geanakoplos (2003) finds that in a world where
agents are heterogeneous and markets incomplete, the ability to use an asset
as a collateral (i.e., buying on margin) increases its price in equilib-
rium. This happens because buying on margin makes it possible for a subset
of agents who value the asset the most to determine its price. The increase in
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price represents a deviation from the Law of One Price (LOP), since two assets
with the same payoff in all states of the world are priced differently. When assets
can be used as collateral to borrow money, their prices not only reflect future
cash flows but also their efficiency as liquidity providers. An identical result is
obtained by Adrian Shin using the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) Value at
Risk approach. Essentially, they find that the price of any asset can be decom-
posed into two parts: its payoff value and its collateral value. The payoff value
reflects the assets owner valuation of the future stream of payments, i.e. it is the
value attached to the asset due to its investment role. But assets can also be
used as collateral to borrow money. The collateral value reflects the asset owners
valuation of this second role. This can theoretically create deviations from Law
of One Price since two assets with identical payoffs can be priced differently if
they have different collateral values.
An apparent weakness in the approach of Geanakoplos is that except for highly
stylized two period versions of the model, the estimation and the results are
not analytically tractable. Also, Basak and Shapiro (2001) analysing optimal
consumption and wealth policies for a finitely lived agent finds some undesirable
results when the Value-at-Risk is embedded in the optimizing framework. In
particular, VaR risk managers incur larger losses than the non VaR counterparts
in the most adverse states of the world.
This section explained how endogenous leverage (margins) can create asset
price booms and busts. To further understand the concept of asset price move-
ments, we introduce the concept of rational bubbles. The next section describes
rational bubbles in a simple partial equilibrium framework and the following one
reviews some of the literature that investigate the role of borrowing constraints
and collateral in the creation of such bubbles in a general equilibrium framework.
1.2.2. Rational Bubbles
One of the first theoretical studies on rational bubbles was by Blanchard (1979)
and Blanchard and Watson (1982a). Blanchard and Watson (1982a) using a
partial equilibrium model finds that rationality of behaviour and expectations
does not always imply that the market price of an asset be equal to its fundamental
value. There can be rational deviations, in other words bubbles.
Blanchard and Watson characterize such a rational bubble using the efficient-
market or the no arbitrage condition between stocks and a riskless asset. Let pt
be the price of a stock, dt be the dividend, and r be the rate of return on the
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riskless assumed, constant over time. Then if risk neutral individuals arbitrage
between stocks and the riskless asset, the expected rate of return on the stock,
which is equal to the expected rate of capital gain plus the dividend-price ratio,
must equal the riskless rate:
E[pt+1|It]− pt]
pt
+
dt
pt
= r (1.4)
or by reorganizing
pt = aE[pt+1|It] + adt, where a = 1
1 + r
< 1 (1.5)
The coefficient a is the one-period discount factor and is less than one as long
as long as the interest rate is positive: the price today depends on the expected
price tomorrow but by less than one for one.
The linear difference equation (1.5) can be solved recursively by repeated
substitution relying on the law of iterated expectations.7 Solving the equation
recursively up to time period T , we can arrive at many solutions depending on
whether the transversality condition holds or not. The first solution is written as
p∗t =
∞∑
i=0
ai+1E[dt+i|It] if lim
T→∞
aT+1E[pt+T+1|It] = 0, (1.6)
says that the price of the stock is the present discounted value of expected future
dividends, the fundamentals. When the transversality condition do not hold,
many other solutions are possible. One such solution can be written as
pt = p
∗
t + bt, E[bt+1|It] = a−1bt (1.7)
7The law of iterated expectations states that if Ω is an information set and ω is a subset of
this information set, then for any variable x,
E[E[x|Ω]|ω] = E[x|ω]
or, heuristically, if one has rational expectations and is asked how she would revise her expec-
tation were she given more information, the answer must be that she is as likely to revise it up
or down so that on average the revision wil be equal to zero. Applied to the information set It
this implies in particular that
E[E[p|It+1]|It] = E[p|It]
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where p∗t is the solution from eq. (1.6). As long as E[bt+1|It] = a−1bt, equation
(1.7) is also a solution to the linear difference equation (1.5). Since a is less than
one, bt explodes in expected value, lim
i→∞
E[bt+i|It] = a−1bt → +∞ if bt > 0 and
−∞ if bt < 0. As long as the process bt 6= 0, the price of the stock will rationally
deviate from its fundamentals. for this reason, Blanchard and Watson (1982a),
calls bt a rational bubble. Empirical testing for the possibilty of these bubbles were
justified by Shiller (1983) and later West (1988). The theory of rational bubbles
literature in a general equilibrium framework is extensive. It is beyond the scope
of this chapter to review this. We provide a section in the Appendix that surveys
some of the important works. The rational bubbles that we study in this chapter
arises from borrowing constraints, these are essentially credit driven bubbles. In
the next section we detail some of the studies in this area.
1.2.3. Rational Bubbles and Borrowing Constraints
Ever since the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), recent papers in the rational bubble literature have incorporated fi-
nancial constraints, specifically borrowing constraints in different forms, see Brun-
nermeier et al. (2012) and Miao (2014) for surveys of the rational bubble literature.
Borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival
and thus the general economy. Such constraints may arise in connection to the
financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs,
like those needed to survive a recession, see Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).
We give some examples of such constraints, their implications to asset prices and
limitations.
Suppose that an entrepreneur has an investment technology that produces one
unit of output using one unit of investment. The entrepreneur can finance the
investment It by his endowment wt, one-period debt bt, and a bubble asset Bt. A
bubble asset is an asset that is intrinsically worthless but grows at the rate of the
interest, see eq.(1.7). The debt has to be repaid the next period with interest.
Furthermore, the lenders (such as banks) impose a borrowing constraint on the
entrepreneur
(1 + rt+1)bt ≤ λIt, λ ∈ (0, 1) (1.8)
where rt+1 is the one period interest rate from time t to t + 1. This constraint
says that the debt repayment in period t + 1 is limited by a fraction λ of the
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investment return It because the entrepreneur can only pledge this amount as
collateral. Farhi and Tirole (2011) finds that in this case the investment satisfies
It =
Bt + wt
1− λ/(1 + rt+1) (1.9)
This equation says that the presence of a bubble Bt > 0 essentially raises the
entrepreneur’s net worth and hence investment. Thus bubbles can crowd in
investment, rather than crowd out investment as in Diamond (1965) and Ti-
role (1985). Kocherlakota (2009) study another type of borrowing constraint.
Kocherlakota examine a model economy in which capital re-allocation is critical.
This re-allocation is accomplished via collateralized lending backed by land. How-
ever, land is scarce and so all entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints that bind
infinitely often into the future. this constraint can be written as
(1 + rt+1)bt ≤ Pt+1Lt (1.10)
where Pt+1 is the land price in period t + 1 and Lt represents the land holdings
chosen in period t. These two ingredients imply that equilibrium bubbles nat-
urally emerge in the price of land, the collateral. The resulting bubbles
expand entrepreneurial borrowing capacity and generate more output, consump-
tion, and welfare.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) consider a downpayment constraint given by:
bt ≤ ψPtLt, ψ ∈ (0, 1) (1.11)
where PtLt represents the date t purchase price of the land and the fraction 1−ψ
of the purchase value must be paid by the entrepreneur’s net worth. As land is
considered as an asset with no intrinsic value, this means that in the absence of
a bubble Pt = 0 and hence there is no collateral for borrowing. The presence of a
bubble in land prices makes Pt > 0 and thus the upper bound on the constraint
gets relaxed. This is called the ”credit easing” effect of bubbles. The bubble
can help solve the collateral shortage problem. The movements of the bubble in
land affect the borrowing capacity directly and thereby investments. One of the
results we get in our analysis in this chapter is that once we endogenize the
margin (ψ here) the credit easing effect creates the bubble and not the other way.
A higher margin relaxes the liquidity shortage faced by the borrower.
In general, most of the literature that use financial constraints assume that it
is of the form:
Loant ≤ ξ.Collateralt (1.12)
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meaning that the borrower can borrow up to a proportion ξ ∈ (0, 1) of the value
of the collateral. The critical assumption here is that this parameter ξ, also
called the pledgeability parameter (or the downpayment rate) is exogenous. The
implication is that changes in financial conditions do not affect the level of the
margin which is an unrealistic assumption. Some other papers in the literature
that use such constraints include Santos and Woodford (1997), Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001), Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), Miao et al. (2015), Miao
and Wang (2012), Martin and Ventura (2012), Jose A. Scheinkman (2013) and
Miao and Wang (2014).
Unlike the studies reviewed in this section, our model derives endogenous
margins on collateral constraints (loan to value ratio), allows for defaults and
price bubbles arise in equilibrium. As the underlying model and the plans and
actions of all the agents are consistent with rational expectations, we call these
bubbles as rational bubbles. Now that we have reviewed the relevant literature,
we proceed to a detailed description of our theoretical model.
1.3. A Model of Endogenous Collateral and
House Prices
Our model is built on a standard endowment economy asset pricing framework
such as Lucas Jr. (1978) and Zhang (1997). It features a discrete time, infinite
horizon economy with uncertainty. Time is denoted by t = 0, 1, 2 . . .∞ and con-
tinues forever. There is no production in the economy. The economy is populated
with two types of households. One type of these households are called ”Borrow-
ers” and the second type are called as ”Savers”. We assume that these two types
of households differ in their discount rates. This is inspired from several housing
models in the literatures such as Iacoviello (2005), Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) and Forlati and Lambertini (2011). Households with high discount
rates are patient and hence called ”Savers” and households with low discount
rates value current consumption more than future consumption and are hence
called ”Borrowers”. All the households in a group are identical, in other words,
our model has a representative borrower and a representative saver. Households
who are impatient will borrow from households who are patient to smooth their
consumption over time. Instead of assuming an exogenous borrowing constraint
we derive it endogenously by explicitly modelling a one period mortgage contract
between Savers (the Lenders) and Borrowers.
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Following Iacoviello (2004) we assume that both the agents receive in each
period some exogenous perishable endowment given by Yt. They have preferences
defined over only the durable housing. Aggregate housing is normalized to some
constant and is in constant supply. However, shifts in housing demand across the
two groups will affect housing prices as well as the allocation of housing between
the borrowing and saving households.
1.3.1. Borrowers
We start with describing the preferences and constraints for the Borrower house-
holds. The discount factor for these Borrowing households denoted by β is lower
than that of Savers, γ, that is β < γ.
The objective of the Borrowers is to maximize the following expected dis-
counted utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(HBt+1), 0 < β < 1, (1.13)
where E0 is the expectations formed at time zero, β is the household’s subjective
discount factor and U(HBt+1) is an utility function which has its arguments the
durable (housing) services denoted as Ht+1. Here we have assumed that the agent
gets utility only from his stock of durable goods, housing, and does not value non
durable consumption. This is primarily to maintain reasonable tractability in our
analysis. With this simplification we can directly analyse the price of housing
coming from the financial variables which we model later. It is assumed that the
housing services that is carried over to period t (alternatively beginning of period
t) are equal to Ht+1, see Forlati and Lambertini (2011). We assume that the
utility function U(.) is continuous, concave and strictly increasing. We use the
superscript B to differentiate the borrower type households from savers. We have
included housing as part of the household’s utility function so that housing is not
just an investment asset but also provides valuable utility services.
Following Cocco (2004) we define the utility function for the borrower house-
holds,
U(HBt+1) =
(HBt+1)
1−σ
1− σ (1.14)
as being a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) functional form where as
usual σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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We assume that the stock of housing depreciates at the rate δ > 0 every period
and that the services derived from the house is quantitatively equivalent to its
stock. At time t, the Borrowers face the following budget constraint:
PHt H
B
t+1 + [1− Ft(ωt)](1 +RZ,t)LBt = LBt+1 + Y Bt + (1− δ)[1−Gt(ωt)]PHt HBt
(1.15)
The left hand side of this equation (1.15) gives the financial expenses incurred by
the household at time t. This includes the total value of housing stock chosen at
time t, PHt H
B
t+1, where Ht+1 is the total units of housing and P
H
t is the price of
one unit of housing; and also payments on loans taken at period t− 1 that have
to repaid now [1 − Ft(ωt)](1 + RZ,t)LBt . This loan repayment is the product of
three components: the state contingent interest rate charged on the loans given
by RZ,t; the total amount of loans taken at time t − 1, LBt ; and also a fraction
[1− Ft(ωt)]. To understand what this fraction means, we reiterate the argument
that our model generates endogenous defaults in equilibrium. This means that
not all the loans taken by the borrowers will be repaid. Some of it is defaulted.
The value [1−Ft(ωt)] indicates the fraction of loans that is repaid to lenders. The
intuition behind this specific formulation and its construction will be explained
later on.
The right hand side of the budget constraint (1.15) gives the total income
available for the borrower households at time t. This includes the loans taken
at time t, LBt+1; the endowment income Y
B
t and net housing value carried over
from period t− 1, (1− δ)[1−Gt(ωt)]PHt HBt where δ > 0 is the depreciation rate
on housing stock. The value [1 − Gt(ωt)] is a fraction which indicates the left
over stock of housing after the borrower’s default in period t− 1. Naturally, the
term Gt(ωt) indicates the fraction of the stock of Borrower’s housing that was
captured or seized by the lenders (Savers) as a consequence of default in period
t − 1. The interpretation and construction of ω, F (.) and G(.) and the terms of
the one period mortgage contract are explained in the following paragraphs. For
the specification of the contract, we follow Bernanke et al. (1999) and Forlati and
Lambertini (2011).
We assume that each household consists of many members. The choice of
housing investment Ht+1 and state contingent interest rates on the loans next
period depend on the contractual agreement of a representative member with the
lender. Each member of the household, denoted by i, receives equal resources to
purchase housing stock HBi,t+1. The total housing stock for the Borrowers would
be then
∫
i
HBi,t+1di = H
B
t+1. The ith member finalizes the mortgage contract
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relating to the housing stock HBi,t+1. All the members in the household are ex-
ante identical. Once the loan contract is agreed, the ith member experiences an
idiosyncratic shock ωit+1 to his level of housing stock H
B
i,t+1. The ex-post housing
value for this member is given by ωit+1P
H
t+1H
B
i,t+1. The implication here is that
investments in housing is risky. The underlying mechanism behind the results in
this chapter rely on constraints formed from the mortgage contract between the
borrower and the lender.
The timing of this contract and the actions of each agents can be written as
follows:
1. At time t, the Borrower household assigns an equal amount of resources to
each of its i members.
2. These members purchase housing stock HBi,t+1 following the instructions
of the household and manages it. The purchase of new housing stock is
financed by a one period mortgage contract with a lender. The borrower
receives a loan Lt+1.
3. Once the contract is agreed, this household member experiences an idiosyn-
cratic shock ωit+1 on his stock of housing.
4. At time t+1, the lender pays a monitoring cost characterized by a proportion
µ of the stock of the borrower’s housing value. This monitoring cost ensures
that the borrower will truthfully reveal his realized value of the shock.
5. The interest rate charged on the borrowers are now set so that it is state
contingent (on the realised shock), RZ,t+1.
6. The household member chooses its decision to default based on the ex-post
realization of the shock on his housing value, ωit+1(1− δ)PHt+1HBt+1 vis-a-vis
the gross repayment to lenders, (1 +RZ,t+1)L
B
t+1.
7. If the member defaults, he loses his pledged collateral (the stock of housing).
As in related contracting models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke
et al. (1996), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) we as-
sume that the random variable wit+1 is independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) across members of the same household and log-normally distributed with
a cumulative distribution function Ft+1(ω
i
t+1). The mean and variance of lnω
i
t+1
are deliberately chosen in a way that the Et(w
i
t+1) = 1 for every time period
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t. The key implication here is that although there are idiosyncratic shocks for
the household members, the household in itself does not experience any risk,
Et(ω
i
t+1H
B
i,t+1) = H
B
t+1. This important assumption will ensure that we do not
need to keep track of each household’s distribution of housing stocks across time
and helps in making our model analytically tractable. Alternatively, we could
assume shock not to individuals but to each households which is qualitatively
similar to the Bewley (1987)-Aiyagari (1994) type models and would require the
employment of numerical analysis.
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the idiosyncratic shocks, Ft+1, is continuous and at least once differentiable.
Furthermore, the hazard rate of the shock satisfies the following constaint
∂ωh(ω)
∂ω
> 0, (1.16)
where h(ω) = ∂F (ω)
1−F (ω) is the hazard rate. The log normal distribution we assumed
for the shock satisfies this restriction and is thus the primary motivation behind
its use here. However, unlike the Bernanke et al. (1999) contract, we assume that
housing investment riskiness can change over time. In other words, the cumulative
distribution function of the shocks Ft+1(ω
i
t+1) is time variant. We achieve this by
letting the standard deviation σω,t of lnωt to follow an exogenous time varying
process.
Once the idiosyncratic shocks are realized, the household member decides
whether to repay his mortgage or default. If the member experiences good (high)
realizations of shocks, he will repay the loan. However, if he faces bad (very low)
shock realizations, he will find it optimal to default on his loans. The implication
here is that the choice of default depends on the realized value of the shock
ωt+1. It is then natural to assume a cutoff or threshold value of the shock
ωt+1 that will make the household indifferent between defaulting and
non-defaulting . Ever since the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
several others have used this insight to analyse endogenous defaults in equilibrium:
Arellano (2008), Mendoza and Yue (2012) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012)
are some examples of sovereign defaults.
The threshold value of the shock ωt+1 is defined by
8
ωt+1(1− δ)PHt+1HBt+1 = (1 +RZ,t+1)LBt+1 (1.17)
8This constraint can be considered as the housing equivalent of the Bernanke et al. (1999)
constraint, see eq. (3.3) in their paper, imposed on borrowing firms. In their model, the
borrowing firm pledges its capital as a collateral.
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This can be considered as a no-default condition for the borrowers. The left hand
side of this eq. (1.17) indicates the ex-post value of the collateral, that is, the
value of the house after the shock has been realized. We have multiplied with
(1 − δ) in order to capture the depreciation that the house experiences between
the time periods. The right hand side shows us the gross payment the borrower
pays to the lender. The level of loans chosen at period t is given by Lt+1 and the
gross interest on borrowing is (1 + RZ,t+1). As we said before, the interest rate
on borrowing is state contingent and set only after the state of nature, the shock
has been realized.
From eq. (1.17) we can infer that when the realized shock falls at or above this
threshold value ωit+1 ≥ ωt+1, that is if ωit+1 ∈ [ωt+1,∞], the borrower will repay
his loans. If on the other hand the realized shock falls below the threshold value
ωit+1 < ωt+1, that is if ω
i
t+1 ∈ [0, ωt+1), the borrower will find it optimal to default
on his loans. In other words, the choice of default depends on the idiosyncratic
shock realization.
Bernanke et al. (1999) derives eq. (1.17) from an optimal contract between
borrowers and lenders in a costly state verification framework, first analyzed by
Townsend (1979). In our context, the agency cost means that lenders do not
observe the realized shock on the housing stocks faced by the borrowers. There-
fore, the lender pays a monitoring cost that will induce the borrower to truthfully
reveal his shock. The presence of monitoing costs thus removes the informational
asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Before we detail the monitoring cost and
its specification we discuss the costs of default to the borrowers.
In our model as in Campbell and Cocco (2015), the loans are nonrecourse.
This means that although the loans (or mortgages) are secured by pledging the
collateral (house), there is a restriction to the amount that can be collected by the
lender in case the borrower defaults. In case of defaults, the household members
lose their housing stocks to lenders. Nonrecourse loans means that the borrowers
cannot be held personally liable for any differences that may arise between this
collateral value and the actual loans that were given. The lender cannot force the
borrower to pay from his future income. As loans in our model are essentially
mortgages on houses, the assumption of non recourse debt is empirically consis-
tent. For example, Crowe et al. (2013) says that non recourse debt explains the
reality of subprime mortgage delinquencies which were at the core of the 2007-09
financial crises. Now that we have explained the cost of defaults to the borrowers,
we proceed to the monitoring cost charged by the lenders.
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Bernanke et al. (1999) assumes that the monitoring cost is equal to a fraction
µ of the realized gross payoff to the defaulting firm’s capital. We follow them
and assume that the cost charged by the borrower is equal to a fraction of the
housing value, µωit+1P
H
t Ht+1. The implication of this cost is that defaults causes
a decline in the stock of housing and thus its services. In other words, the attempt
to monitor the project results in the destruction of µωit+1P
H
t Ht+1 level of housing
wealth, see Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
As far as the defaulting members of the household are concerned, we follow
Forlati and Lambertini (2011) and assume that there is perfect risk sharing among
household members so that consumption of non-durable housing goods and ser-
vices are ex-post identical across all the members of the Borrower household. This
means that Borrower household members are ex-post identical.
Now that we have explained the costs, benefits and actions of the borrowers
in the contract we move on to the Lenders. For the contract to be feasible, the
lenders need some incentive to participate. In the contract theory literature, this
is explained using a participation constraint. The incentive for the lender in this
contract is that they are guaranteed a pre-determined rate of return on the loans
given. At time t the lenders make total loans Lt+1 to Borrowers and demand
the gross rate of return (1 + RL,t). This rate of return is predetermined at t and
non-state contingent. Hence, the time t participation constraint of lenders can be
written as:
(1 +RL,t)L
B
t+1 =
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δ)PHt+1HBt+1ft+1(ω)dω
+
∫ ∞
ωt+1
(1 +RZ,t+1)L
B
t+1ft+1(ω)dω (1.18)
where ft(ω) is the probability density function of ω, which is time variant. The
return on total loans, (1 +RL,t)L
B
t+1, supplied by the lenders is equal to the sum
of two terms. The first term indicates the housing stock adjusted for monitor-
ing costs and depreciation of defaulting Borrower members,
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1(1−µ)(1−
δ)PHt+1H
B
t+1ft+1(ω)dω. The second term shows the repayment of non-defaulting
members,
∫∞
ωt+1
(1 + RZ,t+1)L
B
t+1ft+1(ω)dω. After idiosyncratic shocks have real-
ized, the threshold value ωt+1 and the state-contingent mortgage rate RZ,t+1 are
determined so as to satisfy the participation constraint above. It is important
to note here that the participation constraint holds state-by-state and not in ex-
pected terms. This means that an aggregate state that raises ωt+1 and the rate of
default on mortgages generates an increase in the adjustable rate RZ,t+1 paid by
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non-defaulting members in order to satisfy the participation constraint eq. (1.18)
in that state. This implies that periods characterized by rising default rates are
also accompanied by rising interest rates in our model.
For convenience, we express the expected value of the idiosyncratic shock
conditional on the shock being less than or equal to the threshold value ωt+1 as,
Gt+1(ωt+1) =
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1ft+1(ω)dω (1.19)
where Gt+1 is the expected value, ωt+1 is the shock and the rest
∫ ωt+1
0
ft+1(ω)dω
indicates the probability of default which is nothing but the cumulative distri-
bution function in the interval [0, ωt+1]. Furthermore, we express the expected
share of the housing value that goes to the lenders gross of the monitoring costs
as,
Γt+1(ωt+1) = ωt+1
∫ ∞
ωt+1
ft+1(ω)dω +Gt+1(ωt+1) (1.20)
Now we can rewrite the lender’s participation constraint eq. (1.18) more com-
pactly by substituting in eq. (1.19) and eq. (1.20) as:
(1 +RL,t)L
B
t+1 = [Γt+1(ωt+1)− µGt+1(ωt+1)](1− δ)PHt+1HBt+1 (1.21)
As this participation constraint of lenders arises out of a secured loan agreement
between the lenders and the borrowers, it resembles the standard aggregate col-
lateral constraints derived in models with Kiyotaki-Moore-like financial frictions.
We can interpret the term
[Γt+1(ωt+1)− µGt+1(ωt+1)] (1.22)
as the endogenous loan to value ratio or the endogenous margin or
as the endogenous collateral pledgeable parameter . This is the variable
ψ that we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, see eq. (1.1). This
parameter for us, unlike most of the related literature (see Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Miao and Wang (2012) for example)
is not a constant but an endogenous variable. It depends on several parameters
such as the monitoring cost µ, the variance of the idiosyncratic shock to housing
investment σ2ω,t, the parameters affecting the equilibrium value of the shock, and
also the Borrowers’ housing stock (the asset that is collateralized).9 As far as
9It has to be noted here that the monitoring cost is not the parameter µ, but µ of the housing
value which means that as the housing value changes so will the monitoring cost.
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the lenders are concerned, this endogenous Loan to Value ratio measures the net
share of the housing value that he will receive as repayment in case the borrower
defaults. It is important to note here that this ratio talks about the share of the
collateral and usually lies in the interval [0, 1].
If the borrower decides to default at time t, they are left with an amount of
housing stock given by,∫ ∞
ωt+1
ωt+1(1− δ)PHt Ht+1ft+1(ω)dω = [1−Gt+1(ωt+1)](1− δ)PHt Ht+1 (1.23)
where we have used the assumption that Et(ωt+1) = 1. We used the right hand
side term in the borrowers budget constraint. We substitute the value of RZ,t+1
from eq. (1.18) in the Borrowers budget constraint and rewrite this constraint in
the form,
PHt H
B
t+1 + (1 +RL,t−1)L
B
t = L
B
t+1 + Y
B
t + (1− δ)[1− µGt(ωt)]PHt HBt (1.24)
Now that we have all the relevant equations for the Borrower type. We can
proceed to its optimization problem. The optimization problem for the Borrower
households involves maximizing their intertemporal utility eq. (1.13) subject to
the budget constraint eq. (1.24) and the participation constraint eq. (1.21). The
choice variables are the stock of housing HBt+1, the loans L
B
t+1 and the threshold
level of idiosyncratic shock ωt+1. We solve this by formulating a Lagrangian of
the form:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
U(HBt+1) + λBC,t
(
LBt+1 + Y
B
t + (1− δ)[1− µGt(ωt)]PHt HBt
−PHt HBt+1 − (1 +RL,t−1)LBt
)
+ λPC,t
(
[Γt+1(ωt+1)− µGt+1(ωt+1)](1− δ)PHt+1HBt+1
−(1 +RL,t)LBt+1
)}
(1.25)
where λBC,t and λPC,t+1 are the Lagrangian multipliers on the borrowing con-
straint and the participation constraint respectively. For maximization, we take
the first order conditions (F.O.C) with respect to the choice variables.
The F.O.C’s with respect to the choice variables are given by,
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∂L
∂HBt+1
= U ′HBt+1 − λBC,tP
H
t + β(1− δ)Et
{
[1− µGt+1(ωt+1)]PHt+1λBC,t+1
+λPC,t+1P
H
t+1[Γt+1(ωt+1)− µGt+1(ωt+1)]
}
= 0 (1.26)
∂L
∂LBt+1
= λBC,t − (1 +RL,t)Et
[
βλBC,t+1 + λPC,t+1
]
= 0 (1.27)
∂L
∂ωt+1
= −βλBC,t+1µG′t+1(ωt+1) + λPC,t+1
[
Γ′t+1(ωt+1)− µG′t+1(ωt+1)
]
= 0.
(1.28)
Here U ′
HBt+1
is the derivative of the utility function with respect to housing stock.
We cannot put expectations on the first order condition with respect to ωt+1 as
this equation will hold only state by state.
In this section, we started with specifying the preferences and constraints for
the borrower households and derived an endogenous margin or loan to value ratio
from a participation constraint of the lenders who agree to a one period mortgage
contract with the borrowers. We then stated the optimization problem faced by
the borrowers and derived the first order conditions for maximization. In the next
section, we describe the problem faced by the saver households.
1.3.2. Savers
As we described in the introduction of this model, the second type of households
called ”Savers” are characterized by their high discount factors. These households
are patient and act as lenders to the Borrower type of households. They maximize
the expected discounted value of future utilities where the preferences are defined
over both non-durable goods and durable housing services. We use the supercript
S to differentiate the variables of savers from that of borrowers. The lifetime
expected discounted utility for the savers is given by,
E0
∞∑
t=0
γtU(HSt+1), 0 < β < γ < 1, (1.29)
where E0 is the expectations formed at time zero, γ is the household’s subjective
discount factor and U(HSt+1) is the utility function which has its argument the
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durable (housing) services denoted as HSt+1. Savers just like borrowers receive an
endowment given by Y St . We assume that the utility function U(.) is continuous,
concave and strictly increasing. As before, housing is part of their utility function
so that this durable good is not just an investment asset but also provides valuable
utility services.
We define the utility function for the savers households similar to the borrow-
ers,
U(HSt+1) =
(HSt+1)
1−σ
1− σ (1.30)
as being composed of only the durable housing good. As before, σ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion which is the sames as that of borrowers implying that the
heterogeneity in our economy comes only from the discount factor. As in the
borrowers, we assume that the stock of housing depreciates at the same rate
δ > 0 every period. At time t, the savers face the following budget constraint:
PHt H
S
t+1 + L
S
t+1 = Y
S
t + (1− δ)PHt HSt + (1 +RL,t−1)LSt . (1.31)
The interpretation of these variables are the same as those of borrowers. The left
hand side of this constraint shows the financial expenses incurred and the right
hand side indicates the total income that the household holds at time t.
The optimization problem for the saver households involves maximizing the
utility function eq. (1.29) subject to their budget constraint eq. (1.31) with
respect to the two choice variables: housing stock HSt+1 and loans L
S
t+1. We write
the associated Lagrangian as follows:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
γt
{
U(HSt+1) + λ
S
BC,t
(
Y St + (1− δ)PHt HSt + (1 +RL,t−1)LSt
−PHt HSt+1 − LSt+1
)}
(1.32)
where λSBC,t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the savers budget constraint. The
first order conditions with respect to the choice variables can be written as,
∂L
∂HSt+1
= U ′HSt+1 − λ
S
BC,tP
H
t + γ(1− δ)Et[λSBC,t+1PHt+1] = 0 (1.33)
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∂L
∂LSt+1
= −λSBC,t + γ(1 +RL,t)Et[λSBC,t+1] = 0 (1.34)
Now that we have described the actions and problems of both the agents in
the economy, we proceed to the definition of equilibrium.
1.3.3. The Equilibrium
The following definition characterizes the equilibrium in our economy.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium for our endowment economy is a set of alloca-
tions, namely,
{Hjt , Hjt+1, Ljt , Ljt+1}, where j = B, S. (1.35)
such that
1. Each Borrower household in the economy maximizes its expected discounted
lifetime utility subject to a stream of budget constraints and borrowing con-
straints summarized by equations (1.26,1.27 and 1.28).
2. Each Saver household in the economy maximizes its expected discounted
lifetime utility subject to a stream of budget constraints summarized by the
equations (1.33 and 1.34);
3. For each state of the world, the commodity markets clears:
Y St + Y
B
t =
(
HBt+1 − (1− δ)[1− µGt(ωt)]HBt
)
+
(
HSt+1 − (1− δ)HSt
)
(1.36)
which says that the aggregate endowment in the economy is equal to the con-
sumption of durable goods by the borrowing households plus the consumption
of durable goods by the savers households. The consumption of durable hous-
ing at time period t is given by the net accumulation obtained by subtracting
the initial stock of housing with the end of period housing stocks. These
variables are given in the left and right hand sides of the households budget
constraints eq. (1.24) and eq. (1.31), respectively. This equation takes into
account the fact that a fraction of borrower’s housing stock proportional to
the monitoring costs µGt(ωt) paid by the savers is effectively lost due to de-
fault. Thus, the net accumulation of housing accounts for both depreciation
and defaults.
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4. For each state of the world, the credit market clears:
LBt = L
S
t (1.37)
which says that the net supply of loans is zero.
1.4. Results
To solve for the equilibrium results, we first need functional forms for the fraction
of housing stock lost in case of defaults Gt+1(ωt+1) and the expected share of
housing value obtained by the lenders, Γt+1(ωt+1). This would come from the
distributional assumption on the idiosyncratic shock ωt+1. We follow Bernanke
et al. (1999) and assume that the shock follows a log normal distribution given
by,
ln(ωt+1) ∼ N(−
σ2ω,t+1
2
, σ2ω,t+1) (1.38)
where −σ2ω,t+1
2
is the mean of the distribution denoted by µω,t+1 and σ
2
ω,t+1 is the
variance of the distribution set such that Et(ωt+1) = 1.
10 Also, to make housing
investments risky we assume that σω,t+1 = σω + ω,t+1 where the error process
ω,t+1 is an AR(1) innovation given by:
ω,t+1 = ρωω,t + et+1 (1.39)
where ρω is the persistence of the innovation and et+1 is assumed to be a white
noise process. This implies that the distribution functions G(.) and Γ(.) can be
written as follows:
Gt+1(ωt+1) =
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1ft+1(ω)dω
= exp
(
µω,t+1 +
σ2ω,t+1
2
)[1
2
+
1
2
erf
( ln(ωt+1)− (µω,t+1 + σ2ω,t+1)√
2σω,t+1
)]
(1.40)
10For a random variable X that follows the log normal distribution, the expected value is
given as, E(X) = exp(mean+ variance/2). Substituting values for the mean and the variance
we can show that E(X) = 1.
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Γt+1(ωt+1) = ωt+1
∫ ∞
ωt+1
ft+1(ω)dω +Gt+1(ωt+1)
=
ωt+1
2
(
1− erf( ln(ωt+1)− µω,t+1√
2σω,t+1
))
(1.41)
where as we explained in the modelling section f(.) is the probability distribu-
tion function and erf is the Gaussian error function. We calibrate the constant
standard deviation of the shock σω to estimate the above equations (1.40) and
(1.41). The optimal endogenous leverage which is one of the key variables in our
model is then obtained by these equations and the equilibrium conditions. Now
that we have specified all the necessary equations, we proceed to calibrating our
parameters.
The parameters values for our benchmark calibration are reported in Table
1.1. We follow Monacelli (2009) in choosing the values for the discount factors
for Borrowers and Savers and the rate of depreciation for housing. The Saver’s
discount factor γ is set equal to 0.99 and Borrower’s β is set equal to 0.98. We
choose an annual depreciation rate for housing of 4 percentage points, implying
that the parameter δ = 0.01. The Saver discount factor pins down the steady-
state interest rate at RL = 0.0101 (
1
1+RL
= γ) on a quarterly basis. This implies
an annual interest rate equal of 4.1 percentage points.
Furthermore, following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) we set the standard de-
viation of idiosyncratic shock, σω = 0.2 and the persistence of this time varying
volatility, ρω = 0.983. This implies that the shocks to the mortgage are highly
persistent as is suggested by Campbell and Cocco (2015). We assume that the
monitoring cost to be 12% of the house value consistent with other literature that
have analysed the housing market in the United States, see Cagan (2006). Fi-
nally, the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the borrower and saver household
preference is set to 2 following Cocco (2004) and the endowment income for the
borrower and saver households are fixed at Y B = Y S = 50. There are no specific
reasons for this endowment value, other values will produce qualitatively the same
results
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Table 1.1. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion σ 2
Discount Factor of Borrower Households β 0.98
Discount Factor of Saver Households γ 0.99
Depreciation Rate of Housing Stock δ 0.01
Standard deviation of Idiosyncratic Shocks σω 0.20
Monitoring Cost Proportion µ 0.12
Persistence of Idiosyncratic Shocks ρω 0.983
Endowment of Borrowers Y B 50
Endowment of Savers Y S 50
Notes: This table reports the calibrated parameters for the benchmark
model.
We have now specified the equilibrium characterizing equations and calibrated
the parameters of the model. We proceed to estimate the steady state values
for the three key variables in our model, the endogenous Loan to Value Ratio
(LTV), the probability of default or the rate of default given by the cumulative
distribution function F (.) for an optimal shock ω and the housing price, PH .
In principle, we can report the values for the stock of housing, leverage finance
premium, loans etc. However, we concentrate only on the dynamics between
the endogenous loan margin (LTV), the leverage ratio, default rates and house
prices. To understand these dynamics we find steady state value for all the three
variables under different values of the standard deviation σω of the idiosyncratic
uncertainty shock. These steady state values are reported in Table 1.2.
The first column in Table 1.2 describes the variables and the second to the
fourth columns, the corresponding steady state values. Each column indicates
a particular assumed value for the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock
and the resulting steady state values. Hence, each column represents an
equilibrium (steady state). We will infer about bubble behaviour in house prices
by comparing these equilibria. The endogenous loan to value ratio is defined in
eq. (1.22). For an optimal shock ω, we can obtain this ratio by considering the
functional forms of F (.) and G(.) from eq.’s (1.40) and ((1.41)). Default rates are
nothing but the cumulative distribution function F (.). House prices are obtained
by solving the first order conditions reported in the equilibrium definition.
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Table 1.2. Steady State House Price, LTV and Default Rate
Steady State Values
Variable σω = 0 σω = 0.2 σω = 0.4 σω = 0.8
Loan to Value Ratio 55.21% 47.18% 30.25% 19.18%
Leverage Ratio 2.23 1.89 1.433 1.237
Housing Price 4.01 3.11 2.99 2.10
Default Rate 0% 3.5% 8.7% 15%
Notes: This table reports the steady state values for the endogenous loan to value ratio,
house price and the probability of default (default rate) for different values of σω. The
second column with σω = 0.2 corresponds is the benchmark calibration given in Table
1.1. Both the loan to value ratio and the default rate are expressed in percentages. The
leverage ratio is given by 1
1−LTV where LTV is the loan to value ratio. Housing price is
normalized by the aggregate endowment.
A direct result we can infer from Table 1.2 is that as σω increases the endoge-
nous loan to value ratio decreases and the default rate increases. As we described
earlier, a higher standard deviation of the shock does not change the mean of our
distribution (by construction), that is Et(ωt+1) = 1. This means that any changes
in the uncertainty can be called as a mean preserving spread of the distribution
F (.). Consequently, a rise in the standard deviation will keep the mean unchanged
but will increase the skewness of the distribution of ωt. As we followed Bernanke
et al. (1999) and assumed a log-normal distribution, this means that F (.) cannot
take negative values implying that an increased skewness will result in the lower
tail of the distribution becoming thicker. A thicker tail will hence imply a higher
cumulative distribution function which of course means a higher rate of defaults
on mortgages. In the presence of high mortgage defaults, the share of housing
value (collateral) that the lender will receive will go down, that is the loan to
value ratio will decline, see eq. (1.22).
A higher mortgage risk first impacts adversely the financial condition of the
borrowers. The now worse borrower members of the household will default on
their loans and lose the housing stock which was put up as collateral. In addition,
as the loan to value ratio declines, the borrowers now experience a tightening in
their credit arrangement. This reduces the capacity of the borrowers to take loans
out of their stock of housing. Thus, the fact that the loan to value ratio is
endogenous means that the effect of uncertainty is multiplied. Higher
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uncertainty now influences the economy through two channels, the collateralized
asset and the endogenous margin (loan to value ratio).
We now examine the changes to the house prices. It is observable that there
is a steady decline in house prices with increasing idiosyncratic risk. The first
column reports results for the no shock case, σω = 0. This means that the
borrowers now face no risk to their housing investments. The steady state house
price (normalized by endowment) is found to be 4.01. With no risks to holding
housing goods, there is an increased demand for housing. The fact that the Loan
to Value ratio is very high, 55.1%, means that household borrower members can
take bigger loans to finance their investments in housing. Naturally, the price
of the house would then be high. Thus, there is a “credit-easing” effect.
Relaxed borrowing conditions induce high asset prices. We call this steady state
equilibrium as a Bubbly Equilibrium. This bubbly equilibrium is consistent
with rational expectations but is driven by credit, hence the type of bubbles we
find here are similar to the credit driven rational bubbles studied by Miao and
Wang (2012). This credit easing effect works purely because the loan to value
ratio here is endogenous. A fixed ratio would produce no such effects in the
absence of any uncertainty.
Several studies such as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Miao and Wang
(2012) and Miao (2014) for example in the literature talks of the credit easing
effect caused by rational bubbles in the price of the collateralized asset. Unlike
these papers where the loan to value ratio is exogenous, we have an endogenous
margin. The implication here is that upward price movements arise directly from
a shift in the endogenous loan to value ratio. Increased borrowing thus implies
that the borrower households would invest more in housing stocks raising its
equilibrium price.
The Bubbly equilibrium is thus characterized by high house prices, high loan
to value ratios, no uncertainty and no defaults. High house prices and high loan
to value ratios originate through the credit easing channel. The fact that high
house prices can be obtained with no uncertainty and no defaults is an important
result that justifies the use of endogenizing the loan to value ratio. This result thus
extends those of Kocherlakota (2009) who found bubbly prices in the collateralized
land only under the case of uncertainty.
An alternative way to explain this bubbly steady state equilibrium is to con-
sider the leverage ratio. The values for the leverage ratio are reported in the
second row. It is no coincidence that the bubbly equilibrium with the highest
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price of housing comes when the leverage ratio is also at its peak. This situa-
tion was observed in the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis when at the peak of
the bubble, borrowers were excessively leveraged. In an important study, Corbae
and Quintin (2015) notes that better access to loans with low down payments
made it possible for more households to obtain the financing necessary to pur-
chase a house. In our case, the high loan to value ratio means a low downpayment
(1− LTV ).
An upward change in risk lowers the steady state house price from a value of
4.01 when the idiosyncratic shock has a standard deviation of σω = 0 to a value of
2.1 when σω = 0.8. This can be explained as follows. First, a high risk in holding
housing stock will lower the demand for this asset by households. Second, high
risk is also associated with very tight borrowing margins. In other words, the loan
to value ratio is very low (relatively). For instance, the steady state equilibrium
value for LTV when σω = 0.8 is just 19.18%, a significant decline from the 55.21%
value. This tight collateral margin will imply that borrowers are severely restricted
in their borrowing capacity. This is called a ”credit crunch” in the literature,
see Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). An implication of such a credit crunch
situation is that a significant amount of household members would find it optimal
to default on their mortgage contract. A high rate of defaults by the borrowing
household members means that these households have to downsize because of their
lost collateral that was seized by the lenders. Borrowers will need to replenish their
stock of housing and will demand more from the saver households. However, the
tight margin constraints mean that there is in effect little demand for housing and
thus prices go down. The credit crunch thus produces a steady state equilibrium
characterized by low asset prices.
This credit crunch effect is what characterized the foreclosure crisis in US. The
events that occurred in the US housing market can be described chronologically
as follows. There was a fall in house prices and a rise in foreclosures since early
2006. House prices dipped around 2006-Q2 and then, except for a small rise in
early 2007, fell continuously until 2009-Q2. At that point house prices stabilized
for about a year, fell again for half a year and eventually began to rise. The rate
of new foreclosures rose continuously between 2006-Q2 and 2008-Q4. Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2015) explains this foreclosure crisis in a general equilibrium
model where homeowners experience three unanticipated shocks, one of which is
in the stock of housing. Their analysis involves solving for the optimal policy
functions. Our results here are at steady state levels but it can still provide
us with the intuition behind this foreclosure crisis. As we see in our Table 1.2,
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the default rates rose steadily with increasing shocks. If we consider the no
shock equilibrium representing the year 2006, the rest of the steady state values
would then correspond to each subsequent year exhibiting falling house prices and
increased foreclosures.
Analysing the last two rows of Table 1.2 we observe that as steady state house
prices declined, the default rates increased. This evidence is consistent with what
was observed in the United States during the last decade. For instance, Mayer
et al. (2009) empirically documented this phenomenon and stated that roughly 1.7
million foreclosures were started in the first three quarters of 2008, an increase
of 62 percent from the 1.1 million in the first three quarters of 2007. Garriga
and Schlagenhauf (2009) for example use a general equilibrium model to analyse
mortgage defaults and finds that falling house prices generates sizeable default
rates at the aggregate level. Furthermore, in a recent paper Campbell and Cocco
(2015) also finds that both adjustable rate mortgages and fixed rate mortgages
experienced high default rates when there were a large decline in house price. The
results of Campbell and Cocco (2015) were obtained using a partial equilibrium
model where house prices were considered as exogenous. Our analysis here proves
that even under market clearing endogenous prices, the results would still hold
true.
In summary, our key results can be stated as follows. Firstly, increasing risk
in housing stocks generates steady state equilibrium values characterized by high
defaults, low prices and low LTV and leverage ratios, respectively. Secondly,
the endogenous loan to value ratio amplifies any uncertainty present in the fi-
nancial market. Thirdly, endogenous loan to value ratio leads to a credit-easing
effect where the upper bound on borrowing is relaxed resulting in rational bubbly
equilibrium in house prices. When hit with an idiosyncratic shock, endogenous
LTV gets tightened restricting borrowing and producing a ”credit crunch” effect
bursting any bubble and lowering house prices.
Now that we have finished reporting and explaining the results, we proceed to
a discussion section where we take a broader perspective of our results comparing
it to other literature, explain the limitations of our analysis here and provide an
alternative tractable ways to derive endogenous margins.
1.5. Discussion
One of the results in the previous section could appear to be counterfactual,
specifically the relationship between equilibrium values for the LTV ratio and the
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default rate. It is observed that high LTV, in other words, low downpayment, was
found to generate low default rates. For instance, when the standard deviation of
the shock to housing stock is zero, the downpayment rate is 44.79% (1 − LTV )
while the default rate is zero. We can compare these values to the other extreme
of σω = 0.8, where the downpayment rate now is 81% and the default rate to be
15%. These results suggests that households default when downpayment rates are
very high which is not true. There are two reasons for this finding in our model.
Firstly, in our model the rational bubble equilibrium is given by the first
column of Table 1.2. At this point, households have accumulated a lot of leverage
but defaults have not yet started. Defaults occur when σω ↑ which lowers prices.
This is well explained by Corbae and Quintin (2015) who using estimation as well
as observing the Survey of Consumer Finances data finds that delinquencies and
foreclosures start as soon as the bubble bursts and prices decline. The leverage is
only accumulated during the boom phase. This boom phase is thus characterized
by little or no defaults. Secondly, we have assumed that the shock follows a mean
preserving spread. This was done to ensure that the expected mean of shock will
always remain at unity, Et[ωt+1] = 1.
Our results also showed that an increase in house price is associated with an
increase in leverage. That is, leverage is high during asset price booms and low
during asset price busts. Hence, leverage in our model as in reality is procyclical.
As far as the modelling of the mortgage contract is concerned, we have used
here a one-period debt contract similar to Bernanke et al. (1999) for tractability
reasons. In reality, standard mortgages in the United States generally have a fixed
30-year term and about 70% of these mortgages have fixed rates, see Campbell
and Cocco (2015). Moreover, subprime mortgages with nontraditional features
(that is, adjustable rates) were at the heart of the recent crisis. Our model does
not consider these alternative mortgage instruments and therefore cannot capture
their role.
To introduce uncertainty, we considered only one idiosyncratic shock which
applied to the stock of housing. A growing empirical literature, see for example ?
and ? uses pre- and postcrisis mortgage data to study the importance of various
shocks in households’ decisions to default. This literature has documented that
most defaults involve negative equity (loan value greater than the value of the
collateral) but, at the same time, most households with negative equity choose not
to foreclose. Most foreclosures thus appear to involve a combination of negative
equity and other shocks.
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In the recent crises, unlike the previous ones, the initial disruption started
in the financial sector. It was not a shock in the real sector that was amplified
through financial frictions but uncertainty which originated in the financial sector.
One way to model this would be to add a shock to the endogenous leverage (LTV)
itself. These could then be considered as financial shocks that arise independently
from the real sector. For instance, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) assume that the
pledgeability parameter as an independent stochastic process unrelated to market
conditions. They interpret the parameter as the probability that the lender can
recover the full value of the collateral and thus its complement as the probability
that the recovery value is zero. They call exogenous shocks to the margin as
”financial shocks”.
We started this chapter by mentioning the research by Geanakoplos (2003)
on leverage cycles. Our model in its present form cannot accommodate this
behaviour. However, we can apply the theory developed by Gu et al. (2013)
and generate leverage cycles. These cycles originate and propagate in the credit
sector. These can be shown to exhibit deterministic, chaotic, and stochastic
cycles. One attractive feature of these type of cycles are that they exist even
when fundamentals are deterministic and time invariant. The key friction in this
theory is limited commitment, meaning that borrowers (agent) have the option
to renege on their contract and can divert funds from the lender (principal). In
the appendix, we show how such leverage cycles can be modelled from an optimal
contract between two firms.
In this chapter, we analysed the link between endogenous margins, collateral
constraints and asset price bubbles. Our model was a departure from the stan-
dard asset pricing framework in that agents face constraints to the level of their
borrowing. These constraints which we call collateral constraints can also be con-
sidered as rational debt constraints or solvency constraints. There are other ways
in which we can depart from the frictionless asset market and endogenize the mar-
gins. First, is the consideration of exogenous incomplete markets in which there
are not enough securities to insure against all possible states of nature, see the
examples in Radner (1972) and Geanakoplos (1990). Second, there are models of
liquidity constraints in which individual agents are restricted from borrowing as
much as they wish in the credit market. Bewley (1987) is an example of this types
of models. Third, there are also models of adverse selection and moral hazard, see
Townsend (1979) and Prescott and Townsend (1984). All these types of models
can be used to derive endogenous collateral constraints and thus the loan to value
ratio.
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1.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we modelled an endowment economy asset pricing model with
heterogenous agents, endogenous loan to value ratios and endogenous defaults on
mortgages to understand the boom and bust in house prices. The steady states
of our model revealed several important results.
We find that credit driven rational bubbles can form in steady state house
prices when a high leverage induces a credit easing effect that relaxes the bor-
rowing constraint. Increased borrowing coupled with no uncertainty meant that
house prices in this state were high. Conversely, a credit crunch situation evolved
when the loan to value ratio declined following an increased risk. In this situation,
the borrowing constraint tightened restricting the availability of loans and thus
demand for housing resulting in lower asset prices. A direct consequence of these
two effects was that the leverage ratio was high during asset price booms and low
during asset price busts, that is pro-cyclical.
We restricted our analysis to just the steady states here. However, we could
enrich this model and compute the optimal policy functions to get better insights
on the dynamics between leverage, asset prices and defaults, see Brumm et al.
(2015). Importantly, the fact that the leverage is endogenous implies that policy
makers can regulate the collateral margin requirements and can thus prevent
financial shocks from adversely affecting the economy. This can be achieved if
they set margins (or the parameters that endogenizes the margin) such that they
become counter-cyclical.
Incorporating money and price stickiness into this framework can help us in
understanding how leverage frictions can influence of transmission of monetary
policy. In this chapter we have assumed that the initial disruption is completely
exogenous. There are authors such as Suarez and Sussman (1997) who have
proposed models in which adverse selection could generate economic fluctuations
even in the absence of exogenous shocks.
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Appendix
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1.A. Endogenous Collateral and Leverage
Cycle
In this section we describe a model that endogenize the leverage and generates cy-
cles. The model is kept deliberately simple so as to allow a transparent exposition
of the mechanism. The key mechanism or the friction that drives leverage cycles
is limited commitment. This limited commitment leads to endogenous collateral
constraints. The model is described in the following paragraphs.
We consider an infinite horizon economy. Time is assumed to be discrete,
denoted by t. Each period in the economy is assumed to have two subperiods.
The economy is populated by two types of agents of equal measures, these are
called Firms (or borrowers) and Households (or Lenders).
In each period t, there are two subperiods. These can also be considered as
beginning of period t and end of period t. Both the agents have different needs
in the two subperiods. In the first subperiod of t, the firms need investments
in the form of capital which they consume to generate returns, denoted by y,
in the second subperiod. Households are endowed with k units of consumption
goods (can be considered as capital) at the beginning of every period. We assume
that this good is non-storable and thus depreciates completely by the end of the
period. Furthermore, households do not have investment opportunities meaning
that they cannot use the k units of good to produce y. Thus, households value
consuming y in the second subperiod more than holding on their endowment good
k. This implies that there are gains to be had from trade.
The trade relationship between the firms and the households works as follows.
The firms borrow k units of goods from the households in the first subperiod and
promise, that is, sign a contract to deliver y to households in the second subperiod
when the firms have finally realised the fruits of their investments.
The utility from this trade agreement is UF (k, y) for the firms and UH(y, k)
for the households.11 The ordering of the arguments inside the utility functions
indicates the preference for each agents. Firms value more of k which is their
consumption than y, that is, ∂U
F (k,y)
∂k
> 0 is strictly increasing and ∂U
F (k,y)
∂y
< 0 is
strictly decreasing. Similarly, households value more of their consumption y than
k, ∂U
H(y,k)
∂y
> 0 and ∂U
H(y,k)
∂k
< 0. We assume here that the utility is concave and
twice differentiable. Furthermore the utility is non-negative for both the agents,
U i ≥ 0, where i = F,H.
11The superscript F represents Firms and H represents the households.
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The underlying mechanism that drives our result is the friction of limited
commitment or enforcement. Once investment returns, y, are realized at the end
of the period the firm has the incentive to renege from the contract and divert
these funds y to their own benefit. If the firm behaves in this manner, it gets
a payoff λy over and above its utility UF (k, y). Hence, λ is a parameter that
indicates the temptation to renege. To prevent this from happening, we impose
an additional constraint in the form
UF (k, y + y′) + λy′ ≤ UF (k, y), ∀x, y y′ ≥ 0 (1.42)
This constraint says that the firms never finds it optimal ex ante to divert resources
y′ as he is better off not producing in the first place. This does not mean that
the firm is not tempted to divert resources ex post after the production has taken
place. The incentive to honour the obligation to the contract arises from the
threat to exclude the firms from any future borrowing. This means that the
firm will have an autarky (no trade) payoff of zero. Motivated by related limited
commitment contract models in the literature such as Gu et al. (2013) we allow for
imperfect monitoring. This means that if the firm defaults, there is a probability pi
that it will get caught. Consequently, with 1−pi probability the lender will not be
caught. Now that we have specified the environment and trading arrangements in
the model, we proceed to explicitly state the contract variables and its associated
constraints.
The contract between the firms and the households at time t is
characterized by the pair of allocation (kt, yt). This contract specifies
that the borrower (firm) gets kt from the lender (household), and the
borrower promises to deliver yt to the lender. Consider V
F
t and V
H
t to
be the value functions for the firms and households, respectively. The discount
factor across periods is given by β ∈ (0, 1). We assume that the discounting
across subperiods is contained within the utility functions for each agent and do
not model it explicitly. These value functions can be written as:
V Ft = U
F (kt, yt) + βV
F
t+1, (1.43)
V Ht = U
H(yt, kt) + βV
H
t+1, (1.44)
For a contract to be feasible, the lender must offer the agent a utility level that is at
least as high as the utility level that the borrower obtains outside the relationship.
These constraints are called as participation constraints in the literature. The
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firms outside opportunity level is normalized to zero. Thus, the participations
constraints can be written in the form,
UF (kt, yt) ≥ 0 (1.45)
and
UH(yt, kt) ≥ 0. (1.46)
In addition to these constraints, there is an added constraint called the repayment
constraint which gives our leverage limit. The repayment constraint applies only
for the borrower (firm) and ensures that it is always optimal for the borrow to
repay the loan at the end of the contract period. In our model, this constraint
can be written as,
λyt + (1− pi)βV Ft+1 ≤ βV Ft+1 (1.47)
This equation says that the continuation value to remain in the contract βV Ft+1 is
always greater than the value the firm will obtain if it reneges on the debt, that
is defaults. In case of defaults, the firm gets the deviation payoff λyt plus the
continuation value obtained in case it was not caught (1− pi)βV Ft+1.
The repayment constraint eq (1.47) can be rewritten in the form:
yt ≤ βpi
λ
V Ft+1 (1.48)
Equation (1.48) says that the repayment yt cannot exceed the discounted continu-
ation value of the firm adjusted for monitoring costs and a fraction λ. Intuitively,
this is the limit on the loans that the firm can take on. We call this the leverage
limit. We can express eq. (1.48) as
yt ≤ ψt (1.49)
where ψt =
βpi
λ
V Ft+1 is the endogenous limit on firms loans. In the lines of Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) we can say that the equilibrium loan limit φt is defined such
that the firms are indifferent between repaying φt and defaulting. For any feasible
allocation, payoffs and thus φt should be bounded. Following Gu et al. (2013) we
can define the equilibrium as follows:
DEFINITION 2: An equilibrium is given by nonegative and bounded sequences
of loan limits {φt}∞t=1 and contracts {kt, yt} such that (i) ∀t, (kt, yt) solves the
conditions given yt and (ii) φt solves the equilibrium conditions given {kt, yt}∞t=1.
The debt limit can be then expressed as a first order difference equation which
can be solved and illustrated to depict leverage cycles.
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1.B. Rational Bubbles in Overlapping
Generations
Tirole (1982, 1985) extended the partial equilibrium framework of Blanchard and
Watson (1982a) to a general equilibrium one. Tirole (1985) used Diamond (1965)’s
two period overlapping generations model of capital accumulation in a production
economy (inelastic labour), and gave necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a rational bubble. Tirole found that bubbles crowd out productive
savings and cannot grow faster than the economy, their existence depends on
a comparison between the interest rates and the growth rates of the economy.
If the economy is dynamically efficient, the interest rate will exceed the growth
of the economy, there cannot be a steady state with a positive valued bubble.
However, if the economy is dynamically inefficient, there exists an equilibrium
with a positive bubble value. In such a bubbly equilibrium, the growth rate of
bubbles of is equal to the economy growth rate, which is equal to the interest
rate.
Theoretical arguments can be made to rule out rational bubbles in a finite
horizon framework through backward inductions. Since a bubble cannot grow
from time T onwards, there cannot be a bubble of this size at time T − 1, which
rules out this bubble at T −2, etc. However, there is ample experimental evidence
that individuals violate the backward induction principle. Most convincing are
experiments on the centipede game, see Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013).12
Furthermore, Allen et al. (1993) show that, when common knowledge is absent
and short sale constraints bind, a bubble can exist for a finitely-lived asset. They
describe an example in which the market price of a security can deviate above the
present value of its dividends even though all the agents are rational and knows
the dividends with certainty. The reason is that the agents’ do not know each
other’s beliefs, in other words there is asymmetric information (i.e., there is a
lack of common knowledge that was assumed in the previous backward-induction
reasoning). Moreover, at the time or state when the bubble occurs, every agent is
12In this simple game, two players alternatively decide whether to continue or stop the game
for a finite number of periods. On any move, a player is better off stopping the game than
continuing if the other player stops immediately afterwards, but is worse o§ stopping than
continuing if the other player continues afterwards. This game has only a single subgame perfect
equilibrium that follows directly from backward induction reasoning. Each player’s strategy is
to stop the game whenever it is her turn to move. Hence, the first player should immediately
stop the game and the game should never get off the ground. However, in experiments players
continue to play the game - a violation of the backward induction principle
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either short sale constrained or will be constrained at some possible contingency
in the future. As beliefs are not common knowledge, even though all agents know
that the price of the asset is over-valued, they all rationally believe that they will
be able to sell the asset at a higher price to someone else before the true value is
completely revealed.
Farhi and Tirole (2011) and Martin and Ventura (2012) introduce financial
frictions to the Tirole (1985) model and show that bubbles can exist even though
the equilibrium without bubbles is dynamically efficient. They show that dynamic
efficiency and low interest rates are compatible in the presence of capital market
imperfections.
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Chapter 2
U.S. Housing Market Bubbles: A
Long Memory Approach
2.1. Introduction
House prices in the United States rose rapidly between the early 1990’s until the
mid 2000’s. Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the time series behaviour of the
Standard & Poor Case-Shiller House Price Index. The Index started its upward
trend around 1996 reaching a peak in the first quarter of 2006. After the peak
in 2006, they declined sharply and reached a low in 2012, see Case et al. (2012).
Several explanations have been offered by scholars for this boom-bust episode
such as misguided monetary policy; a global savings surplus; government policies
encouraging affordable homeownership; irrational consumer expectations of rising
housing prices; inelastic housing supply, mortgage securitization to name a few,
see Levitin and Wachter (2012).
The 1997-2006 real house price appreciation prompted numerous economists
and the national media to conclude that there was a bubble in the U.S. Hous-
ing Market. These proclamations arise from observing the largest crash in U.S.
real estate market’s history in 2007 that erased a significant portion of household
wealth. Such a decline in household wealth has adverse macroeconomic effects,
as already overextended consumers reduce spending to boost saving and improve
their weakened financial position. In this context, a wide consensus among ana-
lysts and commentators has emerged on the importance of timely identification
and understanding of a ”housing bubble”.1 Consequently, there is a growing body
1The motivation for exploring the housing market is because of the large role that it had
in the financial crisis. According to the Flow of Funds Accounts compiled by the Board of
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of papers that examine for housing bubbles, see Abraham and Hendershott (1996),
Higgins (1997), Himmelberg et al. (2005), Glaeser et al. (2008) and Phillips and
Yu (2011) among others.2
Figure 2.1. S&P Case-Shiller House Price Index
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Notes: Time series plot of the Standard & Poor Case-Shiller Real House Price Index
in the time span 1987Q1-2013Q4. The peak of the price index, illustrated with a
straight line, occurs in the first quarter of 2006.
In this chapter, we focus on rational bubbles in the U.S. Housing
Market .3 To begin with we have to address the question of defining an asset
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, households held about $14.6 trillion in real estate
at the end of March, 2003. By comparison, households held about $12.8 trillion of corporate
equities and mutual funds in January, 2000 - the peak of the stock market. Moreover, equity
holdings are concentrated at the upper end of the wealth distribution, whereas housing is the
major asset for most households, see Tracy and Schneider (2001). Examining booms and busts
in home prices is thus important.
2See Mayer (2011) and Glaeser and Nathanson (2014) for a survey on the literature and
Levitin and Wachter (2012) for possible reasons to the recent bubble in the United States.
3We often use the words Housing Market and housing prices throughout our narration. In
the context of this chapter, they are one and the same. A bubble in the housing market means
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price bubble. Despite the huge volume of literature on this topic, a consensus on
the definition of an asset price bubble remains elusive. The most common and
widely accepted definition relates an asset price bubble to any divergence from
its fundamental price, see Blanchard and Watson (1982b), Diba and Grossman
(1988) and Kindleberger and Aliber (2005). In case of the stock market, equity
prices contain a rational bubble if investors are willing to pay more for the stock
than they know is justified by the value of the discounted dividend stream i.e.
the fundamentals, see Shiller (1989) and Gu¨rkaynak (2008). This is because they
expect to be able to sell it at an even higher price in the future, making the current
high price an equilibrium price implying the existence of a rational bubble in the
stock market.
As in the stock market, rational bubbles can occur in the housing market
when there are deviations from the fundamental value of the house. An important
fundamental value explaining house prices is the rental price, see Kivedal (2013).
Hence, an investigation on its relationship with the house price, the house rent-
price ratio, will give us valuable insights to the persistence and thus the possibility
of bubbles in the housing market. The housing rent-price ratio is a financial ratio
akin to the dividend-price ratio for the stock market. A low rent to price ratio
indicates that the return on the housing asset for homeowners is low compared to
other assets that they could hold and thus is unlikely to persist. For the return to
rise to a level comparable with returns on competing assets, house prices would
have to fall, see Hatzius (2002) and Case et al. (2005). The ratio of the Owners’
Equivalent Rent Index from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) series to the House
Price Index is often treated as the real estate equivalent of a dividend to price
ratio for corporate equities, see Meese and Wallace (1994), Himmelberg et al.
(2005), Kivedal (2013) and Andre´ et al. (2014).4 In this chapter, we follow these
papers and use the real rent to real house price ratio to detect rational bubbles
in the housing market.
In addition to the theoretical problems of defining as asset bubble, researchers
have found it a challenging task to empirically test for a bubble, see Gu¨rkaynak
(2008). One approach is to test for cointegration between dividends and stock
prices. Cointegration implies that two or more series cannot drift apart indef-
initely as they must satisfy a long run equilibrium condition. For example, a
a bubble in the housing prices and vice-versa.
4Gallin (2008) also used a long horizon regression approach and show that the rent to price
ratio can accurately forecast housing prices and thus, lends empirical support to the use of this
financial ratio as an indicator of valuation in the housing market.
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cointegrating relationship between stock prices and dividends is inconsistent with
rational bubbles, since stock prices and dividends are tied together in the long
run. Another approach is to make use of the present value relation. The present
value model says that the stock prices are equal to the sum of the expected dis-
counted dividend sequence which is also called the fundamental price of the stock.
Deviations from the present value model will imply that the stock market is not
efficient, i.e. the existence of asset bubbles, see Koustas and Serletis (2005).
Univariate time series testing procedures such as unit root testing on present
value model variables like the log dividend-price ratio is a possible way to test for
price bubbles, see Diba and Grossman (1988) and Koustas and Serletis (2005).
The presence of a unit root in the log dividend price ratio implies rational bubbles
as in effect this means that stock prices and dividends do not share a common
trend. In the context of the housing market, a rational bubble means that the
housing prices and rents do not move together and consequently there is a unit
root in the housing rent-price ratio. Phillips and Yu (2011) uses a sequential unit
root test to date housing bubbles in the Case-Shiller log price to rent ratio. Some
other studies that apply unit root tests on U.S. House prices (ignoring rents)
include Meese and Wallace (1994), Meen (2002) and Canarella et al. (2011) to
name a few.
Empirical papers which uses standard unit roots for bubble identification have
had mixed success, see Lamont (1998) and Horvath and Watson (2009). This is
mainly because of the low power of these integer order tests to reject the null
of a unit root against the possibility of fractional roots.5 For instance, standard
unit root tests cannot distinguish between a unit root process and a near unit
root process. Univariate processes that have persistence close to but not equal
unity have a special property in that they have long memory. This means that
the effect of a shock will last for an extended time period (hence the term ”long
memory”) and will thus look like a bubble when in fact they are mean reverting.
As such near unit root processes which revert to their mean in the long run can
be mistakenly considered as possessing bubble behaviour. Hence, standard unit
root tests are not adequate in testing for rational bubbles.
In this chapter, we use long memory models to investigate for
the presence of housing bubbles . The long memory models, also known in
the literature as Autoregessive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average processes
(ARFIMA) stemmed from the seminal contribution made by Granger and Joyeux
5In addition to this, there is an enormous literature which argue that the presence of any
structural breaks affects the performance of standard unit root tests, see Perron (1989, 1997).
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(1980). There is evidence that long memory processes successfully model some
economic and financial data, see Diebold and Rudebusch (1991), Hassler and
Wolters (1995), Bhardwaj and Swanson (2006). The presence of long memory in
the rent-price ratio will mean that even though there is a temporary deviation
in house prices, they will eventually return to their fundamentals, i.e. rents. In
other words, the presence of long memory negates bubble activity.
The presence of long memory in a series is detected by estimating the level of
fractional integration, alternatively called the memory parameter, in the series.
This parameter is denoted by d in this chapter. This is the key parameter of
interest. An estimated value of d below 1 indicates mean-reversion, implying that
exogenous shocks have temporary effects, while a value equal to or above 1 implies
that exogenous shocks have permanent effects. The value of the integer d thus
indicates the persistence of the series.6 Intuitively, the value of d then shows the
presence or absence of a bubble in the series. Long memory processes can also
be non-stationary process when the value of d greater than 0.5. Non-stationarity
in itself does not imply the presence of bubbles. As long as there is no unit root
persistence, there will be no bubbles meaning that a non-stationary long memory
process has no bubbles.
In this chapter, we first estimate the value of d and then test for the null
hypothesis of a unit root d = 1 against that of a fractional unit root, d < 1. This
is achieved by employing the Efficient Fractional Dicky Fuller Test of Lobato and
Velasco (2007). Unlike standard unit root tests, this test is robust to the presence
of fractional roots. If the null is not rejected, we conclude that there is a bubble
in the rent-price ratio series.7 Now that we have detailed the basic premise of
our chapter, we state the key contributions that we make towards the existing
literature.
This chapter makes three main contributions. The first contribution is in the
use of long memory models to identify housing bubbles. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there has been no study that use long memory models to test for bubble
prevalence in the housing market. Existing papers, namely Koustas and Serletis
(2005), Cun˜ado et al. (2005), Cun˜ado et al. (2012) and Kruse and Sibbertsen
(2012), use long memory models to test for stock market bubbles. Inferences on
6Persistence measures the extent to which past economic shocks lead to permanent future
changes. In a highly persistent series like a unit root process the effect of an economic shock
will be permanent. In time series econometrics, persistence is usually tied to the value of the
memory parameter, d.
7In the actual estimation procedure, we use the natural log of the rent-price aeries. This is
motivated by our theoretical model where we derive an expression for the log rent-price ratio.
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bubbles are based from the estimated value of persistence parameter, d, of the
dividend-price ratio. The few papers, that test for persistence in the housing mar-
ket, uses standard unit root and cointegration tests. For example, Gallin (2008)
finds no evidence of cointegration between house prices and per capita income
in the United States, whether using national level data from 1975 to 2002 or a
panel of 95 metropolitan areas from 1978 to 2000. On the contrary, Gallin (2008)
finds cointegration between U.S. house prices and rents over the period 1970 to
2005. Standard unit root tests, we discussed before have low power compared to
the long memory tests which could explain these ambiguous results. Connected
to the use of the long memory model is the type of procedure that is used to
estimate the memory parameter d.
The literature on long memory estimation briefly classify the different methods
to estimate d as either semi-parametric or parametric. Koustas and Serletis (2005)
and Kruse and Sibbertsen (2012) use a parametric procedure of Sowell (1992)
known as Exact Maximum Likelihood to test for bubbles in the S&P 500 Index.
A major limitation of this approach is that it is not consistent when the time
series follows a non-stationary process. Hence a unit root bubble process may
be mistakenly rejected by this procedure. Also, parametric methods that are not
specified correctly for non-normal or heteroskedastic errors will produce inefficient
estimates of d and thus bubble presence. Standard inferencing using t or F tests
would thus lead to erroneous conclusions. Furthermore, they suffer from small
sample biases. To overcome these problems, we make use of Shimotsu and Phillips
(2005) and Shimotsu (2009) semi-parametric methods that are both consistent
under non-stationarity and also robust to heteroskedasticty. We compare these
estimates with a parametric procedure by Beran (1995) called Non-Linear Least
Squares which is also valid for non-stationary d.
The second contribution of our chapter is that we account for endogenous
structural breaks when estimating the long memory parameter for the housing
market. There is a huge volume of papers which argue that long memory can be
spuriously induced by a structural break, see Diebold and Inoue (2001). Also, it
is well known from works such as Perron (1989) that failure to allow for struc-
tural breaks in an intercept or trend can result in spuriously high estimates of
the persistence parameter: Once one allows for changes over time in the mean,
then deviations from this time-varying mean do not seem as persistent. Mayoral
(2012) develops a time domain test of I(d) versus I(0) plus trends and/or breaks,
and finds that the null of I(d) is not rejected in the U.S. inflation data. Choi
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and Zivot (2007), estimate the memory parameter, d, of an exchange rate for-
ward discount series after adjusting for breaks in their mean. They find that the
demeaned forward discount series produced significantly lower persistence values.
Despite these findings, current papers on long memory and stock market bubbles
do not account for possible structural breaks.8 Additionally, with the exception
of Barari et al. (2014) that test for unknown breaks in the aggregate Case-Shiller
Index, estimation of structural breaks in the U.S. HPI’s has been to the best of our
knowledge non-existent. Moreover, the break test used by Barari et al. (2014) is
not consistent for non-stationary series meaning that the number of breaks could
be over estimated. Our work here fills this gap by using the Andrews (1993) and
Andrews and Ploberger (1994) F statistic based structural tests to examine the
presence of an endogenous break in the mean and trend of each series. Infer-
ence for break presence/absence was based on Hansen (2000)’s Fixed Regressor
Bootstrap asymptotic p values that are consistent under non-stationary regres-
sors and robust to heteroskedastic residuals. We estimate persistence after
adjusting for potential breaks making our bubble analysis efficient.
This ensures that the net persistence will account for time varying
changes in fundamentals. If we ignore these breaks, the gross persistence
values will be inflated and will include both the bubble component as well as
changes in fundamentals.
The third contribution is that we use both aggregate and regional level data
in our empirical study. This is because the House Price Index (HPI) used can
have dramatic ramifications on the assessment of whether a house price bubble
exists, see McCarthy and Peach (2004). Furthermore, there is a plethora of re-
search which suggests that an house price appreciation (depreciation) to a large
extend depends on inelastic (elastic) housing supply, see Green et al. (2005) and
Levitin and Wachter (2012) among others. The implication being that as hous-
ing supply elasticity differ from region to region so will the persistence of house
prices. This would mean that national aggregated indices could hide possible
bubbles which are regional in nature. Empirical papers, for example McCarthy
and Peach (2004), Phillips and Yu (2011) and Nneji et al. (2013), that restrict
their analysis to just the national indices could produce questionable findings. In
this paper, we perform our analysis on not just the national indices but also on
several metropolitan statistical areas. Additionally, we use a dataset ending in the
8Kruse and Sibbertsen (2012) does consider a structural break in their analysis by testing
for changes in persistence. However, their test do not distinguish between mean-reverting and
unit root persistence and consequently does not identify bubble behaviour.
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last quarter of 2013 encompassing both the boom phase as well as the subsequent
bust helping us in answering a key question of whether house prices have finally
reverted to their fundamentals.
We can preview our results as follows. First, we find that the long memory
models produced better estimates of the persistence when compared to standard
unit root tests. Secondly, between the semi-parametric and parametric long mem-
ory estimation methods, it was found that the semi-parametric procedures gave
reliable values of d. Based on these estimates we found that the persistence values
were well above the unit root. This was true both for the aggregate and regional
HPI’s. Thirdly, we found one endogenous break in the mean and trend of each
series. The break date coincided with the turnaround in the credit conditions
in the borrowing market and was thus consistent with our a priori expectations.
Finally, when we adjusted for these breaks by detrending and demeaning each
series we found that the new persistence values (d) were significantly lower. Con-
sequently, a few series now exhibited below unity persistence consistent with mean
reverting long memory behaviour devoid of bubbles. Nevertheless, the aggregate
Case-Shiller Index and 8 of 12 regional HPI’s still indicated unit root bubble be-
haviour. We thus conclude that in the estimated time period of 1982Q4-2013Q4
the United States housing market shows evidence for rational price bubbles.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we provide a
brief description of the present value relation of the Housing Market under rational
expectations and introduces the notion of housing price bubbles. We then derive
an expression for the log rent-price ratio. Section 2.3 outlines the long memory
model and properties of the long memory parameter. Section 2.4 briefly goes
through the structural break test that we implement, section 2.5 the different
estimation methods. section 2.6 describes the dataset, section 2.7 the empirical
results and finally section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. Theoretical Model of Housing Bubbles
2.2.1. Set-up
We begin by setting out some key concepts in modelling housing price bubbles.
We start with a simple consumers’ optimization problem to derive the basic asset
pricing relationship assuming no arbitrage and rational expectations. Following
Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988), the expected discounted utility driven from
consumption at time t, u(ct), is maximised in an endowment economy,
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maxEt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
}
(2.1)
with discount rate β and Expectation Et subject to the budget constraint:
ct = yt + (Pt +Rentt)xt − Ptxt+1 (2.2)
where yt is the endowment at time t, xt is the asset, Pt is the after-payoff price of
asset and Rentt is the payoff (dividend) received from the asset. In this chapter,
we are looking at the asset class of the housing market and hence, Pt here is
the real housing price and Rentt is the rent obtained from owning a house. We
now proceed to the household’s optimisation problem to derive the present value
relation of the Housing Market.
2.2.2. Present Value Model of Housing Market
To solve the optimisation, we begin by substituting the constraint (2.2) into the
objective function (2.1),
max
xt+1
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(yt + (Pt +Rentt)xt − Ptxt+1)
}
(2.3)
This is solved by the use of a Bellman equation which can be written as,
V (xt, yt, Rentt) = max
xt+1
{
u
[
yt+(Pt+Rentt)xt−Ptxt+1
]
+βEt[V (xt+1, yt+1, Rentt+1)]
}
,
(2.4)
where V (.) is the value function. The first order condition of the Bellman equation
with respect to xt+1 is given by,
∂V (xt, yt, Rentt)
∂xt+1
= u′(ct)(−Pt) + βEt
[∂V (xt+1, yt+1, Rentt+1)
∂xt+1
]
= 0 (2.5)
The first derivative of the Bellman equation with respect to xt:
∂V (xt, yt, Rentt)
∂xt
= u′(ct)(Pt +Rentt) (2.6)
Taking eq. (2.6) one-period ahead,
∂V (xt+1, yt+1, Rentt+1)
∂xt+1
= u′(ct+1)(Pt+1 +Rentt+1) (2.7)
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Combining eq (2.5) and eq (2.7) gives us the Euler equation:
u′(ct)Pt = βEt[u′(ct+1)(Pt+1 +Rentt+1)] (2.8)
which simply says that given house prices Pt and rents Rentt, agents will find it
optimal to increase their demand of the asset if the expected future gains to doing
so are greater than the costs. It is generally assumed for asset pricing purposes
that the utility function is linear, which implies constant marginal utility and risk
neutrality, see Cochrane (2007). Hence,
Et
[u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]
= 1 (2.9)
and eq (2.8) solves to
Pt = βEt(Pt+1 +Rentt+1) (2.10)
Assuming further the existence of a riskless bond available in zero net supply with
one period net interest rate, R (where β = 1/1 +R), no arbitrage implies
Pt =
1
1 +R
Et(Pt+1 +Rentt+1) (2.11)
This is the Present Value Model of house prices which forms the basis for most
asset pricing tests, see West (1987), Diba and Grossman (1988) and Evans (1991a).
In eq (2.11) 0 < 1/(1 + R) < 1 is the discount factor.9 Solving eq (2.11) forward
j periods yields
Pt =
( 1
1 +R
)j
Et[Pt+i] +
m∑
i=1
Et[
( 1
1 +R
)i
Rentt+i] (2.12)
Assuming that the expected discounted value of the house in the indefinite future
converges to zero:10
lim
k→∞
( 1
1 +R
)j
Et[Pt+i] = 0 (2.13)
This allows us to obtain the fundamental value of the house, as the expected
present value of future rents:
Ft =
( 1
1 +R
) ∞∑
i=1
Et[Rentt+i]. (2.14)
9Here we have treated discount rate as equal to returns. Alternatively, discount rates can
be considered as a constant, return plus risk premia or consumption based Cochrane (1992).
However, testing for bubbles with these specifications is not straightforward.
10The transversality condition is not testable in finite samples, so this assumption is held with
caution, see Cochrane (1992) and Diba and Grossman (1988).
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in (2.14), Ft is the fundamental value of the house. This is equal to Pt as long as
there are constant returns. Abandoning the convergence assumption leads to an
infinite number of solutions any one of which can be written in the form
Pt = Ft +Bt, Bt =
( 1
1 +R
)
Et[Bt+1] (2.15)
The second term Bt is the ”Asset Price Bubble”. Now that we have shown how
asset price bubbles can exist using a simple present value model derived from a
consumption utility function, we now extend this constant discount rate model
to a time varying one and then subsequently derive the expression for the log
rent-price ratio. This is detailed in the following section.
2.2.3. The Rent-Price Ratio and Housing Price Bubble
By allowing the discount rate to vary over time, we are in turn implying that
the housing returns are also stochastic. Furthermore, if the housing returns are
stochastic, the expected present value is a nonlinear function of rents and housing
prices. This section derives and discuss the log linear approximation of the housing
rent-price ratio. Following the seminal paper by Campbell and Shiller (1987), the
log linear dividend-price ratio relation has become one of the central equations in
empirical finance research, particularly those on asset price bubbles.11 Eq (2.11)
can be rearranged with stochastic Rt+1 to express the one period gross housing
return from time t to t+ 1 as,
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 +Rentt+1 − Pt
Pt
(2.16)
Rearranging eq (2.16) as follows:
1 +Rt+1 =
Pt+1 +Rentt+1
Pt
(2.17)
Taking the natural logarithm on both sides of eq (2.17),
rt+1 = ln(1 +Rt+1) (2.18)
= ln(Pt+1 +Rentt+1)− ln(Pt) (2.19)
= ln
[(
1 +
Rentt+1
Pt+1
)
Pt+1
]
− ln(Pt) (2.20)
= ln[1 + eδt+1 ] + pt+1 − pt. (2.21)
11For example Campbell and Shiller (2001),Koustas and Serletis (2005), Cun˜ado et al. (2005,
2012) apply the model for stock markets and Campbell et al. (2009) and Ambrose et al. (2013)
for the Housing Market.
63
The last step is obtained by defining
δt+1 = ln
Rentt+1
Pt+1
(2.22)
where δt+1 is the log rent-price ratio (rentt−pt) and e is the exponential function.
Lower case letters, pt and rentt, represent the natural logs of real housing prices
and real rents, respectively. The first term in (2.21) is non-linear in the log rent
price ratio.
f(δt+1) = ln[1 + e
δt+1 ] (2.23)
The first order Taylor approximation of this term, similar approach in Engsted
et al. (2012), is as follows:
f(δt+1) = f(δˆ) +
[( 1
1 + eδˆ
)
eδˆ(δt+1 − δˆ)
]
(2.24)
where δˆ is the point around which the linearization is done.12 Setting ρ = (1+eδˆ)−1
implies,
(1 + eδˆ) =
1
ρ
(2.25)
and also,
eδˆ =
1− ρ
ρ
(2.26)
Combining eq’s (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) we get:
f(δt+1) = ln
(1
ρ
)
+ (1− ρ)δt+1 − (1− ρ) ln
(1− ρ
ρ
)
(2.27)
Substituting eq (2.27) into (2.23) and the result in (2.21) we obtain an expression
for the stochastic logged interest rate
rt+1 = k + ρpt+1 + (1− ρ)rentt+1 − pt (2.28)
where k is a constant given by k = ln(1
ρ
)−(1−ρ) ln(1−ρ
ρ
). Adding and subtracting
rentt in (2.28), we have
rt+1 = k + δt − ρδt+1 + ∆rentt+1 (2.29)
12 δˆ here is the unconditional mean of the rent-price ratio which is the usual norm in literature,
see Engsted et al. (2012) and also Cochrane (2007).
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Eq. (2.29) can be interpreted as a linear forward difference equation in δt:
δt = −k + ρδt+1 + rt+1 −∆rentt+1 (2.30)
We solve the above expression by forward recursive substitution method assuming
that the transversality condition holds. Imposing the no rational bubble condition
(or the transversality condition),
lim
j→∞
ρjδt+j = 0 (2.31)
we get:
δt ≈
∞∑
j=0
ρj[rt+j+1 −∆rentt+j+1]− k
1− ρ. (2.32)
We can consider eq. (2.32) as an ex ante relationship. Taking expectations on
both sides conditional on the information available at time t,
δt =
∞∑
j=0
ρj[Etrt+j+1 − Et∆rentt+j+1]− k
1− ρ. (2.33)
Eq. (2.33) states that the log rent-price ratio, δt can be written as the discounted
sum of all future log returns minus the discounted sum of all future log rent
changes less a constant term. The above expression also implies that if the log
returns and the log rent changes are stationary stochastic process, then the log
rent-price ratio is a stationary stochastic process under the transversality condi-
tion Craine (1993). On the contrary, the presence of a unit root in δt is consistent
with asset price bubbles in the log rent price ratio. This is because the presence
of a unit root will imply the lack of a cointegrating relationship between rents
and price.
In summary, housing bubble presence depends on the persistence of the log
rent-price ratio. In time series econometrics, we measure the persistence of a series
by its autocorrelation function which is dependent on the value of the memory
parameter d. Formal econometric tests for distinguishing between d = 0 a sta-
tionary non-bubble process and d = 1 a unit root bubble process exist in the
literature, see, for example, Dickey and Fuller (1979) and its various extensions.
However, the jump from d = 0 to d = 1 is often too extreme in the sense that
you are not considering fractional values of d. These fractional roots have the
interesting property that they possess long memory but eventually return to their
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mean. In this chapter, we test for bubbles in the Housing Market by differenti-
ating between long memory processes and unit root process. By their definition,
rational bubbles are highly persistent and their effect is permanent implying unit
root behaviour. If the tested data exhibits unit root type behaviour then we con-
clude that it has a bubble. In contrast, if the series possesses long memory then
we conclude that it does not contain a bubble. This is only one of the reasons
that motivates us to use long memory models. The second reason is related to
aggregation. Granger and Joyeux (1980) has shown that time and cross-sectional
aggregation can generate long memory in aggregate processes. Testing for bub-
bles is done on house price indexes which are aggregates of several regional ones.
We employ both aggregate and regional series in our study to prevent any bi-
ases in the testing for bubbles. The third reason is related to structural breaks.
Granger and Hyung (2004) and Diebold and Inoue (2001) have shown that pro-
cesses with certain kind of structural changes in mean appear indistinguishable
from long-memory processes. Given the significant shocks that have beset the
world economy over the past three decades, as well as the likelihood of structural
change occurring over this period, a measure that allows for such change is clearly
desirable.
2.3. Fractionally Integrated Processes - Long
Memory Models
In this section, we introduce the econometric methodology crucial to our study
on housing price bubbles and describe the distinction between long memory and
bubbles. We start with a brief introduction on long memory processes, then move
on to fractionally integrated processes I(d) and discuss when and why fractionally
integrated processes possess ”long memory” and the ramifications on asset price
bubbles. The presence of long memory in a time series can be defined in terms of
its spectral density function or the autocorrelation function, see Robinson (1994).
Let xt, t = 0,±1... be a time series indexed with time t. It is covariance
stationary if the mean, E(xt) = µ, and the covariance, Cov(xt, xt+j) = γ(j), do
not depend on t. The spectral density of xt is formally given by,
f(λ) =
1
2pi
∞∑
j=−∞
γ(j)e−ijλ,− pi ≤ λ ≤ pi (2.34)
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The series xt is then, said to have ”long memory” if
f(0) =
1
2pi
∞∑
j=−∞
γ(j) = 0 (2.35)
so that f(λ) has a ”pole” at frequency zero. Another way to look at long memory
models is in connection with persistence in autocorrelations. The extent of the
persistence is consistent with an essentially stationary process, but where the
autocorrelations takes far longer to decay than the exponential rate associated
with the ARMA class. The phenomenon has been noted in different data sets
by Hurst (1951) among others. When viewed as a time series realisation of a
stochastic process, the autocorrelation function exhibits persistence that is neither
consistent with an I(1) process nor an I(0) process. As the correlations decay to
zero very slowly, they are not summable i.e.,
∞∑
k=−∞
|%(k)| =∞ (2.36)
The intuitive interpretation is that the process has ”long memory”, see Baillie
(1996). This is in contrast to ”short memory” processes where the correlations
decay quickly to zero such that,
∞∑
k=−∞
|%(k)| <∞ (2.37)
For example, in an ARMA process, the asymptotic decay of the correlations is
exponential in the sense that there is an upper bound
|%(k)| ≤ bak (2.38)
where 0 < b <∞, 0 < a < 1 are constants.
The fractional integrating process I(d), d is a fractional number, can be re-
garded as a halfway house between the I(0) and I(1) paradigms. Formally, a
time series is defined as integrated of order d, denoted as I(d), when applying
the differencing operator (1−L)d renders it a stationary, invertible autoregressive
moving average (ARMA) process. When d is not an integer, the series is said to
be fractionally integrated.
In this case the series is represented by an Autoregressive Fractionally Inte-
grated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model,
Φ(L)(1− L)d(yt − µ) = Θ(L)t (2.39)
67
where L is the lag operator, Lkyt = yt−k, and Φ(L) = 1 −
∑p
i=1 φiL
i, Θ(L) =
1+
∑q
i=1 θiL
i, respectively, represent stationary autoregressive and moving average
components, see Granger and Joyeux (1980) and Robinson (2003) and others.
Further, t has an unconditional N(0, σ
2) distribution, and d can take non-integer
values. The fractional differencing operator is defined by its binomial expansion
(1− L)d =
∞∑
j=0
Γ(j − d)
Γ(j + 1)Γ(−d)L
j (2.40)
where Γ(.) is the Gamma function.
(1− L)d = 1− dL− d(1− d)
2!
L2 − d(1− d)(2− d)
3!
L3 − ..... (2.41)
In general, an ARFIMA(p, d, q) model can be represented in the following form,
(
1−
p∑
i=1
φiL
i
)
(1− L)d(yt) =
(
1 +
q∑
i=1
θiL
i
)
t. (2.42)
When the lag order is zero, ARFIMA(p, 0, q) follows an ARMA(p, q) process
with constant mean and variance over time. When d = 1, ARFIMA(p, 1, q) is
a non stationary process containing a unit root ARIMA(p, 1, q). The effects of
each shock persist and accumulate over periods of time, these integrated process
are not mean reverting.
The εt term in eq (2.42) is the innovation in the process. Normally, this term
is assumed to have a constant variance throughout. However, there is consider-
able empirical evidence that both U.S. aggregate and metropolitan housing prices
exhibit time changing variance, see Crawford and Fratantoni (2003), Miller and
Peng (2006) and Miles (2008).13 Furthermore, Cont (2005) shows that investor
inertia (due to high transaction costs and tax considerations) can cause volatility
clustering. As a result, volatility has to be parameterized to reflect time varying
effects.
Engle (1982) defined an ARCH process for εt of the form εt = ηtσt, where ηt is
an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process with E(ηt) = 0 and
V ar(ηt) = 1. Clearly, εt is serially uncorrelated with a mean equal to zero, but its
13Miller and Peng (2006) use a VAR model and calculates the impulse response functions to
evaluate the effects of volatility shocks to several fundamental housing variables and Crawford
and Fratantoni (2003) assess the efficiency of different time series models in forecasting house
prices and find that GARCH type models perform better.
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conditional variance equals σ2t and may change over time. This can be modelled
by Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Methods (ARCH). A variety
of ARCH models exist in the literature the main difference among them being the
functional form of σ2t . The conditional variance in the Engle (1982) formulation
is a distributed lag of past squared innovations.
σ2t = ω +
p∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i, (2.43)
The ARCH model can describe volatility clustering. The conditional variance of
εt is an increasing function of the shock that occurred in period t − 1. A large
absolute value in εt−1 implies that σ2t and εt (in absolute value) are expected
to be large. As a way of modelling persistent movements in volatility without
estimating a very large number of coefficients in a high order ARCH process,
Bollerslev (1986) suggested the Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model
σ2t = ω +
q∑
j=1
βjσ
2
t−j +
p∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i. (2.44)
There are some limitations to this GARCH model. The non-negativity conditions
on the conditional variance may be violated by the estimated method, since the
coefficients of model probably are negative. Furthermore, GARCH does not allow
for any direct feedback between the conditional variance and the conditional mean.
For these reasons, we make use of the asymmetric exponential GARCH model
of Nelson (2009). These are absolute value GARCH models and can accommo-
date effects of both positive and negative shocks. The EGARCH models is
expressed as follows
ln(σ2t ) = ω + [1− β(L)]−1[1 + α(L)]g(ηt−1) (2.45)
Since the ln(σ2t ) is modelled, the significant advantage of EGARCH models is
that even if the parameters are negative, σ2t will be positive.
g(ηt−1) = γ1ηt + γ2[|ηt| − E|ηt|] (2.46)
The α parameter represents a magnitude effect or the symmetric effect of the
model, theGARCH effect and β measures the persistence in conditional volatility.
When β is relatively large, volatility takes a long time to die out following a crisis
in the market. The γ parameter measures the asymmetry or the leverage effect,
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the parameter of importance so that the EGARCH model allows for testing of
asymmetries. If γ = 0 , then the model is symmetric. When γ < 0 , then
positive shocks (good news) generate less volatility than negative shocks (bad
news). When γ > 0 , it implies that positive innovations are more destabilizing
than negative innovations. E|ηt| depends on the assumptions made regarding the
unconditional distribution of ηt. For a normal distribution which we assume in
our analysis, E|ηt| =
√
2/pi.
In this chapter, we couple the EGARCH(1, 1) model with the ARFIMA
model and then parametrically estimate it by the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
method on the log rent-price data. The purpose of this estimation exercise is
to find the value of the persistence of the log rent-price ratio. The next sec-
tion describes the implication for bubble prevalence under different values of the
estimated persistence, d.
2.3.1. Persistence and Bubbles
Bubble behaviour of the Housing Market is tested using the estimated values of
the fractional integrating parameter, d, of the log rent-price ratio. Table 2.1 sum-
marizes bubble analysis for different values of d. Fractionally integrated processes
possess long memory when d lies between zero and one. They are also mean
reverting in this interval, which means that in the case of the housing market,
housing prices will return to its fundamentals ruling out the presence of price
bubbles.
Table 2.1. Bubble Analysis
Order of integration(d) of δt Analysis*
−1/2 < d < 0 anti-persistent and no bubbles
d = 0 stationary process and no bubbles
0 < d < 1/2 covariance-stationary
and mean reverting implying no rational bubbles
1/2 < d < 1 non-stationary and possess long memory
but also mean reverting implying no rational bubbles
d ≥ 1 non-stationary explosive process, no mean-reversion implying rational bubbles
Figure 1 plots simulated AR(1) process for different values of d. It is clearly
seen that as d approaches 1, the series mimics the slope of an asset price bubble.
This is especially true when d=0.99 very close to a unit toot process but possess
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the property of mean reversion and hence cannot be called a bubble. Standard
empirical methods that look for a unit root in financial ratios do not consider the
possibility of fractional roots and thus could mistake a mean reverting process as
a bubble.
Figure 2.1. Simulations of I(d) processes
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Notes: This figure graphically illustrate Autoregressive (AR(1)) simulations of I(0 ≤
d ≤ 1) processes. The top row traces paths for different covariance-stationary pro-
cesses. The second and third row depict changes in the persistence as d approach
unity.
The analysis here assumed no structural breaks. The presence of structural
breaks in the time series distorts an efficient estimation of the integrating factor d,
see Diebold and Inoue (2001). We implement structural change tests to account
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for this problem. The next section details a brief discussion on structural change
literature and how it affects long memory estimation.
2.4. Structural Changes versus Long Memory
The problem of detecting structural changes in linear regression relationships has
been an important topic in statistical and econometric research, see Hansen (1996)
for a discussion. Existing literature on long memory and asset price bubbles do
not account for structural breaks, see Cun˜ado et al. (2005), Koustas and Serletis
(2005) and Cun˜ado et al. (2012). However, many studies indicate that the time
series with structural breaks can induce a strong persistence in the autocorrela-
tion function and hence generate ”spurious” long memory, see Diebold and Inoue
(2001), Granger and Hyung (2004), Perron and Qu (2007). Perron and Qu (2007)
show how a stationary short memory process with level shifts can generate spuri-
ous long memory. Kruse and Sibbertsen (2012) considered a range of stable shifts
and a change in persistence in several simulated experiments and simulation re-
sults confirm theoretical arguments which suggest that spurious evidence for long
memory can easily be found.
Since the work of Quandt (1960), several methodologies (i.e. Andrews and Fair
(1988), Perron (1989), Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) etc.) have been suggested to
test for possible known or unknown single or multiple structural changes. How-
ever, a limitation of a majority of these tests is that the distribution theory used
for these tests is primarily asymptotic and has been derived under the maintained
assumption that the regressors are stationary. This excludes structural change in
the marginal distribution of the regressors. As a result, these tests technically
cannot discriminate between structural change in the conditional and marginal
distributions.
In this chapter, we make use of Hansen (2000)’s ’fixed regressor bootstrap’
method that is consistent for non-stationary regressors, achieves first-order asymp-
totic distribution and allows for arbitrary structural change in the regressors and
accommodates heteroskedastic error processes. In the following paragraphs, we
briefly describe this break methodology in the context of our chapter.
Consider the following linear regression with m breaks (m+ 1 regimes):
yni = µni + ψni + uni, (2.47)
where i = 1, . . . , n,, yni = δni is the log rent-price ratio, µ is the intercept or the
mean and ψ is the trend. Testing for structural change in the mean and trend is
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all about checking whether or not µ and ψ is constant. Hansen (2000) finds that
the distributions are different when the regressors are non-stationary and that the
size and power distortions can be quite large. The structural change in µ (or ψ)
can take the form
µni =
{
µ i < t0,
µ+ θn i ≥ t0.
(2.48)
The parameter t0 ∈ [t1, t2] indexes the relative timing of the structural shift, and
θn indexes the magnitude of the shift. Essentially, structural breaks are tested by
the null- H0 : θn = 0 against H1 : θn 6= 0.
Hansen (2000) assumes that θn takes the form
θn = ζσ/
√
n (2.49)
with ζ fixed as n→∞. The parameter ζ indexes the degree of structural change
under the local alternative H1 : θn 6= 0. We denote the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimators as µˆ and ψˆ, the residuals as uˆ and the variance as σˆ2 = (n −
m)−1
∑n
i=1 uˆ
2
i . Under the alternative H1 : θn 6= 0, the model can be written as
yni = µ+ θnI(i ≥ t0) + ψ + θnI(i ≥ t0) + uni (2.50)
For any fixed t, eq. (2.50) can be estimated by OLS, yielding estimates (µˆt, ψˆt, θˆt),
residuals uˆit and variance estimates σˆ
2
t = (n− 2m)−1
∑n
i=1 uˆ
2
it. Let tˆ = arg min σˆ
2
t
denote the least squares estimate of the breakdate and set µ˜ = µˆtˆ, ψ˜ = ψˆtˆ and
u˜i = uˆiˆt.
The standard test for H0 against H1 for known t (eg., Chow (1960)) is the
Wald statistic:
Ft =
(n−m)σˆ2 − (n− 2m)σˆ2t
σˆ2t
(2.51)
When the true changepoint t0 is unknown, Quandt (1960) proposed the likelihood
ratio test which is equivalent to
supFn = suptFt, (2.52)
where the supremum is taken over t ∈ (t1, t2). Andrews and Ploberger (1994)
suggested an exponentially weighted Wald test
ExpFn = ln
∫
exp(Ft/2)dw(t), (2.53)
73
and the average F test
AveFn =
∫
t
Ftdw(t), (2.54)
where w is a measure putting weight 1/(t2 − t1) on each integer t in the interval
[t1, t2]. Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and others assume that the regressors are
stationary which as illustrated by Hansen (2000) affects the asymptotic distri-
butions of the test statistics in complicated ways. Hansen (2000) advocates an
alternative bootstrap distribution called ’Fixed Regressor Bootstrap’.
The bootstrap procedure for the SupF test is discussed below. There are two
forms of fixed regressor bootstrap, one appropriate if the error uni is (1.) ho-
moskedastic and under (2.) heteroskedasticity. For the homoskedastic bootstrap,
let {yni : i = 1, . . . , n} be a random sample from the N(0, 1) distribution. Regress
yni(b) on µni and ψni to get the residual variance σˆ
2(b) and regress yni(b) on µni,
µniI(i ≤ t), ψni and ψniI(i ≤ t) to get the residual variance σˆ2t (b) and Wald
sequence
Ft(b) =
(n−m)σˆ2(b)− (n− 2m)σˆ2t (b)
σˆ2t (b)
(2.55)
The bootstrap test statistic is SupFn(b) = supt1≤t≤t2Ft(b). The bootstrap p-
value pn = 1 − Gn(SupFn), where Gn(x) = P (SupFn(b) ≤ x|Jn) denote the
conditional distribution function of SupFn(b) and x is the regressors (µ and ψ).
The bootstrap test rejects H0 when pn is small. We can allow for heteroskedastic
errors by making a small modification. Set yhni(b) = zi(b)u˜i, where {zi(b) : i =
1, . . . , n} is an iid N(0,1) sample. The heteroskedasticity corrected p-value is then
phn = 1−Ghn(SupFn) where Ghn is the modified conditional distribution.
In this chapter, we implement the three break tests based on the F statistic
(SupF , ExpF and AveF ). We then use Hansen (2000)’s methodology to compute
the heteroskedasticity corrected bootstrap p-values to make inference on presence
of structural changes. The results are reported in §2.7.4. Now that we have
detailed persistence characteristics on bubble behaviour and the implications of
structural breaks on it, we proceed to a review of the methods that we employ
to estimate the long memory persistence of the log rent-price ratios in the U.S.
Housing Market.
2.5. Long Memory Estimation
The literature on estimating long memory models is extensive with a wide range
of methods, see Li and Mcleod (1986), Hassler (1993) and Taqqu et al. (1995). In
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general, the estimators of the fractional order of integration, d, can be categorized
into two groups - semi-parametric and parametric methods. ‘Semi-parametric’
methods do not require the modelling of a complete set of parameters, we are only
interested in d. If a complete model is specified, such as an ARFIMA we term
the estimation ‘parametric’.14 The main disadvantages of parametric methods
are that they are computationally expensive and are subject to misspecification.
On the other hand, semi-parametric models consider d as the most important
parameter of interest and it is robust to mis-specification. A correctly specified
’parametric’ model aids us in analysing both the short run and the long run
memory of the series whereas the semi-parametric procedures only concentrate
on the long run persistence. However, we are only interested in the long run
persistence d in this paper. Hence, we believe the semi-parametric methods which
do not require the modelling of the short run dynamics and thus free of any
specification errors should perform better. Our results in §2.7.4 validates this
argument. Nevertheless, we implement both these estimation procedures, these
are explained in brief in the following two sections.
2.5.0.1. Parametric Estimation Methods
Parametric ARFIMA modelling can capture the long term persistence through
the order of integration and also the short term persistence through the ARMA
process.
This chapter makes use of a full parametric estimation method, namely the
Non-Linear Least Squares Estimation method of Beran (1995) which unlike Sowell
(1992)’s Exact Maximum Likelihood (often used in the literature), is consistent
in the non-stationary region as well. Beran (1995) developed an approximate
maximum likelihood estimator based on minimising the sum of squared naive
residuals, which is also applicable for non-stationary ARFIMA processes with
d > 0.5. The approximate log likelihood known as Non-linear Least Squares
(NLS) is given by
logLA(d, φ, θ, β) = c− 1
2
log
1
T − k
T∑
t=2
e˜2t , (2.56)
14Parametric methods can be in both the time domain and the frequency domain. Here,
we concentrate only on time domain parametric methods for an effective comparison with the
frequency domain semi-parametric ones.
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where e˜t are the one-step prediction errors from the naive predictions defined near
the AR(∞) representation of zt
zt =
∞∑
j=1
pijzt−j + εt, (2.57)
where zt = xt − µt. The results for the Beran (1995) estimation procedure for
the U.S. housing market is reported in §2.7.2. A major drawback of the para-
metric estimation is that the computed values are highly biased under misspec-
ification. Presence of non-normal/ARCH/autocorrelation errors will lead to in-
efficient estimates. Importantly, for small samples most of the persistence would
be concentrated in the ARMA part and thus the d value would be significantly
over-differenced. This motivates our use of the semi-parametric procedures.
2.5.0.2. Semi-parametric Estimation Methods
We use three semi-parametric estimation methods to evaluate the memory pa-
rameter, all of which are robust to both conditional heteroskedasticity and non-
normality. We start with the Local Whittle Estimate (LWE) developed by Kuen-
sch (1987) and Robinson (1995). It starts with the following Gaussian objective
function, defined in terms of the parameters d and G
Qm(G, d) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
[
log(Gλ−2dj ) +
λ2dj
G
Ix(λj)
]
, (2.58)
where the parameter m , usually referred to as the truncation point or the window
bandwidth, is a function of n (the sample size), chosen such that as n → ∞,
m/n → 0. Also, Ix(λj) is the periodogram of Xt evaluated at the fundamental
frequencies. Also, Xt is a fractional process with order d.
The local whittle procedure estimates G and d by minimising Qm(G, d), so
that
(Gˆ, dˆ) = arg min
G∈(0,∞),d∈[∆1,∆2]
Qm(G, d), (2.59)
where ∆1 and ∆2 are numbers such that −1/2 < ∆1 < ∆2 < ∞.15 Henceforth,
we denote the Local Whittle estimation of d as dˆLWE. Shimotsu and Phillips
(2004) finds that this Local Whittle estimator is not reliable when the value of d
15Robinson (1995) showed that
√
m(dˆ−d0)→d N(0, 1/4) as n→∞ under certain conditions.
Here d0 is the true value of the d parameter.
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is in the non-stationary zone (d > 1/2). The asymptotic theory is discontinuous at
d = 3/4, at d = 1 and not consistent beyond unity. Although data differencing and
tapering have been recommended (Velasco (1999) and Hurvich and Chen (2000)),
these approaches do have some disadvantages, such as the need to determine the
appropriate order of differencing and the effects of tapering on data trajectory
and asymptotic variance.
Shimotsu and Phillips (2005) proposed an Exact Local Whittle Estimation
procedure that does not rely on tapering or differencing pre-filters and which is
consistent when d ≥ 1/2. If for the fractional process Xt
(1− L)dXt = ut1{t ≥ 1}, t = 0,±1,±2 . . . (2.60)
where ut is an I(0) process with mean 0 and 1{.} is an indicator function. If the
spectral density of Xt is given by fu(λj) ∼ G and I∆dX is the periodogram of d-th
difference of Xt, the fractional order d is estimated by
dˆELW = arg mind∈[∆1,∆2]R(d), (2.61)
where
R(d) = log Gˆ(d)− 2d 1
m
m∑
j=1
log λj (2.62)
and
Gˆ(d) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
I∆dX (λj) (2.63)
dˆELW is called the Exact Local Whittle (ELW) Estimator of d.
Most economic and financial series is modelled with a mean and a time trend.
In fact, the rent-price series we analyse in this paper does exhibit a polynomial
trend in its trajectory. Shimotsu (2009) extended the ELW estimator to accom-
modate an unknown mean and a polynomial time trend. When the data Xt are
generated by
Xt = µ0 +X
0
t ; X
0
t = (1− L)−d0ut1{t ≥ 1} (2.64)
where µ0 is a nonrandom unknown finite number. Shimotsu (2009) prescribes
estimating the unknown mean, µ0, as a linear combination of the sample mean,
X¯, and the first observation, X1:
µ˜(d) = w(d)X¯ + (1− w(d))X1, (2.65)
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where w(d) is a twice continuously differentiable weight function such that w(d) =
1 for d ≤ 1/2 and w(d) = 0 for d ≥ 3/4.16 With this estimate of µ0, consider the
modified ELW objective function:
RF (d) = log GˆF (d)− 2d 1
m
m∑
j=1
log λj, GˆF (d) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
I∆d(x−µ˜(d))(λj). (2.66)
d is then estimated by applying a 2-step procedure on this objective function
under the assumption that f(λ) is bounded for λ ∈ [0, pi]. They call this the
2-step Exact Local Whittle Estimator, dˆ2ELW , which is given by
dˆ2ELW = dˆT −R′F (dˆT )/R′′F (dˆT ), (2.67)
where dˆT , known as the first stage estimator, is a tapered local Whittle estimator
of Velasco (1999) and Hurvich and Chen (2000). RF is the modified objective
function defined in eq. (2.66). dˆ2ELW is asymptotically normal and
√
m consistent.
This two-step ELW estimator can be extended to the cases where the data has a
polynomial time trend in addition to an unknown mean:
Xt = µ0 + β1t+ β2t
2 + . . .+ βkt
k +X0t ; X
0
t = (1− L)−d0ut1{t ≥ 1}. (2.68)
d can be estimated by regressing Xt on (1, t, . . . , t
k) and then applying the two-
step estimation to the residuals Xˆt. In this chapter, we consider both an unknown
mean and a polynomial trend and the d estimate is denoted as dˆ2ELW . Both the
ELW and the 2ELW inherit the desirable properties of the local whittle procedures
in that they are robust to normal errors and conditional heteroskedasticity.
However, one problem in computing the Whittle estimators concerns with the
choice of bandwidth m in finite samples. Hence, we follow Kumar and Okimoto
(2007) and choose m based on simulations. We simulate Yt = (1− L)−dt, where
t is a Gaussian white noise process, with sample size 125.
17 The optimal m
is the one which minimizes the sample Mean Squared Error (MSE) for several
choices of m, that is m = {n0.60, n0.65, n0.70, n0.75, n0.80}. Based on the simulation
results, we select m = 0.75 for both 2ELW and ELW and m = 0.80 for the
LWE. The simulation results also showed that the 2-step ELW estimator gave
consistent estimates which were closer to the true value of d. The results for the
semi-parametric procedures are reported in §2.7.3
16An example of w(d) for d ∈ [1/2, 3/4] is (1/2)[1 + cos(4pid)].
17This is the sample size of the data that we use later on in our empirical section.
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To summarize our key methods so far, we shall seek to apply non-stationary
consistent parametric ARFIMA and semi-parametric Whittle methods to esti-
mate the order of integration d. These d values are examined for asset bubbles.
We also examine whether endogenous breaks induce any bubbles.
2.6. Rent-Price Data
Having described a theoretical framework that defines housing bubbles and an
econometric framework to test for the existence of these bubbles, we now introduce
the dataset. We use a log normalized house rent to house price ratio of three
national HPI’s and 12 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). The dataset spans
the quarterly 31 years time period 1982Q4-2013Q4. The fact that we use an
updated dataset ensures that our analysis incorporates both the upswing as well
as the subsequent collapse in U.S. house prices.
The aggregate level price of residential housing is measured by the HPI (House
Price Indexes) published by the Federal Housing and Finance Agency (FHFA),
the Standard & Poor 500 Case-Shiller Index (Case-Shiller) and the United States
Bureau of Census (Census). Both the FHFA and the Case-Shiller measure house
prices as changes to the price of owner occupied housing by reviewing repeat
mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose mortgages have been
purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, see Calhoun (1996). The
US Bureau of Census produces a constant-quality HPI which employs the hedonic
methodology adjusting for several physical attributes.18
The FHFA also publishes regional HPI data for MSA’s belonging to the four
census regions :- Midwest, Northeast, South and West. In this chapter, to augment
the aggregate level analysis we use HPI data of 12 MSA’s, three each from the
four census divisions.
18Adjusted to attributes such as geographical location, lot size, number of bedrooms, num-
ber of bathrooms, type of parking facility, construction method, types of heating and air-
conditioning systems etc. As such this index is a more reliable estimate of changes in housing
prices than either the Case-Shiller or the FHFA. The Census index is also superior to other
home price indexes such as the median price of existing homes sold by the National Association
of Realtors (different from the NAR affordability index used here) and the median price of new
homes sold published monthly by the Bureau of the Census of the United States Department
of Commerce due to three main reasons. Firstly these two indices are not seasonally adjusted
despite apparent seasonality; secondly there is high volatility in the short run as regional and
product mix of sales varies from month to month; and thirdly as the underlying price data
reflect only recent sales, the series may not accurately demonstrate housing stock values, see
McCarthy and Peach (2004).
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The rental data is extracted from the Owner’s Equivalent Rent of Primary
Residence belonging to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) market basket published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) following Ayuso and Restoy (2006),
Clayton (1996) and Mankiw and Weil (1989) among others. This index is based on
the following question that the Consumer Expenditure Survey asks of consumers
who own their primary residence: ”If someone were to rent your home today, how
much do you think it would rent for monthly, unfurnished and without utilities?”.
The ratio of this rental index and the HPI indexes gives us the nominal rental
price ratio which is then deflated to real values by the region specific Consumer
Price Index Excluding Shelter as in Abraham and Hendershott (1996). Both the
HPI’s and the rental data are also seasonally adjusted using the X-12 Census
procedure.
There are several papers in the literature that use similar HPI and Rental
Indexes to look for asset price deviations in the United States Housing Market.
Abraham and Hendershott (1996) used repeat sales Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
index to assess contributions of several macroeconomic factors to the appreciation
in real house prices in 30 MSA’s belonging to the four census regions. Ayuso and
Restoy (2006) use an FHFA quarterly dataset spanning 1987Q1 - 2003Q2 and
a CPI-Rent data from BLS to examine for overvaluation of real housing prices
in relation to rents. Barros et al. (2012) also use quarterly national and state
level FHFA HPI data from 1975:1 till 2010:7 to check for fractional co-movement
between regional and the national indexes. Campbell et al. (2009) make use of
FHFA national and 23 MSA level HPI and rental data to decompose the variability
of the rent-price ratio.
Figure 2.1 plots the national log rent-price ratios (δt) of FHFA, Case-Shiller
and Census. When house prices are high relative to housing rents (i.e. fundamen-
tal values), the rent-price ratio is low. Thus, it can be concluded that a rent-price
ratio far below its historical average indicates that asset prices have increased
beyond fundamental values suggesting a possible bubble in the housing market.
The non-availability of high frequency data for rental prices is the primary rea-
son behind using a quarterly level analysis. It goes without saying that volatility
effects (GARCH) will not be as prevalent as in the monthly series. However, hous-
ing unlike other assets such as stocks are illiquid because of the high transaction
and labour costs involved. This coupled with the fact that buying and selling
are done at irregular intervals imposes heteroskedasticity in the price indexes by
construction. This is one of the reasons why we find substantial GARCH effects
when using parametric ARFIMA−GARCH estimation.
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Figure 2.1. National Rent-Price Ratio’s
Notes: This figure provides a graphical illustration of the log rent-price ratio of aggregate
FHFA, Case-Shiller and Census. The general trend is downward in the log rent-price ratio
associated with the upward trend in house prices.The second row plots the autocorrelation
functions and the spectral densities.
On visual inspection, it is observable that the δt’s of FHFA, Case-Shiller and
Census follow a similar trend in that they gradually decline to a historical low in
the 2006-2007 period (suggesting a bubble phase) followed by a gradual apprecia-
tion. This is in agreement with Krainer and Wei (2004) who calculate US FHFA
house price to CPI rent ratio and find that house prices have been rising faster
than implied rental values during the period of 1997-2004.
The autocorrelation function, second row in Figure (2.1), shows a slow decline
with increasing lags and the spectral density plot has an upper bound at zero
frequency both suggesting long memory in the national indices.19 All the 12
Metropolitan Statistical Areas plotted in Figure (2.B.1) in the Appendix B follow
a similar pattern in that they appear to be correlated with each other agreeing
with Case et al. (1991) who demonstrate that house prices in the four regions of
the United States are serially correlated.
19The spectral density of a covariance stationary process can be written as f(λ) ∼ Gλ−2d as
λ→ 0+ where d as usual is the memory parameter, d ∈ (0, 1) and G ∈ (0,∞). When d = 1/2,
f(λ) approaches to a positive constant at zero frequency, d ∈ (0, 1/2) it approaches to zero and
when d ∈ (1/2, 1) it tends to infinity, see Robinson (1995).
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics
Housing Market Mean Min Max Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob. N
FHFA 0.182 -0.308 0.710 0.314 -0.056 1.671 9.266 0.019** 125
Case-Shiller 0.920 0.367 1.384 0.294 -0.280 1.728 8.691 0.012** 108
Census 1.309 0.941 1.681 0.230 -0.085 1.624 10.018 0.016** 125
Midwest
Chicago 0.887 0.348 1.522 0.333 0.169 2.029 5.510 0.050* 125
Cleveland 0.818 0.449 1.372 0.291 0.512 1.891 11.872 0.011** 125
Detroit 0.794 0.275 1.496 0.365 0.373 1.843 9.869 0.016** 125
Northeast
Boston 0.728 0.172 1.660 0.399 0.218 2.123 5.003 0.060* 125
New York 0.820 0.226 1.646 0.373 0.018 2.112 4.113 0.087* 125
Philadelphia 0.845 0.251 1.518 0.375 -0.204 1.829 8.002 0.025** 125
South
Atlanta 0.715 0.261 1.248 0.307 0.041 1.590 10.396 0.015** 125
Dallas 0.600 0.206 0.926 0.227 -0.384 1.610 13.131 0.009*** 125
Houston 0.442 0.018 0.799 0.245 -0.348 1.674 11.676 0.011** 125
West
Los Angeles 0.670 -0.123 1.346 0.421 -0.113 2.059 4.879 0.063* 125
San Francisco 0.756 0.021 1.600 0.475 0.159 1.956 6.199 0.041** 125
Seattle 0.787 0.073 1.541 0.439 0.191 1.942 6.592 0.036** 125
Notes: These are descriptive for statistics on the log rent-price ratio for th complete set of dats
aeries that we described in this section. The dataset spans the quarterly time period 1982Q4-
2013Q4 (N=125) except Case-Shiller which starts in 1987Q1 (N=108). The Jarque-Bera statistic
has a joint hypothesis that the skewness and the excess kurtosis is zero, i.e. null that the data is
normally distributed. ’***’, ’**’ and ’*’ indicate rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. Deviations from the Normal distribution (fat tails) indicates the possibility of swings
in the data.
The descriptive statistics for both aggregate (national) and regional rent-price
ratio’s are recorded in Table 2.1. Null of normality is uniformly rejected across
the entire dataset indicating the presence of fat tails in the distribution, a char-
acteristic generally observed in most of the financial time series data. Deviations
from normality also imply that there are possible swings in the data or in other
words, an asset price bubble. We also observe high standard deviation in the
Western region comprising Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. Case and
Shiller (2003) find comparatively higher growth in house prices in the West Coast
of the United States. Malpezzi (1996); Malpezzi and Wachter (2005) among oth-
ers believe that the high magnitude of price appreciation in such regions is due to
the metropolitan housing market’s supply inelasticity. To further understand the
time series properties of the US housing market and to infer about persistence
and bubbles, we proceed to implement the tests discussed in section 2.5.
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2.7. Empirical Results
This section reports and discusses the core empirical results obtained in this chap-
ter on the existence of bubbles in the U.S. Housing Market. We start with some
preliminary unit root tests to set the scene. Given the limitations of standard
unit root testing we then progress to parametric and semi-parametric estimation
of the fractional order of integration (d) parameter. Before we conclude we test
whether the estimates of d are from a true long memory process or induced by a
structural break.
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2.7.1. Evidence for Bubbles - Unit Root Tests
Table 2.1. Unit Root Results
Housing Market Unit Root Tests Conclusion
ADF DF-GLS KPSS
FHFA -2.202 -2.350 0.090 I(0)/I(1)
Case-Shiller -2.455 -2.333 0.104 I(0)/I(1)
Census -2.471 -2.524 0.088 I(0)/I(1)
Midwest
Chicago -2.398 -2.219 0.114 I(0)/I(1)
Cleveland -0.674 -1.499 0.229*** I(1)
Detroit -1.622 -1.691 0.213** I(1)
Northeast
Boston -3.034 -2.965* 0.078 I(0)/I(1)
New York -2.458 -2.341 0.083 I(0)/I(1)
Philadelphia -1.741 -2.116 0.095 I(0)/I(1)
South
Atlanta -2.288 -2.315 0.120* I(1)
Dallas -2.936 -1.813 0.201** I(1)
Houston -1.258 -1.618 0.163** I(1)
West
Los Angeles -1.710 -2.046 0.072 I(0)/I(1)
San Francisco -0.553 -1.219 0.081 I(0)/I(1)
Seattle 0.288 -1.188 0.115 I(0)/I(1)
Crit. Value
1% -4.042 -3.565 0.216
5% -3.450 -3.018 0.146
10% -3.150 -2.728 0.119
Notes: This table reports the unit root test results for the log rent-price ratios of the three national
indexes (i.e. FHFA, Case-Shiller and Census) and the 12 regional MSA’s. The sample spans the time
period 1982Q4-2013Q4, except Case-Shiller which is 1987Q1-2013Q4. Critical values (1%, 5% and 10%)
for the tests is given in the last three rows. All the unit root test statistics reported assume the presence of
an intercept and a trend. p-values/Critical Values for DF-GLS, KPSS is obtained from MacKinnon(1996)
and Kwiatoski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992). The null hypothesis for all the tests except KPSS is that δt
has a unit root. The null hypothesis for KPSS is that the series is stationary. Lags are fixed at 12. For
the KPSS test, the Newey West automatic method using Bartlett kernel selects the bandwidth. ”*”,”**”
and”***” indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The last
column gives the resultant conclusion of the unit root tests, specifically says whether the series is stationary
I(0), a unit root bubble process, I(1) or I(0)/I(1) when the tests contradict each other.
Integer order tests are implemented to examine the stationarity, I(0), or non-
stationarity, I(1), of the log rent-price ratio (δt). The presence of a unit root,
I(1), in δt is consistent with the presence of housing price bubbles.
Table 2.1 reports the unit root results for the Housing Market. Column 1
defines the housing series estimated and columns 2-4 report test statistics of all
the different tests implemented. We use two tests, namely the Augmented Dicky-
Fuller (ADF) and the GLS-detrended Dicky-Fuller Elliot et al. (1996). Both these
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tests have a null hypothesis that the rent to price ratio has a unit root. The way in
which classical hypothesis testing is carried out ensures that the null hypothesis is
hard to reject. Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) argue that such unit-root tests often fail
to reject a unit root because they have low power against relevant alternatives,
such as, fractionally integrated series. They propose tests, known as KPSS tests,
with the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root.
They argue that such tests should complement unit-root tests and that by testing
both the unit-root and the stationarity hypotheses, one can distinguish between
series that appear to be integrated, series that appear to be stationary, and series
that are not very informative about whether or not they are stationary or have a
unit root. The KPSS test statistics are reported in column 4 of Table 2.1. The
lags for all these tests are fixed at 12 and the tests employ the presence of an
intercept and a trend in the test regression.
The results in Table 2.1 aid us in presenting a preliminary empirical evidence
on the presence of price bubbles in the U.S. Housing Market. The last column in
the Table shows the conclusions we draw from the three tests. There are three
cases we have to consider here. First, the case of unit root and bubbles - I(1).
This occurs when both the ADF and the DF-GLS test were unable to reject the
null of a unit root and the KPSS test rejected the null of stationarity, I(0). We
find that 5 out of 15 series showed this behaviour.
Second, the case of no bubbles I(0) when the ADF and the DF-GLS test reject
the null of a unit root and the KPSS test do not reject the null of stationarity.
We observe that none of the series exhibited this behaviour.
Third, the case of I(0)/I(1) when the tests contradict each other. In this
scenario, no conclusion can be drawn about bubbles from the tests. We will
explain this with an example. Take the case of the aggregate FHFA series. The
ADF and the DF-GLS both were unable to reject the unit root which should
mean that the KPSS test will reject the null of stationarity. However, the KPSS
test do not reject its null. In this case, we conclude that the series could be
either an I(0)/I(1). The majority, 10 out of 15 series, fall in this category. These
series which include all the aggregate ones may possess long memory and mean
reversion implying no bubbles or unit root or explosive indicating bubbles.
It is this inability of these standard unit root tests that validate our use of
the fractional order methods. In the following sections, we make use of both
parametric and semi-parametric estimation methods and also consider structural
breaks to arrive at an efficient method to analyse housing bubbles.
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We discuss the results for the regional series in more detail here. The results for
the FHFA Regional MSA’s are mixed. All the West and the Northeast regions as
well as Chicago from the Midwest follow the national indexes in that they could be
mean-reverting (I(0)/I(1)). However, Cleveland and Detroit from the Midwest;
and Atlanta, Dallas and Houston from the South; show unit root tendency.20 Most
of the current literature that analyse the time series properties of U.S. Housing
Indexes do not consider the ratio of rental to housing price series and tests for
rational bubbles. They concentrate on merely the persistence of the house prices.
Hence, an effective comparison with our results is not possible. Nevertheless, they
uniformly find unit root persistence in the U.S. HPI’s. For instance Canarella
et al. (2011) who uses the DF-GLS test and finds overwhelming evidence to the
presence of a unit root in the Case-Shiller MSA’s for the monthly 23 year time
period, January 1987-April 2009. Using quarterly data from 1975 to 1996 from the
50 US states, Mun˜oz (2004) also finds unit roots in house price changes, using the
Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF–GLS) test. Meen (2002) compares
the time-series behaviour of house prices in the US and the UK. Using quarterly
data from 1976 to 1999 for the US and from 1969 to 1999 for the UK, Meen
(2002) conducts both Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–Perron (PP)
unit-root tests on the level of house prices. He finds that in both countries house
prices follow a difference stationary process. That is, house prices are I(1).
It is clear from the results in Table 2.1 that the standard unit root tests do
not provide a clear analysis about the exact persistence of the rent-price ratio’s
primarily because these test are too restrictive in that they consider only two
possible values of d in the real space d ∈ [0, 1]. A recent unit root test by Cavaliere
and Xu (2014) is widely applicable in series which are naturally bounded. THis
test unlike the conventional ADF tests do not over-reject the null hypothesis.
Nominal interest rates, unemployment rates and target zone exchange rates are
examples of such bounded series. However, the use of this test in a model designed
to detect bubbles which are marked by deviations from any bounds based on
fundamentals is not appropriates. Nevertheless, this test complements the unit
root tests used here. Furthermore, much research argues that the presence of
structural breaks distorts the validity of standard unit root tests (Perron (1989,
1997)). This motivates our use of both parametric and semi-parametric methods
for estimating the actual persistence or memory parameter (d). Koustas and
Serletis (2005) also finds that unit root tests like ADF have low power in detecting
20Firstly, the KPSS test rejects the null of stationarity and secondly, both the ADF and the
DF-GLS do not reject the null of a unit root.
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asset price bubbles in the dividend-price ratio and advocates the use of ARFIMA
based parametric estimation methods. The following two sections describe their
results.
2.7.2. Evidence for Bubbles - Parametric Estimation
The use of a full parametric estimation in the time domain, makes it possible to
analyse both the short run (using ARMA) and the long run persistence (using
d) simultaneously. Having two null hypothesis of d = 1 (unit root) or d = 1
(stationarity) allows our long memory methods to encompass both the ADF and
KPSS tests in the previous section.
Existing literature that use maximum likelihood methods to estimate long
memory in the time domain such as Koustas and Serletis (2005) and Kruse and
Sibbertsen (2012) apply the Exact Maximum Likelihood method of Sowell (1992)
on the dividend-price ratio in the U.S. Stock Market. A major drawback of this
approach is that the Exact maximum Likelihood gives valid estimates of d only
for stationary ARFIMA process i.e., d < 1/2. At every step of the optimisation
procedure, d is forced to take stationary values and hence, the resulting value of d
is an over-differenced estimate. An additional problem in using a full parametric
approach is that the precision with which the memory parameter is estimated
hinges on the correct specification of the model, see Hauser et al. (1999). Thus,
it is imperative to know the underlying data generating process before applying
likelihood methods.
In this chapter, to circumvent these problems, we make use of the the Non-
Linear Least Squares estimate (NLS) proposed by Beran (1995) which is consistent
for d > 1/2 and we select the optimal model for the ARMA part using the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). NLS given by eq. 2.56 in §2.5.2.5.0.1 is
estimated on the following ARFIMA equation for each time series,(
1−
p∑
i=1
φi
)
(1− L)d(δt − µ) = (1 +
q∑
i=1
θiL
i)εt, (2.69)
where p and q are the optimal AR and MA lags selected by BIC. The results of
this estimation for the Housing Market dataset is reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
The two parameters that are of interest to us are d, the long memory pa-
rameter, and ρ the sum of autoregresive coefficients (SARC), ρ =
∑p
i=1 φi - a
conventional measure of short run persistence in time series literature proposed
by Andrews and yuan Chen (1994). Tests for bubbles are based on imposing
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linear restrictions, d = 1 and d = 0, respectively. We also test for ρ = 1, that
is unit root in the short run. However, we are only concentrated on the long
run behaviour of the log rent-price ratio’s we conclude for bubble behaviour only
when there is a unit root in d. Hence, the linear restrictions helps in examing for
the stationarity or unit behaviour of the rent-price ratios and whether these are
rational bubbles. Shaded columns indicate the series in which the null of a unit
root in the long memory (d = 1) cannot be rejected and thus exhibits bubbles.
The first column of these tables shows the parameters, residual tests and linear
restrictions while the other columns report the corresponding estimated values
with standard error in parentheses. In addition to computing the parameters,
we also implement residual tests namely, for normal, ARCH and autocorrelation
errors. The reported p-values less than 0.05 indicate rejection of the null and
implies the existence of these errors at the 5% significance level. The gray shaded
columns indicate series with bubble behaviour.
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Table 2.2. Parametric ARFIMA Estimation - National δt’s
Est FHFA Case-Shiller Census
AR(4)MA(0) AR(4)MA(0) AR(3)MA(0)
dˆ 1.290 (0.256) 1.276 (0.359) 0.074 (0.083)
φˆ1 0.215 (0.261) 0.596 (0.342) 0.914 (0.118)
φˆ2 -0.175 (0.103) -0.209 (0.109) 0.041 (0.097)
φˆ3 0.262 (0.134) 0.090 (0.069) 0.028 (0.031)
φˆ4 0.215(0.088) 0.117 (0.056)
µ 0.672 (0.139) 0.488 (0.899) 0.787 (0.350)
ρ 0.517 0.794 0.983
Residual Tests
Normality 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002***
ARCH 0.044** 0.077* 0.102
Autocorrelation 0.216 0.960 0.542
Linear Restr.
d = 0 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.370
d = 1 0.257 0.442 0.000***
ρ = 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.471
Notes: This table reports the Non-Linear Least Squares parameter estimates of the
log rent-price ratio’s corresponding to the three national HPI’s. The sample spans
the quarterly time period 1982Q4-2013Q4 (N = 125), except Case-Shiller which is
1987Q1-2013Q4. d is the fractional integration parameter, φi’s are estimated AR
parameters of p order and µ is the constant mean used in the regression.’*’, ’**’
and ’***’ indicate rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters. The null
hypothesis in the residual tests are normality, no ARCH effects and no autocor-
relation. The unit root hypothesis is tested by the linear restriction d = 1 while
the stationarity hypothesis is tested by d = 0. The ARCH effects are analysed
using Engle’s ARCH 1-1 (F stats) and the autocorrelation using Portmanteau (χ2
stats). The Linear Restrictions use a χ2 test statistic with one degree of freedom.
Shaded columns indicate the possibility of unit roots in d and thus housing price
bubbles. Estimation is done using the arfima package in OxMetrics, see Doornik
and Ooms (2003). ρ is the sum of autoregressive coefficients, for a stationary process
−1 < ρ < 1.
Both the Case-Shiller and the FHFA report long memory estimates (dˆ) greater
than 1 suggesting explosive roots and bubble behaviour. This is confirmed by the
Linear Restrictions on d, the null of stationarity (d = 0) is rejected while that of
a unit root (d = 1) is not. These long memory tests thus improve upon the ADF
and KPSS tests as the reported results are much clearer and is hence a consistent
estimator for bubble testing.
The Census has a d value close to zero suggesting covariance-stationarity.
Also, the null of a unit root is rejected while that of stationarity is not negating
bubble behaviour. Unlike for FHFA and Case-Shiller the SARC (ρ = 1) here is
non-stationary suggesting that while in the long run Census reverts to its mean
there are significant bubble like deviations in the short term. This contrasting
behaviour is expected as the Census unlike the FHFA and the Case-Shiller is
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a constant quality index meaning that any improvements to an owner occupied
housing will reflect in its price. McCarthy and Peach (2004) also find that the
Census unlike other HPI’s reverts to its mean in the long run. The unit root
persistence in the short run is probably due to the housing bubble that was
observed in the 2006-07 period. It is also important that we examine whether the
residuals are sensible for estimation in Table 2.2.
Residual Tests suggest the presence of non-normality and heteroskedasticity
in all the aggregate series.21 The presence of ARCH errors leads us to question
the usefulness of the ARFIMA approach but we control for these errors later on.
We now turn to the disaggregate data given by the 12 metropolitan areas.
Table 2.3 describe parametric estimates for 12 such Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas,i.e. three MSA’s each from the four census regions:- Midwest, Northeast,
West and South. In contrast to the aggregate δt’s, all 12 regional MSA’s with
the exception of New York report d values less than unity. Inferences for unit
root bubble behaviour are made from the p-values reported for the linear restric-
tions. As described earlier, a rejection of stationarity (d = 0) and an inability to
reject the unit root null (d = 1) would imply the possibility of bubbles. These re-
gions are shaded in grey. These include two MSA’s from the Northeast (Boston,
New York) and all three West areas (Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle).
The non-shaded series comprising 2/3 from Midwest (Cleveland, Detroit), 1/3
from Northeast (Philadelphia) and 3/3 from the South (Atlanta, Dallas, Hous-
ton) shows unit root behaviour in the short run i.e. ρ=1 is not rejected. We can
imply that these series probably contained bubble episodes but are now reverting
to their long run mean.
Of interest is the aggregate FHFA series showing a persistence of dˆ = 1.290
much greater than any of the regional ones. This is suggestive of an aggregate
bias in the construction of the FHFA House Price Index.
The residual tests in Table 2.3 for the disaggregate data again reported nor-
mal and ARCH errors in most of the series implying that we have to model the
variance. The presence of heteroskedastic errors in repeats sales indexes (FHFA,
Case-Shiller) as argued by Goodman and Thibodeau (1998) has to do with the
timing of house sales. Goodman and Thibodeau (1998) examine whether the
21The presence of heteroskedasticity can bring severe problems. Under classical assumptions,
ordinary least squares regression procedure (OLS) gives best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE).
However, with heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators are unbiased but not best, i.e. they are not
minimum variance. Additionally, the variance calculated by standard OLS procedures are biased
and this implies that the standard tests (t, F, etc.) are unreliable, see White (1982)
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likelihood that houses have different-vintage renovations can contribute to het-
eroskedasticity. For example, owner occupied homes tend to be improved (by
the seller or the buyer or both) at the time of sale. In their empirical analysis,
they hypothesize that the shorter the time between sales, the less extensive the
undocumented improvements are likely to be, and hence the more accurate the
predictions of house prices and of subsequent appreciation rates can be. They
report that the interval between two sales contributes significantly to the size
of residual variance. Fletcher et al. (2000) extends the work of Goodman and
Thibodeau (1998) and finds that heteroskedasticity is present in hedonic based
house price indexes (Census). Their study concluded that the appearance of non-
constant residual variance was not because of outliers in the data but due to
heterogeneity of houses i.e. the variance of the disturbance term differed between
types of property (detached, semi-detached, terraced) and the age of the property.
These studies imply that heteroskedasticity is an inherent part of the house price
indexes and hence, has to be accounted for in the estimation procedure.
To address the problem of ARCH errors in the residuals, we include an
EGARCH term (see Bollerslev and Ole Mikkelsen (1996)) in the ARFIMA
model (2.69). Maximum Likelihood Estimation is done on an ARFIMA(p, d, q)−
EGARCH(1, 1) process.22 The addition of the EGARCH process implies the es-
timation of (2.69) along with the following equations:
σ2t = ω +
q∑
j=1
βjσ
2
t−j +
p∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i. (2.70)
ln(σ2t ) = ω + [1− β(L)]−1[1 + α(L)]g(ηt−1) (2.71)
where
g(ηt−1) = γ1ηt + γ2[|ηt| − E|ηt|] (2.72)
We assume the innovations ηt to be normal so that E|ηt| =
√
2/pi.
22Estimation of ARFIMA-EGARCH is done using the Simulated Annealing algorithm for
optimizing non-smooth functions with possible multiple local maxima. Starting from an initial
point, the algorithm takes a step and the function is evaluated. When minimizing a function,
any downhill step is accepted and the process repeats from this new point. An uphill step
may be accepted. Thus, it can escape from local optima. This uphill decision is made by the
Metropolis criteria. As the optimization process proceeds, the length of the steps decline and
the algorithm closes in on the global optimum. Since the algorithm makes very few assumptions
regarding the function to be optimized, it is quite robust with respect to non-quadratic surfaces.
Several initial values are tested to obtain strong convergence.
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report likelihood estimates of the parameters for the na-
tional and the regional log rent-price ratio’s when the variance follow an EGARCH(1, 1)
process. In general, the estimated long memory is significantly different to those
of the pure ARFIMA estimates (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). The magnitude and sign
of the difference is largely dependent on normality of the residuals rather than
heteroskedasticity. Efficient estimation of maximum likelihood relies on the as-
sumption of Normal Distribution, in other words the series is linear. The pure
ARFIMA results (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) indicated non-normal residuals and hence
those estimates are not efficient i.e. unit root bubble testing which relies on linear
restrictions on d (F stat.) could be unreliable. The addition of the EGARCH
term in the estimation process ensured that the residuals are normal and free of
ARCH errors. However, the residuals in most series do indicate serial correlation
implying the results are subject to this caveat.
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Table 2.4. Parametric ARFIMA-EGARCH Estimation - National δt’s
Est FHFA Case-Shiller Census
AR(4)MA(0) AR(4)MA(0) AR(3)MA(0)
dˆ 0.692 (0.000) 1.591 (0.250) 0.484 (0.216)
φˆ1 0.617 (0.001) 0.483 (0.392) 0.297 (0.273)
φˆ2 0.091 (0.001) -0.043 (0.581) 0.406 (0.068)
φˆ3 0.111 (0.001) 0.301 (0.346) 0.277 (0.222)
φˆ4 0.193 (0.000) 0.259 (0.168)
µˆ 2.907 (0.000) 11.815 (4.765) 0.372 (2.919)
ωˆ -9.538 (0.165) -8.817 (0.262) -8.345 (0.206)
αˆ1 0.225 (0.155) 1.247 (0.809) 1.041 (0.259)
βˆ1 -0.724 (0.028) 0.145 (0.702) -0.719 (0.092)
γˆ1 0.279 (0.120) 0.004 (0.304) 0.343 (0.149)
γˆ2 0.744 (0.146) 0.700 (0.613) 0.679 (0.528)
ρ 1.042 1.000 0.980
Residual Tests
Normality 0.973 0.364 0.108
ARCH 0.418 0.611 0.954
Autocorrelation 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.120
Linear Restr.
d = 0 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.025**
d = 1 0.000*** 0.715 0.017**
ρ = 1 0.255 0.450 0.100
Notes: This table reports Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the ARFIMA −
EGARCH model on the national δt’s. The sample spans the quarterly time pe-
riod 1982Q4-2013Q4 (N = 125), except Case-Shiller which is 1987Q1-2013Q4. d is
the fractional integration parameter, φi’s are estimated AR parameters of p order,
µ and ω are the constant mean and variance respectively. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors of the estimated parameters. The null hypothesis in the resid-
ual tests are normality, no ARCH effects and no autocorrelation. ’***’, ’**’ and
’*’ indicates rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The
unit root hypothesis is tested by the linear restriction d = 1 while the stationarity
hypothesis is tested by d = 0. The ARCH effects are analysed using Engle’s ARCH
1-1 (F stats) and the autocorrelation using Portmanteau (χ2 stats). The Linear
Restrictions use a χ2 test statistic with one degree of freedom. Shaded columns
indicate the possibility of housing bubbles. Estimation is done using the arfima
package in OxMetrics, see Doornik and Ooms (2003). ρ is the sum of autoregressive
coefficients, for a stationary process −1 < ρ < 1.
In contrast to the pure ARFIMA results, only Case-Shiller in Table 2.4
amongst the aggregate δt’s exhibits unit root in long memory (and also in short
memory). FHFA is observed to have stationary d although there is a strong non-
stationarity in the short memory component highlighted by the high value of ρ
(1.042). Among the 12 MSA’s in Table 2.5 only three (New York, Los Angeles
and Seattle) exhibit long run unit root persistence (d = 1 is not rejected). The
rest of the nine MSA’s are stationary in d but possess unit root in the short mem-
ory AR component i.e. ρ = 1 is not rejected. In general, we can deduce that
accounting for heteroskedasticity reduces the number of series which exhibited
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bubble behaviour. Specifically, the aggregate FHFA and the regional MSA’s of
Boston and San Francisco no longer show unit root persistence in the long mem-
ory. This explicitly depicts the effects that non-normal and ARCH errors has
on the d value. Parametric methods imply there is no considerable evidence of
bubbles in housing prices.
Hypothesis tests based on asymptotic theory can be misleading when you
have a small finite number of observations, 125. The likelihood based parametric
ARFIMA estimates could be biased and confidence levels for Wald tests may
deviate significantly from the normal levels. One way to address this issue is to
use parametric bootstrap methods to investigate the comparative performance of
the estimates in a similar sample. Parametric bootstrap inference can be used
to test for any value of d. For example in related literature on parametric long
memory estimation, Koustas and Serletis (2005) generate 1000 pseudo-samples
by drawing from completely specified ARFIMA data generating processes with
independent normal errors. For each pseudo-sample they compute parameter
estimates and associated t-values for tests on the true data generating process.
Although the use of parametric procedure separates the long run persistence
from short run dynamics, the results as we found are sensitive to both normality
and conditional heteroskedasticity. This motivates our use of semi-parametric
methods in the frequency domain that are robust to both these errors.
2.7.3. Evidence for Bubbles - Semi-parametric Estimation
We described in detail three semi-parametric methods to estimate the value of the
long memory parameter d, namely the Local Whittle Estimator, dˆLWE, the Exact
Local Whittle Estimator dˆELW and the 2-step Exact Local Whittle Estimator,
dˆ2ELW . While dˆLWE is not consistent when d > 0.5, the dˆELW and dˆ2ELW in
contrast provide good estimates even in the non-stationary region. Importantly,
all the three Whittle based estimation methods are robust to conditional het-
eroskedasticity and non-normality, see Robinson and Henry (1999), Henry (2001)
and Nielsen and Frederiksen (2005). However, a drawback of using these semi-
parametric procedures is that the estimate depends on the value of the bandwidth
parameter or Fourier frequency m, see Baillie (1996).23
23Semi-parametric estimates have a slower rate of convergence than parametric ones but better
robustness properties. However, parametric estimates are consistent under short samples, see
Robinson and Henry (1999).
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To address this issue, we follow Kumar and Okimoto (2007) and choose m
based on simulations. We simulate Yt = (1 − L)−dt, where t is a Gaussian
white noise process, with sample size 125.24 The optimal m is the one which
minimizes the sample Mean Squared Error for several choices of m, that is m =
{n0.60, n0.65, n0.70, n0.75, n0.80}. Based on the simulation results, we select m = 0.75
for both 2ELW and ELW and m = 0.80 for the LWE. The simulation results
also showed that the 2-step ELW estimator gave consistent estimates which were
closer to the true value of d. Armed with the optimal m, we estimate the memory
parameter using the three Whittle procedures. The results are reported in Table
2.6. We include the parametric results for comparison.
In general, it is seen in Table 2.6 that the Exact Local Whittle methods,
dˆELW and dˆ2ELW , report a higher persistence value compared to the Local Whittle
procedure. This is expected as the Local Whittle Estimate, is less preferred and
dˆLWE, gives over-differenced values when the series is non-stationary, see Shimotsu
and Phillips (2005).
Unit root testing on the frequency domain Whittle estimates is implemented
by the application of the Efficient Fractional Dicky-Fuller Test (EFDF) of Lobato
and Velasco (2007). The EFDF tests the null of a unit root (d = 1) against the
alternative of a fractional root (d = dˆ < 1). The numbers in bold indicate that
the null of a unit root was not rejected.
It is observed that only three aggregate or disaggregate series exhibit unit root
behaviour consistent with price bubbles. These are the log rent-price ratio’s of
the aggregate Census and the Southern MSA’s of Dallas and Houston. This is
despite the fact that the 2-step ELW estimates are higher than unity for most
of the series. This is because the EFDF that examines unit root behaviour can
only accommodate stationary values of d in the alternative, i.e. d < 1. To the
best of our knowledge, right-tailed unit root tests in the frequency domain do not
exist in the literature. In order to overcome this limitation, we impose a Linear
Restriction of d = 1.5, i.e. an explosive root in the frequency domain. I(d > 1)
in column 5 indicates that a null of an explosive root was not rejected or in other
words a bubble exists.
24This is the sample size of our dataset.
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Table 2.6. Semi-parametric and Parametric Estimates of National and Regional
δt’s
Housing Market Semi-Parametric Estimates Parametric Estimates
dˆLWE dˆELW dˆ2ELW Conclusion dˆARFIMA ρARFIMA dˆARFIMA−EGARCH ρARFIMA−EGARCH Conclusion
FHFA 0.965 1.077 1.368 I(d > 1) 1.290 0.517 0.692 1.042 I(0)
Case-Shiller 0.951 1.059 1.615 I(d > 1) 1.276 0.794 1.591 1.000 I(1)
Census 0.924 1.031 1.192 I(1) 0.074 0.983 0.484 0.980 I(0)
Midwest
Chicago 0.962 1.039 1.343 I(d > 1) 0.764 0.941 0.841 0.906 I(1)
Cleveland 0.955 1.034 1.195 I(d > 1) 0.088 0.976 0.378 0.997 I(0)
Detroit 0.930 1.037 1.309 I(d > 1) 0.577 0.988 0.276 0.995 I(0)
Northeast
Boston 0.934 1.034 1.487 I(d > 1) 0.996 0.933 0.295 0.969 I(0)
New York 0.989 1.050 1.568 I(d > 1) 1.000 0.892 1.039 0.876 I(1)
Philadelphia 1.096 1.118 1.376 I(d > 1) 0.685 0.950 0.667 0.952 I(0)
South
Atlanta 0.960 1.042 1.244 I(d > 1) 0.517 1.074 0.334 1.002 I(0)
Dallas 0.941 1.053 1.074 I(1) 0.102 1.004 0.267 1.000 I(0)
Houston 1.069 1.203 1.221 I(1) 0.223 0.960 0.244 0.953 I(0)
West
Los Angeles 1.086 1.161 1.690 I(d > 1) 0.979 0.413 1.175 0.522 I(1)
San Francisco 1.120 1.147 1.577 I(d > 1) 0.830 0.742 0.567 0.972 I(0)
Seattle 1.139 1.177 1.458 I(d > 1) 0.648 0.933 1.345 0.354 I(1)
Notes: This table reports semi-parametric estimates of d for the log rent-price ratios of the three national HPI’s and 12 MSA’s. The sample
spans the quarterly time period 1982Q4-2013Q4 except for Case-Shiller which is 1987Q1-2013Q4. The optimal frequency, m, selected by
simulations is n0.80 for LWE and n0.75 for ELW and 2ELW (de-trended), where n is the sample size i.e. 125. The asymptotic standard
error for LWE is 0.072 and for ELW and 2ELW is 0.081. Unit root test for the semi-parametric whittle estimates is done by implementing
the Efficient Dicky-Fuller Test (EFDF). This tests for the null of a unit root (d = 1) against the alternative of fractional roots (d = dˆ < 1).
For the parametric procedure, Linear Restrictions on d and ρ acts as unit root tests. Numbers in bold indicate that the null of a unit root
cannot be rejected. Parametric estimates are extracted from Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.
We can summarize that the log rent-price ratio’s of all three aggregate and 12
MSA’s follow a process consistent with housing bubbles. These results contrast
strongly with the parametric test. Barros et al. (2012) estimate Whittle and log pe-
riodogram estimates on regional FHFA HPI’s of several U.S. States and find long
memory values of d > 1 in most of them. They also implement semi-parametric
Whittle estimate on FHFA national HPI in the quarterly span of 1975:1-2010:7
and get a value of dˆLWE = 1.500 and a parametric value of 1.478. They reject the
null of a unit root. However, they did not consider either explosive alternatives
or the rental series in their analysis.
The three MSA’s from the Northeast region (Boston, New York and Philadel-
phia) on average reported higher than unity persistence in the long memory based
on the 2ELW method (and also the parametric EGARCH one for New York).
In general there is widespread consensus in the literature (see Case and Shiller
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(2003); Case et al. (2012)) and anecdotal evidence for self-fulfilling price expec-
tations or housing bubbles in the Boston and New York metropolises.
One reason for such high persistence in these cities, as argued by Gyourko et al.
(2013), is that the marginal home buyers in ”superstar” cities are high income
household who have moved from other parts of the city. This pattern would imply
that the median homes in such cities are purchased by new residents whose income
exceeds that of the median income. Furthermore, our result provide empirical
validity to arguments by Green et al. (2005) and others who hypothesize that
house price appreciation depends largely on elasticity of housing supply. They
compute supply elasticities for 45 MSA’s and find that densely populated regions
like New York and Los Angeles have highly inelastic housing supply. This explains
why we obtain higher than average d values in the Northeast and West MSA’s.
Columns 6-9 in Table 2.6 report the parametric results extracted from the
previous section. Comparisons can be made using the two most reliable esti-
mators, the semi-parametric dˆ2ELW and the parametric dˆARFIMA−EGARCH . It is
evident that the estimated values of long memory by the 2-step Whittle is sig-
nificantly larger than the ARFIMA − EGARCH one. Most of the persistence
for the parametric procedure is concentrated in the AR part reflected by near
unity values of ρ. The Census series is a perfect example for this phenomenon.
Here the 2-step ELW gave a unit root long memory value of 1.192 while the
ARFIMA−EGARCH procedure estimated d as 0.484 which is stationary. This
is primarily because of the short sample size we use, for small samples most of
the persistence will be carried by the short run ARMA components resulting in
low values of d. The persistence in the short run indicated by ρ for the Cen-
sus was 0.980 with a unit root. Furthermore, our results from the parametric
ARFIMA−EGARCH model is not completely reliable as the residual tests did
indicate normal and autocorrelation errors in some of the series. Nevertheless,
we caveat both the parametric and the non-parametric results to the presence
of structural breaks which if present can induce spurious long memory. It is im-
perative that we examine for any endogenous breaks and account for it in our
estimation.
2.7.4. Evidence for Bubbles - Structural Changes
So far we have identified evidence of rational bubbles in house prices using our
most reliable method, namely, the semi-parametric tests. Structural breaks in
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time series generate slowly decaying autocorrelations and can thus generate spu-
rious long memory behaviour. In this section, we test for the presence of abrupt
breaks in the mean and trend of the log rent-price ratio’s. We then estimate the
d parameter after adjusting for these breaks.
2.7.4.1. Estimating Break in Mean and Trend
To complement the ocular evidence presented in the plots of the national and
regional rent-price ratios (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.B.1) we implement three tests,
namely the SupF test of Andrews (1993) and the ExpF and AveF of Andrews
and Ploberger (1994) (refer eq. (2.52), (2.53) and (2.54) from §2.5.1) to test
for possible breaks in the mean and trend of each series. Inference for presence
or absence of breaks is based on Hansen (2000)’s bootstrap heteroskedasticity
corrected p-values. We limit our analysis to one break considering the relatively
short sample size we are estimating on.
Table 2.7. Structural Change Tests on National and Regional δt’s
Housing Market SupF ExpF AveF Breakdate
Test Stat. Bootstrap p Hetero- p Test Stat. Bootstrap p Hetero- p Test Stat. Bootstrap p Hetero- p
FHFA 488.186 0.000*** 0.000*** 239.635 0.000*** 0.000*** 83.092 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q4
Case-Shiller 210.574 0.000*** 0.000*** 101.105 0.000*** 0.000*** 64.012 0.000*** 0.000*** 2003Q1
Census 348.712 0.000*** 0.000*** 170.718 0.000*** 0.000*** 60.832 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q3
Midwest
Chicago 466.886 0.000*** 0.000*** 229.448 0.000*** 0.000*** 117.522 0.000*** 0.000*** 2003Q2
Cleveland 795.594 0.000*** 0.000*** 394.258 0.000*** 0.000*** 350.387 0.000*** 0.000*** 2003Q2
Detroit 1317.230 0.000*** 0.000*** 654.215 0.000*** 0.000*** 515.738 0.000*** 0.000*** 2003Q1
Northeast
Boston 65.951 0.000*** 0.001*** 29.831 0.000*** 0.001*** 33.870 0.000*** 0.000*** 1989Q4
New York 90.028 0.000*** 0.000*** 41.159 0.000*** 0.000*** 34.680 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q4
Philadelphia 158.642 0.000*** 0.000*** 75.380 0.000*** 0.000*** 40.127 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q4
South
Atlanta 564.129 0.000*** 0.000*** 277.694 0.000*** 0.000*** 132.966 0.000*** 0.000*** 2003Q4
Dallas 255.068 0.000*** 0.000*** 123.601 0.000*** 0.000*** 152.733 0.000*** 0.000*** 1999Q4
Houston 100.265 0.000*** 0.000*** 46.521 0.000*** 0.000*** 64.974 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q1
West
Los Angeles 161.429 0.000*** 0.000*** 76.369 0.000*** 0.000*** 37.796 0.000*** 0.000*** 2005Q1
San Francisco 128.458 0.000*** 0.000*** 60.427 0.000*** 0.000*** 41.437 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q4
Seattle 302.679 0.000*** 0.000*** 147.719 0.000*** 0.000*** 85.516 0.000*** 0.000*** 2004Q4
Notes: This table reports the test statistics of the SupF test of Andrews (1993) and the ExpF and AveF of Andrews and Ploberger (1994)
(refer eq. (2.52), (2.53) and (2.54) from §2.5.1) and Hansen (2000) bootstrap p values under homoskedastic (Bootstrap p in the table)and
heteroskedastic (Hetero- p in the table) residuals. All the three tests examine the null of no breaks against the alternative of breaks in the mean
and trend. The trimming parameter is set at 0.15 which means the starting index for break search is 18.
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Table 2.7 reports the test statistics of the three break tests (SupF , AveF
and ExpF ) along with Hansen (2000)’s bootstrap p values under homoskedastic
and heteroskedastic residual processes. All the three tests examine the null of no
change against the alternative of a structural change in the mean (µ) and trend
(ψ) of the log rent-price ratio’s. The reported p values uniformly reject the null
hypothesis at the 1% level strongly implying the presence of a structural break in
the mean and trend of all the log rent-price series. The estimated breakdate for
the national series is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1. Estimated Breakdates of National Rent-Price Ratio’s
Notes: This figure provides a graphical illustration of the estimated breaks in mean and trend
of the log rent-price ratio’s of FHFA, Case-Shiller and Census aggregate series. The break date
of each series is given in text in the corresponding plots.
A brief review of the estimated breakdates reveal that in general they are
centered around 2003Q1-2004Q4. On visual inspection it is clear that there is
a marked change in the trajectory of the log rent-price ratio’s between 1982Q4-
2003Q1 and then on. This is consistent with a sudden upsurge followed by down-
turn in housing prices highlighted by a U shape in the δt trajectory from 2004Q4.
Our structural change test revealed one endogenous break in all of the series. The
breakdate was found to lie in general in the 2003-04 time period.
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This breakdate suggests a shift in household beliefs. For example, Piazzesi
and Schneider (2009) using Michigan Consumer Survey data finds that the U.S.
housing boom had two distinct stages. In the first stage, during 2002-03, about
72% of households cited favourable credit conditions and believed that the time
for buying a house was good. From 2004, in the second stage, houses were con-
sidered too expensive but the number of agents who were optimistic about future
price increased from 10% in 2003Q4 to over 20% by 2005Q2. Our results thus
empirically validate these arguments.
From the breakdates for the regional MSA’s, it is apparent that they mirror
the national series i.e. the breakdates found are in and around the 2004-05 time
period. The exception to this was Boston (1989Q4) and Dallas (1999Q4). This
divergent behaviour we believe has more to do with regional rental changes rather
than house prices. Severe regulations cap the rent you can charge on residential
households in several MSA’s in the United States which includes the Boston and
Dallas metropolises.
A recent forecasting paper by Barari et al. (2014) found four structural breaks
in the aggregate Case-Shiller Index (1991:1-2009:12) by applying the Bai and
Perron (1998, 2003) procedure. It is well documented that the Bai and Perron
(1998) procedure could overestimate the number of breaks when the regressors
are non-stationary. Canarella et al. (2011) applied the Lumsdaine and Papell
(1997) and the Lee and Strazicich (2001) tests to the Case-Shiller 10 city regional
HPI’s and found two breaks in the intercept and trend for all the 10 metro areas.
Specifically the tests indicated that the second breakdate for the most of the metro
areas (Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York) was found to occur around
2005-2006 time period concurring with our results. Both these papers however
do not take into account the effects of the rental series. Nevertheless, Nneji et al.
(2013) use a Markov switching approach to the aggregate FHFA price-rent ratio
in the period 1960-2011 and finds that the housing market switched from a low
price-rent ratio to a high price-rent ratio around the year 2000.
Now that we have identified breaks we proceed to a robust estimation of long
memory on the de-meaned and de-trended series, i.e. δt− µˆ− ψˆ. The next section
reports and discusses these results.
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2.7.4.2. Long Memory Estimation on De-meaned and De-trended δt’s
Table 2.8. Long Memory on De-meaned and De-trended δt
Housing Market Semi-Parametric Estimates Parametric Estimates
dˆLWE dˆELW dˆ2ELW Conclusion dˆARFIMA ρ dˆARFIMA−EGARCH ρARFIMA−EGARCH Conclusion
FHFA 0.646 0.662 0.662 I(0) -0.107 0.834 0.687 0.337 I(0)
Case-Shiller 0.864 1.078 1.079 I(1) 0.185 0.815 0.738 0.645 I(0)
Census 0.585 0.645 0.652 I(0) 0.037 0.645 -0.184 0.743 I(0)
Midwest
Chicago 0.772 0.906 0.930 I(1) 0.016 0.874 0.803 0.172 I(1)
Cleveland 0.880 1.007 0.991 I(1) 0.046 0.909 0.134 0.911 I(0)
Detroit 0.900 1.137 1.123 I(1) 0.105 0.960 0.207 0.811 I(0)
Northeast
Boston 0.965 1.089 1.092 I(1) 0.149 0.929 1.233 -0.101 I(1)
New York 0.978 1.055 1.136 I(1) 0.104 0.945 0.106 0.919 I(0)
Philadelphia 0.768 1.090 1.032 I(1) 0.620 0.329 0.192 0.772 I(0)
South
Atlanta 0.668 0.692 0.691 I(0) 0.412 0.377 0.637 0.278 I(0)
Dallas 0.840 0.907 0.915 I(0) -0.060 0.900 -0.276 0.883 I(0)
Houston 0.673 0.905 0.940 I(1) 0.021 0.841 -0.152 0.894 I(0)
West
Los Angeles 1.008 1.140 1.132 I(1) 0.130 0.877 0.666 0.977 I(0)
San Francisco 0.910 1.082 1.060 I(1) 0.103 0.895 0.122 0.907 I(0)
Seattle 0.770 0.949 0.972 I(1) 0.118 0.823 0.746 0.837 I(0)
Notes: Evaluation is done on the residual equation yt − µˆ − ψˆ. Detailed description of the detrending and demeaning procedure
is described in section 2.4. The optimal frequency, m, selected by simulations is n0.80 for LWE n0.75 for ELW and 2ELW, n is
the sample size i.e. 125. The asymptotic standard error for LWE is 0.072 and for ELW and 2ELW is 0.081. For the parametric
estimation, AR(1)MA(0) is the optimal model selected by BIC. The residual tests indicated the presence of normal errors in all the
series. Addition of the EGARCH process removed ARCH and autocorrelation errors but not the normal errors. Unit root tests for
semi-parametric methods is done by applying the EFDF test and for the parametric method by applying Linear Restrictions, that
is d = 1 and ρ = 1. Numbers in bold indicate that the null of a unit root was not rejected at the 5% level. The test statistics and
critical values of the EFDF test is reported in Table 2.C.1.
Table 2.8 reports semi-parametric (i.e. dˆLWE, dˆELW and dˆ2ELW ) and parametric
(ARFIMA and ARFIMA − EGARCH) persistence estimates for each series
after adjusting for structural breaks. Estimation is done on the filtered demeaned
and detrended series, δt − µˆ − ψˆ where is the µˆ mean and ψˆ is the trend. As
expected, the dˆ values for the de-trended series are much lower validating the
arguments by Diebold and Inoue (2001) and Granger and Hyung (2004) that the
presence of level or trend shifts could spuriously generate long memory.
Unit root tests for the semi-parametric estimates are conducted using the
Efficient Fractional Dicky-Fuller (EFDF) tests of Lobato and Velasco (2007). The
test statistics and critical values for this test is reported in Table 2.C.1 in the
Appendix. Linear restrictions of d = 1 and ρ = 1 effectively tests for the null
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of a unit root in the long run and in the short run AR process in the case of
the parametric estimation. Bold numbers in Table 2.8 indicate regions where the
null of a unit root was not rejected at the 5% level. Columns 5 and 10 in the
Table describe the conclusions we can draw from analysing the two most reliable
estimators, the 2-step ELW and the ARFIMA− EGARCH.
We find that the semi-parametric procedure performs better than the para-
metric one. The residual tests of the ARFIMA−EGARCH procedure indicated
the presence of non-normality which implies that the likelihood estimates that we
recorded in Table 2.8 are inefficient and unit root tests, d = 1, unreliable. In fact,
parametric estimation on some series (the aggregate Census, South MSA’s of
Dallas and Houston) produced negative values of d i.e. anti-persistence. Granger
and Hyung (2004) also find negative or over differenced d values on a de-meaned
Standard & Poor 500 stock returns series. This is probably due to the existence
of some form of nonlinearity, such as a smooth transition, a nonlinear trend, etc.
in the series which is not adequately captured by the linear ARFIMA model.
The semi-parametric methods on the other hand are robust to non-normal and
heteroskedastic errors. As discussed earlier in §2.7.2, the studies of Goodman and
Thibodeau (1998) and Fletcher et al. (2000) prove that both repeat sales and
hedonic based house price indices suffer from heteroskedasticity. The addition of
the EGARCH term takes care of the heteroskedasticity problem. However, the
issue of non-normal residuals still remain unresolved.
Furthermore, data limitation of the rental series meant that we used a small
sample size in our analysis, T = 125. In the parametric procedures, the ARMA
part captures most of the persistence resulting in low d values. There are ad-
ditional problems we encounter during the optimization of the ARFIMA −
EGARCH model. We use the Simulated Annealing Algorithm for optimiza-
tion which requires specifying starting values. We simulated different values to
get strong convergence. However, despite these efforts some series only converged
weakly.
While the semi-parametric procedure detected unit root persistence consistent
with bubbles in two national (Case-Shiller and the NAR Housing Affordability In-
dex) and 10 regional series, the parametric procedure identified bubble behaviour
in only two regional MSA’s (Chicago and Boston). None of the aggregate indexes
showed any unit root tendencies under the parametric method.
Comparing the three national indexes (FHFA, Case-Shiller and Census) we
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arrive at two main conclusions.25 Firstly, we find substantial heterogeneity in the
persistence of the aggregate HPI’s. The semi-parametric estimates reveal that
the Case-Shiller HPI, unlike the FHFA and the Census HPI’s, follows a unit root
process consistent with housing bubbles. The most reliable estimated long mem-
ory value of d = 1.079 for Case-Shiller in Table 2.8 suggests an explosive process
agreeing with Phillips and Yu (2011) who implemented a sequential right-tailed
unit root test on Case-Shiller price-rent ratio and rejected the null of a unit root
against an explosive alternative consistent with housing bubbles. Although the
ARFIMA − EGARCH model rejects a unit root here, the computed d value
(0.738) is the highest among all the three aggregate HPI’s. This contrasting
behaviour between Case-Shiller and the other two aggregate series (FHFA and
Census), we believe, lies in the way the three HPI’s are constructed. Although
both FHFA and Case-Shiller use a weighted repeat sales methodology, the HPI
of FHFA is based only on homes sales with conforming home mortgages (loans
less than $417,000), which eliminates a fair percentage of real estate transactions.
Case-Shiller looks at all home sales, regardless of the mortgage amount. Further-
more, the S&P Case-Shiller Indexes are value-weighted, meaning that price trends
for more expensive homes have greater influence on estimated price changes than
other homes. FHFA, on the other hand, weights price trends equally for all prop-
erties. The geographic coverage of the indexes also differs. The S&P Case-Shiller
National Home Price Index, for example, does not have valuation data from 13
states. FHFA’s aggregate index is calculated using data from all the states.
Secondly, among all the three aggregate HPI’s, the estimated long memory
persistence, by both d2ELW and dARFIMA−EGARCH , are lowest in the Census In-
dex. This mirrors the result in McCarthy and Peach (2004) who also found that
the price deviations from fundamentals in the Census HPI is much lower than
either FHFA or Case-Shiller as the Census is a constant-quality index. That is,
both the FHFA and the Case-Shiller Index do not take into account changes in the
physical characteristics of homes and so does not control for depreciation or addi-
tions and alterations between sale dates that could have changed the quality and
thus price of the house. In essence, Census accounts for the heterogeneity among
25Although we are estimating on the rent-price ratio’s we can make effective comparisons
between the three national HPI’s as the national rental series (in the numerator) is the same.
That is, any appreciation or depreciation differences between the three δt’s has more to do with
the particular HPI variations than any aggregate rental changes.
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houses.26 Furthermore, both Case-Shiller and FHFA use a ”repeat sales” method-
ology to examine house price changes which has its own important caveats. Most
importantly, the index is based only on the sample of homes that have sold at
least twice (hence the term ”repeat sales”), a fact which serves to exclude all new
construction (which can account for more than 10% of real estate transactions).
For these and other reasons, McCarthy and Peach (2004) argue that the Census
series is the most appropriate among all the three HPI’s to infer on house price
appreciation relative to fundamentals such as rents in the United States. Case
et al. (1991) compares the hedonic methodology with the repeat sales one and
finds that the hedonic based HPI possess lower bias and inefficiency problems.
As the log rent-price ratio of the Census Index in the 31 year time span 1982Q4-
2013Q4 is found to follow a stationary mean-reverting long memory process, we
can say that in the national level the United States is devoid of bubble behaviour
i.e. the housing market is efficient agreeing with Capozza and Seguin (1996),
Linneman (1986) and Meese and Wallace (1994) who observe that in the long run
the aggregate United States Housing Market is efficient in that they follow the
present value relation. They believe that high transaction costs, measurement
errors and failure to account for a risk premium in the homeowner cost of capital
can cause a short run violation of rationality but in the long run, the U.S. hous-
ing markets are bubble free. The presence of a unit root in the NAR Housing
Affordability Index implies that housing is now more affordable to single family
households earning the median income thus validating our no bubble result.
The FHFA regional rent-price ratios,δt’s, in general contrasted their aggregate
counterpart such that 10 out of 12 metro areas exhibited unit root long memory
persistence consistent with housing price bubbles. To our knowledge time series
analysis of FHFA MSA’s is absent. A recent paper by Canarella et al. (2011)
applied structural break and non-linearity adjusted unit root tests to the Case-
Shiller 10 city regional index. They found that although tests indicated that
structural breaks existed in the rate of capital gain from the sale of houses during
the early 1990s and the first half of the 2000’s yet they were unable to reject the
null of a unit root in most of the metropolitan regions agreeing with our results.
Atlanta and Dallas metro areas from the South in contrast to the other 10 MSA’s
26No two houses are the same. At the very least, they differ in location. They may differ
in neighborhood, city, or metro area. Even the difference of a few hundred feet can have an
appreciable price effect. Obviously, so too will other attributes, both locational and physical.
The combination of these characteristic attributes can be considered as the house’s ”quality”,
see Rappaport (2007).
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rejected the null of a unit root in d. They thus paralleled their aggregate FHFA
counterpart and negated any bubble activity. This can be attributed to the low
rentals in the South region as argued by Thibodeau (1995) who constructed a
constant quality hedonic house price index for several MSA’s. The study revealed
that in general the shelter rental estimates for the Northeast and the West regions
were about 2.9 to 4.6 times those of the South region.
2.8. Discussion
We began our empirical analysis with standard unit root tests i.e. ADF, DF-GLS
and KPSS, which gave ambiguous evidence to the presence or absence of a unit
root in most of the series. This was primarily due to the fact that these tests are
too restrictive such that they consider just two values of d in the real space [0,1] i.e.
they ignored the possibility of fractional roots. We thus, proceeded to estimate
the fractional value of d using two methods: Parametric ARFIMA in the time
domain and Semi-Parametric Whittle estimates in the frequency domain. Both
the methodologies applied procedures that were consistent in the non-stationary
region (d > 1/2). We found that the long memory procedures allowed us
to identify the persistence more accurately . Among the two long memory
methods, the semi-parametric procedure was more reliable and produced
better estimates than the parametric ARFIMA method.
The parametric pure ARFIMA estimates found bubble behaviour in the log
rent-price ratio’s of two aggregate HPI’s (FHFA, Case-Shiller) and four FHFA
regional MSA’s (2/3 from Northeast and 3/3 from the West regions). The addition
of the asymmetric EGARCH removed non-normal and heteroskedatic residual
errors and concluded bubble processes in fewer regions (aggregate Case-Shiller
HPI, 1/3 from Northeast and 2/3 from the West regions). This implied that the
presence of these residual errors does impact the value of long memory persistence.
Semi-parametric estimates which do not require the modelling of the short run
dynamics and are hence robust to these errors reported significantly higher values
of d and implied bubble behaviour in all the three national and 12 regional series.
A comparison between the two methodologies revealed that the parametric pro-
cedures captured most of the persistence in the short run ARMA component i.e.
the null of a unit root was not rejected in the Sum of Autoregressive Coefficients
(ρ). This we believe is primarily due to the relatively short sample size we use,
data limitations of the rental series preclude us from further investigation. Hence,
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we concluded that the semi-parametric procedure is a superior methodology and
thus more reliable as far as our analysis is concerned. Thus our results argue for
employing semi-parametric methods against parametric time domain ones.27
Although linear methods are widely used when testing for long memory, it is
documented in the literature that presence of structural breaks in the levels or
trends could slow down the d convergence generating ”spurious” long memory.
In light of this, we tested for endogenous breaks using three tests based on the
Quandt (1960)’s F statistic (SupF , ExpF and AveF ). To infer for presence of
breaks we computed Hansen (2000)’s ”Fixed Regressor Bootstrap” asymptotic
p-values that are consistent under non-stationary regressors and heteroskedastic
residuals.
We found one endogenous structural break in the rent-price series.
This estimated breakdate for the mean and trend of the log rent-price ratio’s in
general occurred in the 2003/04 time period. This validates arguments made in
the literature about change in household beliefs characterizing this period. For
instance, in a study of data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, Piazzesi and
Schneider (2009) report that ”starting in 2004, more and more households became
optimistic after having watched house prices increase for several years.”28 The
presence of a break means a shift in the fundamentals of the housing
market, as we are examining for rational bubbles, that is deviations
from fundamentals, we cannot neglect this break . Accounting for this
break will ensure that the net persistence of the series will contain only deviations
that arise from non-fundamental factors or bubbles. We do this by demeaning
and detrending each of the series.
27In contrast, Baillie and Kapetanios (2007) argues that a correctly specified parametric
model is superior to other alternative procedures. The small sample size we use implies that
the maximum likelihood parametric methodology captures most of the persistence in the short
run ARMA part resulting in a biased low value of d. Furthermore, Goodman and Thibodeau
(1998) and Fletcher et al. (2000) argue that the House Price Indexes inherently contain het-
eroskedasticity due to several factors such as the differences in the timing of house sales. We
find that this is true from our results.
28Cerqueti and Costantini (2011) present empirical evidence of the bubbles phenomena in the
international stock markets over the period 1992:1- 2010:6 for a panel of 18 OECD countries.
They use a similar theoretical model like ours, namely the log–linear present-value model of
Campbell and Shiller (1988), and investigate the presence of rational bubbles in the log dividend-
price ratio and total returns. They use panel unit root and cointegration methodology, and allow
for multiple endogenous structural breaks in the individual series. Their procedure regarding
structural breaks in the dividends and returns data shows that breaks occur around the same
dates for most of the countries, in particular around the ”tech-stock” bubbles period.
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Long memory was then estimated on the new filtered series. The ex-post
persistence values were significantly lower validating our approach. When applied
to the demeaned and detrended series, the semi-parametric method found unit
root process consistent with housing price bubbles in just one national HPI (Case-
Shiller). Nevertheless, 10 out of 12 FHFA MSA’s continued to exhibit bubble type
behaviour. As before, these conclusions differed drastically from the parametric
procedures. The ARFIMA − EGARCH model in contrast found I(1) type
behaviour in only two MSA’s (Chicago and Boston). Considering the small sample
bias and the presence of residual errors, we infer for bubble behaviour from
the semi-parametric Whittle estimators, specifically the 2-step Exact Local
Whittle of Shimotsu (2009).
Among the three aggregate HPI’s only the value weighted repeat sales S&P
Case-Shiller Index indicated bubble behaviour. FHFA which is also constructed
based on a repeat sales weighted procedure was devoid of bubbles, so was the
Constant Quality House Price Index from Census. The following question arises -
”Which of these three national HPI’s best describes aggregate housing price trend
of U.S.?” The answer to this depends, as argued by Rappaport (2007), on one’s
purpose.
A bubble type behaviour in the value weighted aggregate Case-Shiller Index
suggests price rises in expensive houses in big metropolises. Mean-reverting ten-
dency in the FHFA Index describes that in general the aggregate value of the
household has returned to mean levels. The Census Index which provides lit-
tle evidence of housing bubbles says that the residential construction sector is
healthy.
Our results for the FHFA regional MSA’s indicated that persistence was on
average higher in the Northeast and the West regions. The metropolitan areas
like New York (Northeast), Los Angeles and San Francisco (West) are densely
populated possessing highly inelastic housing supply and thus we empirically val-
idate theoretical arguments put forward by Green et al. (2005), Glaeser et al.
(2008), Glaeser et al. (2012) and others that supply elasticity and price growth is
positively correlated. A further implication is the possibility of aggregation bias.
In contrast, we found that the aggregate series exhibited a lower persistence than
other disaggregate ones. This indicates that some region specific factors average
out in the aggregation, i.e. no aggregation bias. This agrees with Campbell
et al. (2009) who also find that the FHFA rent-price ratio is 30% more volatile
in the regional level than the national level suggesting that some region-specific
factors average out in the aggregate. This is because regional housing markets
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may not always respond at the same time to a common economic shock as re-
gional sensitivities to demand and supply varies due to differences in area specific
factors such as migration patterns, per capita income, availability of mortgage,
labour mobility, demographics, degree of urbanization, rental housing market etc
see, Malpezzi (1996) and Barros et al. (2012).
Our results of high persistence in the rent-price ratio agrees with that of Andre´
et al. (2014) who investigated the persistence of housing price-to-income and price-
to-rent ratios in 16 OECD countries over a 40-year period, using a fractional
integration framework. They find that these ratios tend to fluctuate around a
stable level over the very long term, they are generally not found to be mean-
reverting over the sample. They find that the order of integration of price to
income and price to rent ratios are above unity for most countries, and thus
exogenous shocks to these ratios will be permanent. Moreover, the integration
order is in most cases significantly higher than 1, suggesting that shocks are in
fact amplified. However, a drawback of their approach is that even though they
use the semi-parametric method for estimation they use Whittle methods which
are not powerful in case of non-stationarity. Furthermore, they do not find any
evidence for structural breaks.
It can be argued that our investigation of bubble presence examined the di-
verge of prices from only one fundamental factor, the rents. However, there are
several other fundamentals such as interest rates, construction costs, labour costs,
geographical location etc that influence the movement of house prices. In a re-
cent paper, Kivedal (2013) finds that our analysis is consistent as far as the recent
boom-bust episode in the U.S. is concerned. Kivedal (2013) shows that there is
an explosive root in house prices, while the rental price does not contain explosive
elements. This implies bubble behaviour consistent with our results. This also
holds in the case where the net rental price is used, indicating that the declin-
ing interest rate in the period before the subprime financial crisis is not a strong
enough effect to explain the large increase in the house price that exceeds the
increase in the rental price.
In an important paper, Evans (1991a) addresses the inability of standard unit
root tests in detecting a special class of rational price bubbles which are positive,
explosive and periodically collapsing. Standard unit root tests incorrectly reject
the null of a unit root when such bubbles are present in the data. Phillips and
Yu (2011) developed a recursive unit root testing procedure (PSY) that accom-
modates such periodically collapsing bubbles, these test for the null of a unit root
(d = 1) against an explosive root (d > 1). These right tailed tests do not consider
110
the possibility of either a structural break or long memory. The methodology
used in this chapter can be easily extended to consider such collapsing bubbles.
Appendix 2.A simulates these types of bubbles and reports our results. We find
two key results. Firstly, the value of long memory, d, rises as the probability of a
bubble to collapse increases and Secondly, a Wald Test that looks for a change in
d values can successfully detect these types of bubbles.
2.9. Conclusion
In this chapter we use long memory models to estimate the persistence of the log
rent-price ratio’s in the national and regional House Price Indexes in the United
States and thereby investigate the presence of price bubbles in the housing market.
We based our analysis of bubble presence (absence) depending on unit root (mean-
reverting) persistence. Essentially, we test for the null of a unit root, I(1), against
the alternative of stationarity/mean-reversion, I(d < 1). We analysed a quarterly
dataset that spanned the 31 year time period 1982Q4-2013Q4 encompassing both
the observed upturns and downturns in US housing prices.
Our results revealed that the semi-parametric procedures which are robust to
contaminations in the form of short term correlation, normality and heteroskedas-
ticity found bubble behaviour in far more regional markets than when using the
parametric procedure. Results for bubble identification were different for different
House Price Indexes. While the Census and the FHFA series showed no unit root
bubble behaviour, the Case-Shiller Index did. We also found that the regional
indexes were far more volatile than the aggregate ones. Finally, we found an en-
dogenous break in all the series. This breakdate coincided with the turn of credit
market conditions in the United States. When we adjust the series for this break,
we find significantly lower persistence. In summary, we conclude that there is
strong evidence for the presence of housing bubbles in the U.S. housing market.
Furthermore, more of the regional series exhibited bubble type behaviour than
the national ones.
This study opens up several possible areas for future investigation. The chief
one relates to the time varying characteristic of long memory. To the best of
our knowledge, appropriate methods to estimate a changing d parameter robust
to structural breaks is not available. Roueff and von Sachs (2011) construct a
semi-parametric procedure to estimate d when it is time varying. However, the
procedure is only consistent for stationary processes. Efficient estimation of the d
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parameter free of short run contaminations will help in the timely identification of
bubbles which has wide scale advantages. The accurate estimation of persistence
will directly assist policy makers in the United States housing industry to make
optimal decisions. In fact, when realtor authorities have a priori knowledge of the
persistence on housing prices, they can design appropriate housing strategies to
adjust persistence in house prices benefiting urban consumers.
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Appendix
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2.A. Robustness - Periodically Collapsing
Bubbles
In this section, we see whether the semi-parametric long memory methods used
in this chapter can be used to detect a special type of bubbles introduced by
Evans (1991a). These are a class of positive and explosive periodically collapsing
bubbles which are consistent with rational expectations. They take the form:
Bt+1 =
{
(1 + r)Btut+1 if Bt ≤ α[
ω + (1+r)
pi
θt+1(Bt − 11+Rω)
]
ut+1 if Bt > α
(2.73)
where ω and α are positive parameters with 0 < ω < (1+r)α, ut+1 is an exogenous
i.i.d positive random variable with Et(ut+1) = 1, θt+1 is an i.i.d Bernoulli process
which takes the value 1 with probability pi and 0 with probability 1−pi. As long as
Bt ≤ α, the bubble grows at mean rate 1 + r and when Bt > α the bubble bursts
into a phase in which it grows at the faster rate (1 + r)/pi as long as the eruption
continues. The bubble collapses with probability 1− pi per period and eventually
falls to a mean positive value of ω, from which the process begins again.
These bubbles appear to be stationary when unit root tests are applied even
though they contain explosive roots, except in the case where the probability of
collapse is very close to zero. We simulate periodically collapsing bubbles for
different values of pi and then estimate the long memory parameter for these
processes. Figure 2.A.1 plots these simulated bubble processes. The following
table describes the results for long memory estimation.
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Figure 2.A.1. Simulations of Periodically Collapsing Bubbles
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Notes: This figure depicts simulated Evans (1991a) periodically collapsing bubbles at four
different probabilities of bubble collapse (1−pi). The bubles were simulated using r=0.05, α=1,
ω = 0.5, initial Bt=ω, ut+1 = exp(yτ − τ2/2) where yτ ∼ N(0, τ2) and τ=0.05.
Table 2.A.1. Long Memory Estimation of Simulated PCB’s
m = 40 m = 60 m = 80
pi dLWE d2ELW d2ELWdet dLWE d2ELW d2ELWdet dLWE d2ELW d2ELWdet
1.0 0.906 2.287 2.273 0.905 2.163 2.176 0.885 2.189 2.206
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
0.85 0.539 0.590 0.607 0.624 0.714 0.714 0.672 0.836 0.835
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
0.70 0.369 0.397 0.385 0.485 0.563 0.598 0.530 0.678 0.679
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
0.55 0.161 0.180 0.155 0.278 0.338 0.331 0.357 0.487 0.485
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Notes: This table reports the semi-parametric estimates of long memory for the simulated
periodically collapsing bubbles. We use three different bandwidths, m, and four different
probabilities of bubble collapse, 1−pi. n is the sample size which is 200. dLWE is the Local
Whittle estimator, d2ELW and d2ELWdet are 2-step Exact Local Whittles estimators
without and with de-trending. The asymptotic standard errors for the estimates are given
in parenthesis.
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It is apparent from Table 2.A.1 that the estimated value of long memory d de-
creases as the probability of bubble collapse pi increases. Presence of periodically
collapsing bubbles will thus lead to erroneous conclusions about bubble behaviour.
A stationary mean reverting series could thus potentially contain bubbles. The
Shimotsu (2006) can be used in the frequency domain to detect these types of
bubbles as described below. Table 2.A.2 show that as the bandwidth window
(m) and the number of subsamples (b) increases, the Wald statistic gets better in
detecting periodically collapsing bubbles. Simulations help us in using this test
as an effective way to test for periodically collapsing bubbles in the U.S. Housing
Market. On testing in our dataset, we did not find periodically collapsing bubble
phenomenon and thus we omit the discussion in our text.
Table 2.A.2. Detecting periodically collapsing bubbles
m dˆ d Wc
pi b=10 b=20 b=10 b=20
1.0 40 2.217 1.412 1.920 0.020 13.018
0.85 40 0.590 1.028 1.535 13.568 8.675
0.70 40 0.397 1.181 1.739 29.191*** 15.199
0.55 40 0.180 0.713 1.468 3.421 17.210
1.0 60 2.163 1.438 1.515 0.034 8.213
0.85 60 0.714 1.103 1.791 22.001*** 46.370***
0.70 60 0.563 1.189 1.907 48.614*** 110.934***
0.55 60 0.338 0.817 1.459 7.291 68.467***
1.0 80 2.189 1.487 1.600 0.069 12.334
0.85 80 0.836 1.185 2.216 29.384*** 154.236***
0.70 80 0.678 1.289 2.563 62.184*** 424.969***
0.55 80 0.487 0.900 2.262 11.824 501.339***
Notes: The Wc statistic tests the null that the memory parameter has remained constant through-
out the subsamples and is χ2 distributed with b − 1 degrees of freedom where b is the number
of subsamples. *** indicates rejection of the null at the 5% level indicating the presence of
periodically collapsing bubbles.
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2.B. Rent-Price Ratio - FHFA Regional
Figure 2.B.1. Regional
Notes: This figure provides a graphical illustration of the log rent-price ratio of 12 FHFA
Regional MSA’s. The second row plots the autocorrelation functions and the spectral
densities.
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2.C. Efficient Fractional Dicky-Fuller Test
Table 2.C.1. EFDF Test on break adjusted semi-parametric estimates
Housing Market Break adjusted (EFDF)
dˆLWE dˆELW dˆ2ELW
FHFA -2.880*** -3.005*** -3.005***
Case-Shiller 0.146 0.183 0.184
Census -3.085*** -3.266*** -3.248***
NAR 0.970 1.041 1.056
Midwest
Chicago -1.406 -1.348 -1.317
Cleveland -0.067 -0.021 -0.037
Detroit 0.779 0.779 0.777
Northeast
Boston 0.895 0.928 0.931
New York 0.225 0.230 0.290
Philadelphia -0.866 -0.798 -0.855
South
Atlanta -2.874*** -3.001*** -3.002***
Dallas -2.111** -2.111** -2.186**
Houston -1.100 -1.071 -1.033
West
Los Angeles 0.211 0.269 0.261
San Francisco 0.129 0.139 0.119
Seattle -0.438 -0.453 -0.419
Crit. Value
1% -2.551 -2.551 -2.551
5% -1.904 -1.904 -1.904
10% -1.564 -1.564 -1.564
Notes: This table reports the Efficient Fractional Dicky-Fuller test statistics on the demeaned and de-
trended log rent-price ratio’s of the four national and the 12 regional MSA’s. The sample spans the
quarterly time period 1982Q4-2013Q4, except Case-Shiller which is 1987Q1-2013Q4. The EFDF tests
for the null of a unit root (d = 1) against fractional roots i.e. d = dˆ < 1, where dˆ is one of the three
semi-parametric estimates ( ˆdLWE , ˆdELW and ˆd2ELW ). Critical values (1%, 5% and 10%) for the tests
is given in the last three rows. Critical values for Case-Shiller are -2.527, -1.876 and -1.533 at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % levels respectively. ’***’ indicate rejection of the null of a unit root at the 1% level.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Life-Cycle Asset
Allocation with Return
Predictability, Risky Housing and
Non-Tradable Labour Income
3.1. Introduction
Financial advisors and much of the academic literature argue that young investors
should place most of their savings in stocks, which historically have paid a high
risk premium relative to US Treasury securities, and switch to less risky assets as
they age. For instance, Malkiel (1996) recommends putting a percentage of assets
equal to the number 100 minus an investor’s age in a well-diversified portfolio of
stocks.
However, low stock market participation rates and moderate equity
holdings for stock market participants are observed in US data . In this
chapter, the key variable of interest is the proportion of assets held in risky assets
and is denoted by αt. The 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) shows that
only 55.3% of US households have direct or indirect holdings of risky assets. This
low stock market participation by households despite high expected returns is
called the STOCK MARKET PARTICIPATION PUZZLE. Furthermore,
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the 1968-2007 period
show that the median household direct risky asset holdings and indirect risky asset
holdings are zero. Moreover, lifecycle risky asset holdings are “hump shaped.”
Young investors typically hold very little stock, progressively increase their risky
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assets holdings as they age, and decrease their exposure to stock market risk
when they approach retirement, see Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Ameriks and Zeldes
(2002), Alan (2006) and Campbell (2006). Canner et al. (1997) calls this the
ASSET ALLOCATION PUZZLE.
Interest in these puzzles are not confined to stock brokers. Extensive privati-
sation in countries ranging from the financially developed, such as the United
States, to emerging market economies hinges on developing and maintaining a
broad base of stockholders. While initial participation is encouraged by extensive
advertising or by enthusiasm for market structures, the sources of the reluctance
to hold stocks in a financially mature country such as the United States or the
United Kingdom are puzzling, see Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Poterba (2002).
Stockholding was shown by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) to have implications for
the widely researched ’equity premium puzzle’, see Mehra and Prescott (1985),
confining attention to stockholders lowers the risk aversion implied by the equity
premium.1
Several explanations for the observed limited stock market participation have
been offered in the literature. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) find theoretical evi-
dence in an expected utility maximisation framework that presence of short-sales
constraints and business cycle risks can deter stockholding. Hong et al. (2004)
empirically analyse data from the Health and Retirement Study, and find that
social household - those who interact with their neighbour or attend church -
are substantially more likely to invest than non social households controlling for
wealth, education, race and risk tolerance. van Rooij et al. (2011) finds using
survey data that respondents who displayed reasonable levels of financial literacy
in terms of grasping concepts such as interest compounding, inflation and time
value of money hold stocks in their portfolio implying that financial literacy af-
fects stockholding. It is conventional in the literature to club all these factors such
as social interaction, financial literacy etc., in the form of a fixed entry cost that
deters equity market participation, see Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Guiso
et al. (2003) and Alan (2006) among others. In this chapter, we follow these
papers and consider an exogenous fixed cost of stock market participation.
1The equity premium puzzle is a phenomenon that describes the anomalously higher his-
torical real returns of stocks over government bonds. The equity premium, which is defined
as equity returns less bond returns, has been about 6% on average for the past century. It is
supposed to reflect the relative risk of stocks compared to ”risk-free” government bonds, but
the puzzle arises because this unexpectedly large percentage implies a suspiciously high level of
risk aversion among investors.
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The choice of whether or not the investor pays the fixed cost and participates
in the stock market depends on his level of wealth which varies with the investor’s
age. The Survey of Consumer Finances data on household portfolios reveal that,
portfolio share devoted to risky assets has a hump shaped profile with respect
to age (Campbell (2006), Flavin and Yamashita (2011)). That is, as households
accumulate wealth they tend to invest an increasing fraction of their wealth in
risky assets. In contrast, conventional wisdom maintains that for reasonable levels
of risk aversion, young agents should place a large proportion of their wealth
into the market portfolio, and this proportion should decline as the agent nears
retirement, see Davis and Willen (2013).
Both empirical observation and conventional wisdom seem at odds
with the academic literature . Early and enduring theoretical contributions in-
clude Merton (1969, 1971), and Samuelson (1969). Merton (1969, 1971) considers
a dynamic portfolio optimization problem in which investors maximize expected
utility through their choice of risky and risk-free investments, subject to a wealth
constraint. Closed form solutions for optimal portfolio shares are obtained using
dynamic programming arguments when returns are generated by a Brownian mo-
tion process, and for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions, a
class that includes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA). One important result that emerges from Merton’s analysis
is a two-fund separation theorem. It states that given n assets with log-normally
distributed prices, there exists a unique pair of “mutual funds” consisting of a
linear combination of the assets, such that independent of preferences, wealth
distribution, or time horizon, investors will be indifferent between choosing from
a linear combination of these two funds or a linear combination of the original n
assets. This reduces the analysis of many assets to a two-asset case. With CRRA
utility, and one risky and one risk-free asset representing the two funds, the the-
ory has the testable property that the share invested in the risky asset is affected
neither by the level of wealth nor by the consumption decision, see Curcuru et al.
(2004).
These early studies conclude counter-factually that a long-lived
agent should hold a constant fraction of his wealth in the risky asset
throughout his life . When calibrated to historical values of the equity premium
and stock market return volatility, these models predict that the appropriate pro-
portion of wealth placed in the risky asset is large, sometimes higher than 100%.
These models generate little heterogeneity in stock market participation even if
there is significant variation in risk aversion across agents. These results are also
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derived under many restrictive assumptions, including power utility, independent
and identically distributed (IID) returns on the risky and risk-free investments,
the absence of market frictions, the absence of labour income etc., see Benzoni
et al. (2007).
In an attempt to reconcile theory and observation, many of the restrictive as-
sumptions underlying the Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) results have been
progressively relaxed. This has been achieved through incorporating labour in-
come (Bodie et al. (1992), Benzoni et al. (2007)), generalizing preferences (Camp-
bell and Viceira (1999), Gomes and Michaelidis (2005)), making intertemporal
utility non-separable in a durable good such as housing (Grossman and Laroque
(1990), Flavin and Yamashita (2011)) and analysing the effects of time variation
in equity premium (Campbell et al. (2001)).
Although each of these dynamics have been used independently in several
studies, to the best of our knowledge, none of them incorporates all the dynamics.
Furthermore, analytical expressions for αt in a substantially realistic model in
discrete time setup is more or less non-existent. In this chapter, we do both.
First, we use a reasonably stylized model to derive an expression for risky asset
demand, αt. In the second section, we extend this model to incorporate all the
above discussed features in a life-cycle context. The next subsection describes the
main contributions and key results that we obtain.
3.1.1. Contribution and Results
We have contributions in both the analytical and the numerical sections of this
chapter. We start with a moderately stylized model in Section III abstracting
from life-cycle dynamics but still having time varying returns, a risky durable
good and uncertain labour income with Epstein-Zin preferences. We then ana-
lytically characterize the optimal risky asset demand. This approach is closer to
Campbell and Viceira (1999), Viceira (2001) and Yogo (2006) in that we derive
approximate log linearized Euler equations and budget constraints. These equa-
tions incorporate a risky labour income and are potentially useful for empirical
research, particularly in explaining the cross-sectional variation of asset returns.
Importantly, we express the optimal risky equity demand as the sum of two com-
ponents, a myopic demand and an intertemporal hedging demand. Our analytical
characterization provides valuable intuition to the factors that determine the level
of wealth invested in the risky asset when the household faces changes in the in-
vestment opportunity set, shocks to the labour income and shocks to durable
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housing prices. In this way we extend the seminal work of Campbell and Viceira
(1999) to include durable goods and labour income.
In Section IV we extend the stylized model by incorporating short-sales and
borrowing constraints, calibrated hump-shaped labour income, and a risky stochas-
tic house price process in a life-cycle context. Essentially we extend Cocco (2004)
and Vestman (2012)’s life-cycle portfolio choice model which has both housing and
risky labour income by including (i.) time varying returns, (ii.) Epstein-Zin pref-
erences, (iii.) a bequest motive and uncertainty of death. Time varying returns
implies that investors in our model can use a factor such as the log dividend-
price ratio (log dividend yield) to predict expected excess returns and can devise
strategies in response to changing opportunities. We then numerically solve it
to understand the evolution of risky asset demand, αt, and the level of stock
market participation over the life-cycle. Our results provide valuable insights to
the resolution of these puzzles and other portfolio problems. Our results can be
summarized as follows.
Firstly, we find that in the presence of housing both the stock market par-
ticipation rate and the risky asset allocation share is found to be hump-shaped
over the life-cycle consistent with empirical evidence, see Attanasio et al. (2012)
and Guiso and Sodini (2013). Thus, consistent with other models that include
housing such as Cocco (2004), Yao and Zhang (2004), Li and Yao (2007) and Vest-
man (2012), housing initiates a crowding out effect restricting younger liquidity
constrained households from market participation and equity market investments.
Secondly, we find that both risky asset allocation as well as the stock market
participation rate is extremely sensitive to factor realization, factor volatilities and
the persistence of the factor process. We find that both, a high factor realization
and a high factor persistence are positively related to the equity allocation. By
factor, we mean the dividend-price ratio. In other words, unit root persistence in
the factor process indicative of stock market frenzies such as bubbles can generate
substantially high levels of equity demand and market participation. Furthermore,
a huge drop in realized levels of the return predicting factor and high volatility in
the factor produces a subsequent fall in risky asset allocation. The drop was much
larger in the later years of the life-cycle (65-100). These suggest a ”rare disaster”
in the economy. Our results thus extend the disaster literature, Barro (2006,
2009) and Wachter (2013), to understand household asset allocation. We also
find that investors can hedge background risks such as labour income and house
prices better under return predictability compared to the IID case. Intuitively,
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this means that substantial welfare losses arising from investment mistakes can
be avoided, see Calvet et al. (2009) and von Gaudecker (2015).
Thirdly, we resolve both the stock market participation and the asset alloca-
tion puzzles. Our simulated results predict levels of asset allocation and stock
market participation rates which are very close to the estimated ones from the
Survey of Consumer Finance dataset. Importantly, our results arise without re-
sorting to preference heterogeneity which is the case with Gomes and Michaelidis
(2005) and Vestman (2012). In other words, a moderate level of risk aversion
and a moderate level of elasticity of substitution can successfully replicate the
observed participation and equity shares.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In §3.2 we describe the lit-
erature review, in §3.3 we detail a reasonably stylized model of discrete time
portfolio choice and §3.4 describes the corresponding analytical characterization
for the Euler equations, budget constraints and importantly the optimal risky as-
set demand. §3.5 extends this model to a richer life-cycle one which is empirically
calibrated and the simulated results are then plotted, tabulated and described in
§3.6. Finally, §3.7 concludes.
3.2. Literature Review
In this section, we briefly review the literature on each of the modifications that
are critical in our model on household portfolio choice. These include labour
income, risky housing, return predictability and recursive preferences.
3.2.1. Labour Income and Portfolio Choice
A crucial element one needs to consider when discussing portfolio choice over
the life-cycle is labour income and the risk associated with it. For many agents,
the human capital (i.e., the certainty-equivalent present value) tied up in terms of
future wages dwarfs their financial wealth. As such, it is intuitive that the optimal
portfolio choice that takes labour income into account may generate significantly
different predictions.
Benzoni et al. (2007), discusses the role of labour income risk in explaining
lifecycle asset allocation decisions. They argue that the correlation between shocks
to stock market returns and wages is an increasing function of the investment
horizon. For a young investor, this effect generates a large positive correlation
between stock returns and the unobservable return to human capital. That is, the
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present value of future labour income flows acquires features identical to stocks in
that returns can be volatile and unpredictable. However, older investors, who have
shorter times to retirement, are much less exposed to long-run labour income risk.
Hence, their remaining human capital becomes more identical to bonds in that
returns are stable and highly predictable, see also Heaton and Lucas (1997) and
Viceira (2001). Together, these effects create a hump-shaped optimal portfolio
decision over the investor’s lifecycle, consistent with empirical observation. In
conclusion, the level and risk of labour income risk varies with age over the lifecycle
and portfolio choice for an investor depends on these changes. We thus consider
labour income, that is calibrated to capture the hump-shape, in our lifecycle asset
allocation model.
Recent literature on portfolio selection in the lifecycle context considers labour
income risks. However most of these papers do not explicitly account for housing,
see for example Dammon (2001), Ameriks and Zeldes (2002), Campbell (2006),
Cocco et al. (2004), Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) and Davis et al. (2006) among
others. For most households, a house is the single most important consumption
good, appearing, as an argument of the utility function and at the same time, the
dominant asset in the portfolio. On average over 1952-2013 in the US, housing
wealth accounts for 35% of household assets and 40% of household net worth
(assets minus liabilities), while home equity (housing wealth minus mortgage debt)
is 23% of assets and 26% of net worth. Furthermore, two-thirds of all households in
the U.S. own their home and for most home-owning households, housing accounts
for a substantial portion of total wealth, see Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2014).
In the following section we review the literature that accommodate housing in
making portfolio choice decisions.
3.2.2. The Role of Risky Housing in Portfolio Allocation
As argued by Corradin et al. (2014) and Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2014), there
are several housing specific characteristics that make portfolio allocation decisions
nontrivial. First, housing is illiquid in the sense that changing the quantity of
housing may take time and/or require incurring substantial transaction costs.
Therefore, homeowners would optimally want to rebalance their housing position
less frequently than other investment assets. Second, house is an indivisible good,
that is, a limited assortment of types and sizes are available for purchase at any
time which in general includes a minimum size. Third, home ownership and
housing consumption are generally intimately related. Most households own only
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one home and live in the house they own. Fourth, housing has an investment
dimension in that households can use it as a collateral against which they can
borrow. Investment in housing is much more leveraged than investments in other
financial assets and the value of owned housing limits the amount of leverage in
households’ portfolios. Finally, house prices move with business cycles and exhibit
both persistence and volatility making them a risky investment.
Despite these implications of housing on optimal portfolio choice, most papers
do not consider an individual’s investment in a home (i.e., a durable consump-
tions good). Grossman and Laroque (1990) present the first exception as they
develop a theoretical model with a single illiquid durable consumption good (e.g.,
a house) from which an infinitely lived investor derives utility. The illiquidity
derives from the fact that transaction costs are born when the good (house) is
sold. In addition to the durable good the individual can invest in a risk free
asset and a set of risky financial assets. At each time, the individual must de-
cide whether to acquire a larger (smaller) house and how to allocate his or her
remaining wealth among financial assets. Grossman and Laroque show that it is
optimal for the individual to wait for large increases (decreases) in wealth to raise
(reduce) their consumption of the durable consumption good. In addition, they
conclude that transaction costs cause the individual to allocate a smaller portion
of their financial wealth to risky assets than would occur if the individual could
adjust homeownership continuously. A drawback of their analysis is that only
the durable good is considered in the utility function, ignoring completely non-
durable consumption, implying that the potential spillover effects on nondurable
consumption or the implications for portfolio allocation of housing risk arising
from variation in the relative price of housing.
In a paper designed to explain the equity premium puzzle Chetty and Szeidl
(2007) show, in a two good model, one of which is a durable consumption good,
that a “consumption commitment” (e.g., for a house), will result in individuals
acting as if they are more risk averse. These authors conclude that their model
can fully resolve the equity premium puzzle. Alternatively Piazzesi et al. (2007)
and Yogo (2006) consider the effect of “composition risk” on asset pricing.2 Here
2The standard Consumption-Capital Asset Pricing Model focuses on consumption risk, which
relates changes in the conditional distribution of a single factor, the aggregate consumption
growth, to asset prices. However, consumption-savings decisions depend not only on the un-
certain overall size of future consumption bundles, but also on their uncertain composition, for
example, between housing and other consumption. Composition risk is an added risk which
relates changes in asset prices also to changes in expenditure shares of housing relative to other
non-durable goods.
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the individual’s utility function is not separable between the consumption of a
durable good and a non-durable good. These authors find that composition risk,
variations in the consumption of the durable good relative to the consumption
of other goods can help explain time variations in the equity premium. The
presence of such composition risk makes investors highly risk averse boosting
their precautionary savings motive and thus shifts down risky asset allocation.
This effect is particularly severe in recessions.3
Flavin and Yamashita (2002); Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) study the impact
of the portfolio constraint imposed by the consumption demand for housing on
an individual’s optimal holdings of financial assets. In addition to a house, the
individual can invest in T-Bills, T-Bonds, stocks, and borrow through a mortgage
loan. They use PSID data to explore the life cycle impact of the “housing con-
straint” (as reflected by the ratio of housing to net worth) on the individual’s op-
timal holding of financial assets. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) use mean-variance
analysis to characterize optimal portfolios of financial asset over the life cycle.
They conclude that an exogenous increase in the value of the house owned results
in a relatively large shift from equities to bonds in a mean-variance optimal port-
folio. All these papers immensely contributed to our understanding of the role of
the durable good in portfolio choice decision, but they did not consider life-cycle
dynamics.
In an important paper, Cocco (2004) developed an empirically parameter-
ized model of consumption and portfolio choice when there is an illiquid durable
consumption good (a house) in a life-cycle setting. In his paper the individual
purchases a home for the consumption services it provides. The individual has a
stochastic income and can invest in two financial assets: a risky stock and risk-
less Treasury bills. Cocco uses this portfolio optimization model to predict the
cross-sectional pattern of variation in the composition of wealth by age and net
worth.
In a similar life-cycle environment, Yao and Zhang (2004) investigate the op-
timal portfolio decisions of an individual who can obtain housing services from
renting or by buying a home. They investigate the decision as to how an indi-
vidual should obtain these services (i.e., rent or buy) and the implications of this
3During recessions, because investors expect higher future consumption, they try to sell
stocks today to increase current consumption. This intertemporal substitution mechanism drives
stock prices down in bad times. Investors’ concern with composition risk implies that recessions
are perceived as particularly severe when the share of housing consumption is low. That is, a
new intertemporal substitution mechanism increases the downward pressure on stock prices in
severe recessions.
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decision on investment choices. In their model the expected real rate of home
value appreciation is assumed to be zero. Yao and Zhang find that homeown-
ership has an important impact on the individual’s portfolio choice; specifically
homeowners substitute home equity for risky stocks. These authors find that,
over the life-cycle, the policy of always renting or buying a home can results in
large losses in welfare, with the largest being born by individuals with substantial
net wealth who are constrained to rent or older individuals with very little net
worth who are constrained to buy.
Yogo (2009) develops a life-cycle model in which a household faces stochastic
health depreciation, which affects its marginal utility of consumption and life ex-
pectancy, to analyse the portfolio choice in retirement. The household receives
retirement income including Social Security and chooses consumption, health ex-
penditure, and allocates wealth between bonds, stocks, and housing to maximize
its lifetime utility that includes a bequest motive. Yogo finds that in addition to
the housing risk, health expenditure also significantly affect the level of risky stock
allocation- households are more likely to invest in stocks when they are healthy.
A limitation in this paper, acknowledged by Yogo, is that the analysis is restricted
to the retirement phase and ignores the working period of the household.
In a recent empirical paper, Chetty and Szeidl (2014) distinguish between
home equity wealth and mortgage debt, as they have opposite signed effects on
portfolio choice. They find that increases in mortgage debt reduce stock holding
significantly, whereas increases in home equity wealth raise stock holding. In addi-
tion, they provide evidence that higher housing investment substantially reduces
the amount that households invest in risky stocks.
Although these papers provide valuable insights to the issue of durable goods
impact on risky asset allocation over the life-cycle, they ignore a very important
stylized fact in the financial economics literature, which is that stock returns are
time-varing and is predictable through financial factors such as the log dividend-
price ratios.
3.2.3. The Role of Return Predictability and Rare Disasters in
Portfolio Allocation
A large body of empirical literature has documented the long-term predictabil-
ity of asset returns and the linkages between wealth and other macroeconomic
variables. An important reason for the interest in this relation is that expected
excess returns on assets appear to vary with the business cycle. For instance,
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Chen (1991) studies the relation between changes in the financial investments
opportunity set and the macroeconomy. Chen (1991) finds that state variables
such as the dividend-price ratio, the default premium, the term premium etc are
good indicators of recent and future economic growth. Importantly, he finds that
these variables are positively correlated with expected excess return and future
economic growth; and negatively correlated with recent economic growth. The
counter-cyclicality of risk premium is found to hold even when post 1990 stock
market data is considered, see Henkel et al. (2011).
Different explanations have been offered for this empirical result, namely: in-
efficiencies of financial markets (Fama and French (1988, 1992) and Fama (1998));
the rational response of agents to time-varying investment opportunities driven
by variation in risk aversion Campbell and Cochrane (2000) or in the joint distri-
bution of consumption and asset returns.
One area where return predictability has profound implications is asset allo-
cation. For long-term investors the static Markowitz Mean-Variance model will
only be suitable under very strict assumptions, one of them being that investment
opportunities are constant over time, meaning that returns are unpredictable. If
this is not the case, long-term investors can benefit from the return predictability,
both in the form of market-timing and in the form of intertemporal hedging of fu-
ture return risk. Neither of these effects are captured by the static Mean-Variance
model.
Lynch (2001) assesses the impact of return predictability on portfolio choice
for a multi-period investor by characterizing the intertemporal hedging demand in
a continuous time setting. Lynch finds that parameters such as the persistence of
the return predicting process can have a large impact on the optimal risky share of
asset allocation. He attributes the variation in the risky share to hedging motives.
However, his model is highly stylized and abstracts from life-cycle dynamics,
labour income, any durable good or short sales constraints. Nevertheless, these
results are consistent with what we find.
There have been a few recent papers which argue how ”rare disasters” in the
economy can resolve several puzzles in the finance literature including but not
limited to the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)), the risk free
rate puzzle (Weil (1990)) and the excess volatility puzzle (Shiller (1981)).4 This
4The risk free rate puzzle emerges out of the equity premium puzzle: why are the risk free
rates so low if the agents are so averse to intertemporal substitution. The excess volatility puzzle
is the stylized fact that volatility of dividends (fundamentals) cannot explain the much larger
volatility in stock returns.
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strand of literature can be traced back to Rietz (1988) who models the possibility
of a low probability depression like state and shows how such a state can explain
these puzzles. The motivation is that Risk-averse equity owners demand a high
return to compensate for the extreme losses they may incur during an unlikely,
but severe, market crash. To the extent that equity returns have been high with
no crashes equity owners have been compensated for the crashes that happened
not to occur.
An open question has therefore been whether the risk is sufficiently high, and
the rare disaster adequately severe, to quantitatively explain the equity premium.
Recently, Barro (2006) revitalized this literature by analysing 20th century dis-
asters using GDP and stock market data for 35 countries and showed that it
is possible to explain the high equity premium when the disaster probability is
set at roughly 2% per year. The framework of his model is based on Lucas’
representative-agent, fruit-tree model of asset pricing with exogenous, stochastic
production with tractable elements of closed economy and complete markets. The
investor is allowed to hold two assets, one of which is risky and the other riskless.
At every date, the agent faces a constant exogenous probability of disaster risk,
and an associated size of this collapse. These parameters act as determinants in
the analytical closed form solutions of Barro’s optimal expected risky premium
and risk free return.Since Barro (2006), several papers have come out and have
been successful in explaining several asset market puzzles such as the excess stock
return volatility (Wachter (2013))
If rare economic disasters can solve the pricing puzzles, intuitively they should
also explain the observed household portfolio holdings (quantity) and/or the lim-
ited rates of equity market participation. In other words, perceived risk associated
with a disaster in stock markets should be revealed in household portfolios. How-
ever, such endeavours have been by and large unsuccessful.
For example Alan (2012) examines whether such rare economic disasters as
argued by Barro (2006) can explain the asset allocation and stock market partic-
ipation puzzles. Alan (2012) finds that it is difficult to reconcile the results of the
calibrated model with observed levels of limited asset allocation and participation
rates unless an implausible level of labour market stress is assumed at the time
of the disaster.
In a related exercise Fagereng et al. (2013) develop and numerically simulate
the standard life-cycle model of portfolio allocation incorporating labour income
risks and IID investment opportunity sets adding a small subjective probability
of a large loss when investing in stocks (a ”disaster” event) where the parameters
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are calibrated to Norwegian Household Panel Data. Their study predicts a joint
pattern and level of participation and the risky asset share over the life cycle
similar to the one observed in the data, with early rebalancing of the risky share
before retirement. However, the stock market participation rate is found to be,
counter-factually, 100% for most part of the agent’s life.
Michaelides and Zhang (2015) who solve for optimal portfolio choice and con-
sumption in a standard life-cycle model without housing but with recursive pref-
erences and undiversable labour income risk and importantly accommodating a
predictable time varying equity premium. They find that in the presence of return
predictability ignoring market information can lead to substantial welfare losses.
In this chapter we model return predictability following Michaelides and Zhang
(2015) but we do not focus on welfare analysis.
Some recent papers have investigated the impact of return predictability in
house prices on optimal portfolio choice. For instance, Fischer and Stamos (2013)
study the decisions of households facing time varying expected growth rates in
house prices and show that homeownership rates, as well as the sizes of housing
and mortgages, increase during good periods of housing market cycles. Their
results do not point to a statistically significant impact of the regime of housing
market cycles on stock holding. However, Corradin et al. (2014) find that the share
of wealth invested in risky assets is lower during periods of high expected growth
in house prices and that the decrease in risky portfolio holdings for households
moving to a more valuable house is greater in high-growth periods. Unlike these
papers, we do not model return predictabiity in house prices but assume that
excess stock returns are predictable. There is considerable empirical evidence
that house prices and stock prices are uncorrelated and that return predictability
in stock prices crucially affects risky portfolio choice.
3.2.4. Role of recursive preferences in portfolio choice
An often made assumption in several portfolio choice models is homogeneity in
preferences. In other words, investors are assumed to have Constant Relative
Risk Aversion (CRRA). This implies that as agents become more risk averse, they
simultaneously become more intolerant of intertemporal variation in consumption.
Consequently, higher risk aversion results in higher predicted levels of savings.
The importance of the equity premium relative to the fixed participation cost
increases with the level of savings. For some parameters, more risk-averse agents
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are therefore, counter-intuitively, more likely to participate in the stock market,
see Curcuru et al. (2004).
This counter-factual prediction arises because of the shortcomings of the CRRA
utility function - the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution are represented in just one parameter. In some sense,
this is consistent with the way the risk is modelled in expected utility framework:
uncertainty is the expansion of the decision making scenario to a multiplicity of
states of nature. Total utility is the expected value of optimal decision making
in each of these states. Thus, there is no difference between time and states of
nature. Time is just another subindex to identify states of the world. However,
households seem to regard time and uncertainty as essentially different phenom-
ena, see Weil (1990). It is natural then to seek a representation of preferences that
can treat these two components of reality separately. This has been addressed by
Epstein (1988), who axiomatically worked on non-expected utility and came up
with a non-expected utility function representation for a preference relation that
considers time and states of nature as more than just two indices of the state of
the world.
The advantage of such a separation has been highlighted by the empirical lit-
erature on the behavior of asset returns and consumption over time. Expected
utility, representative agent, optimizing models have not performed well empiri-
cally, Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985). One possible
explanation for this poor performance is the above noted inflexibility of the ex-
pected utility specification, see Epstein and Zin (1989).
Svensson (1989) analysing the portfolio choice problem in a non-stochastic
environment conclude that the optimal portfolio choice depends only on the risk
aversion parameter but not on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Simi-
larly, Weil (1990) assuming independent and identically distributed (IID) interest
rates over time finds that asset allocations are myopic and does not include a com-
ponent to hedge against intertemporal changes in the investment opportunity set.
However, Campbell and Viceira (1999), Chacko and Viceira (2005) and many oth-
ers who allow for non-IID stochastic investment find that both these parameters
matter in determining optimal consumption-portfolio choice decisions.
Campbell and Viceira (1999) solves analytically the optimal portfolio choice
assuming Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, however, ignoring life-cycle labour income
dynamics or the presence of a risky durable housing good. In the first section of
this chapter, we extend their work by including both risky labour income and a
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durable housing good and then derive an approximate analytical characterization
of the optimal risky portfolio choice.
Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) numerically solves a realistically calibrated life-
cycle model incorporating recursive preferences and attempts to resolve the asset
allocation and the stock market participation puzzles. Vestman (2012) extend
Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) model to include housing (without return pre-
dictability) and analyse the owning versus renting decisions of households and its
impact on stock market participation. They find that the life-cycle model, when
calibrated to Swedish household level data, predicts lower market participation
for renters relative to homeowners. Importantly, both these papers find that
heterogeneity in preferences can explain the allocation and participation puzzles.
3.3. A Dynamic Model of Consumption,
Housing and Portfolio Choice
In this section, we describe a stylized model of consumption and asset allocation.
We then derive Euler equations which are log-linearized to derive an expression
for the optimal risky asset allocation, αt, the key variable of interest.
3.3.1. Assumptions on Investor Preferences
We consider a partial equilibrium problem in which the investor’s preferences are
described by the recursive utility proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and
Weil (1990). These preferences allow us to disentangle the relative risk aversion
and the elasticity of substitution parameters. As these preferences are vital to
our analysis, we explain them in detail in the following paragraphs.
To arrive at the recursive preferences we start with the standard expected
utility time separable preferences defined as the expected discounted sum of util-
ities derived from the consumption of non-durable goods (Ct) and housing (Ht)
services:
Vt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs−tU(Ct+s, Ht+s) (3.1)
where U(.) is the concave, increasing and twice continuously differentiable per-
period utility function, Et denotes the expectations at time t and β is the time
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preference rate. This value function, Vt, can be defined recursively as
Vt = U(Ct, Ht) + βEtVt+1 (3.2)
Scaling with (1− β) 5
Vt = (1− β)U(Ct, Ht) + βEtVt+1 (3.3)
Epstein-Zin-Weil generalize this value function and express it recursively over
current (deterministic) consumption and a certainty equivalent µt(Vt+1) over to-
morrow’s utility
Vt = W (U(Ct, Ht), µt(Vt+1)) (3.4)
where W is an aggregator and the Certainty Equivalent part is defined as:
µt(Vt+1) = G
−1(EtG(Vt+1))
with W and G increasing and concave. µt(Vt+1) = Vt+1 if there is no uncertainty
on Vt+1 (future consumption). The more concave G is and the more uncertain Vt+1
is, the lower is µt(Vt+1). We follow most of the related literature (Campbell (1993),
Campbell and Viceira (1999) for instance) and consider a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) form for the aggregator W and a power functional form for
G as
W (c, z) = [cζ + βzζ ]1/ζ , 0 6= ζ < 1, 0 < β < 1 (3.5)
G(x) =
x1−Ψ
1− Ψ , Ψ > 0 (3.6)
with elasticity of substitution ψ = (1 − ζ)−1. Thus, ζ is a parameter that is
understood to reflect substitutability and Ψ is the relative risk aversion coefficient.
Expressing the recursive utility in these functional forms results in the utility
function we make use of in this chapter:
Vt =
{
(1− β)u(Ct, Ht)1−
1
ψ + βEt
[
V 1−γt+1
]1/κ} 11−1/ψ
(3.7)
where κ = (1−γ)/(1−1/ψ) specifies the preferences for the timing of the resolution
of the uncertainty. If κ < 1 agents prefer earlier resolution of uncertainty and late
5Homogeneity of the recursive preferences implies that they are scale invariant, that is, the
order of preferences do not change.
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resolution otherwise. This reduces to the standard nonseperable expected utility
form as in Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) when ψ = γ−1. We further assume that
the intratemporal utility follows the constant elasticity of substitution form:
u(Ct, Ht) =
{
[δC
1−1/ρ
t + (1− δ)H1−1/ρt ]
1
1−1/ρ if ρ 6= 1
CδtH
1−δ
t if ρ = 1.
(3.8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative importance of housing to non-durable goods
consumption and ρ ≥ 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. For high
values of ρ, agents are willing to substitute the two goods within each period. The
two goods become perfect substitutes as ρ→∞ and perfect complements as ρ→
0. Taking the limit as ρ → 1 yields the Cobb-Douglas specification. Equations
(3.7) and (3.8) describe the inter and intratemporal utility functions, respectively,
that describe the preferences for the consumers in our model. We have derived
these equations to ensure that the risk aversion parameter is separated from the
elasticity of substitution parameter.6
3.3.2. Assumptions on Labour Income and Human Capital
For most people, labour wealth, that is the present value of future wages, also
known as human capital, dwarfs financial wealth. Furthermore, unlike other assets
human capital cannot be traded. We assume that labour is supplied inelastically
and in the context of our work, it is exogenous.
We follow Viceira (2001) and assume that there are two states for labour in-
come that occur with constant probabilities, employment and retirement. The
employment state occurs with probability pie wherein the investor receives a re-
alization of the income process. The retirement state occurs with probability
pir = 1 − pie with 0 < pir < 1, and it is irreversible: If this state occurs, labour
income is set to zero forever. After retirement, the individual faces each period a
constant probability of death pid. Blanchard (1985) and Gertler (1999) have used
this probabilistic device to understand horizon effects on decision making, while
preserving analytical advantages of an infinite-horizon model. In section §3.4 we
consider a more realistic but less tractable life-cycle model with a finite horizon.
In the employment state, labour income is subject to permanent, multiplicative
shocks. We model the labour income as in Carroll and Samwick (1997):
Yt = Yt−1 exp(g + ξt) (3.9)
6In the Appendix, we give a detailed explanation of the recursive equation used here.
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where ξt ∼ NIID(0, σ2ξ ). This equation says that the Labour Income at time t,
Yt, is expressed as the product of last period, t−1, income Yt−1 and the exponent
of a mean growth in income term g added to a stochastic component ξt. An
equivalent way for expressing eq. (3.9) is by taking logs on both sides which
would gives us an AR(1) equation with a drift component. We define permanent
income in the form of Carroll (1997) as the level of capital income the household
would have received in the absence of any transitory shocks. Empirical evidence
reveals that the labour income is subject to both transitory and persistent shocks.
To make our model analytically tractable and also motivated by Viceira (2001)
that transitory shocks have little impact on portfolio allocation, we abstract from
the use of these type of shocks. Nevertheless, we do consider these shocks in the
numerical section.
It is interesting to note that to the best of our knowledge, existing literature
that work with Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) preferences and aim for deriving
analytical solutions do not explicitly consider labour income. This is surprising
considering Epstein and Zin (1991) themselves remarked that although ’ ’ . . . a
term measuring labor income is not present in our wealth constraint. If labor
income is nonstochastic and there is a riskless asset, then the sequence of incomes
can be discounted back to period 0 and treated as part of the initial endowment.
If labor income is stochastic, then the wealth return form is still applicable pro-
vided that the wealth measure is reinterpreted . . . ” We follow their advice and
reinterpret wealth when deriving the Euler equations noting that the two states
of nature for income, that is employment and retirement, will now translate to
two states of nature for the new wealth. However, when log linearizing the bud-
get constraint, we explicitly decompose the wealth into financial wealth, labour
income and housing wealth to understand the effects of each on optimal portfolio
choice and consumption.7
3.3.3. Assumptions on Housing
We assume a correspondence between the size of the house the investor owns
and the consumption benefits (flow of service) derived from it. We also assume
that the investor owns the house, ignoring rental occupied housing. At any time
period t the investor owns Ht units of the durable housing good. The size and
7Campbell (1996) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) consider ”tradable” income as div-
idends of human capital. They then modify the gross portfolio return as a weighted linear
combination of financial wealth and human wealth.
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quality of the house is dynamic in that it depreciates at the rate ν ∈ (0, 1] in
each period. After depreciation, the household chooses housing expenditure EXt,
which can be negative in the case of downsizing. Following Yogo (2006) the
housing accumulation follows
Ht = (1− ν)Ht−1 + EXt (3.10)
The price of housing fluctuates over time. The price of other consumption goods
(the numeraire) is fixed and normalized to one and consider PHt to denote the
real price of house. This real house price would be used later when we describe
the budget constraint.
3.3.4. Assumptions on Investment Opportunities
There are two financial assets that the investor holds, namely a risky stock and a
riskless bond. The household can freely trade in both the assets without incurring
any transaction costs. The gross return on the portfolio that the investor yields
from period t to t+ 1 is given by:
Rp,t+1 = Rf + αt+1(R1,t+1 −Rf ) (3.11)
This equation says that the return on the portfolio, Rp,t+1, is the sum of the return
from the risk free asset, Rf and the total expected excess return on the risky asset.
The variable αt is the portfolio weight on the risky asset.
8 Following Campbell
and Viceira (1999), the expected excess return on the risky asset, R1,t+1−Rf , can
be expressed in two different forms. First, they can be IID and not predictable,
rt+1 − rf = µS + St+1 (3.12)
where R1,t+1 = exp(r1,t+1), Rf = exp(rf ) and αt is the proportion of total wealth
invested in the risky asset at time t. Second, they can also be time varying and
predictable with a single factor, ft, that can predict future excess returns as in
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012) or Michaelides and Zhang (2015):
rt+1 − rf = ft + zt+1 (3.13)
where
ft+1 = µS + φ(ft − µS) + St+1 (3.14)
8Here we have suppressed the expectation term for convenience.
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Here St+1 and zt+1, the two innovations to excess returns are assumed to be i.i.d
normal random variables with mean zero and variance σ2S and σ
2
z . The factor ft
can be considered as the log dividend-price ratio. Eq. 3.12 is when the returns
are IID and the rest two arises only when they are predictable. One of the key
contributions of this chapter is in comparing the values for risky asset allocation
αt, that is the weight on risky asset, when the returns are predictable eq. (3.13)
against when they are not eq. (3.12).
3.3.5. The Inter-Temporal Optimization Problem
The investor’s optimization problem involves maximizing the utility function sub-
ject to the intertemporal budget constraint which is constructed as follows. At
every period t the household enters with financial wealth Wt and stock of durable
housing Ht. The household then receives labour income Yt, this combined wealth
is used to meet consumption Ct and housing expenditure EXt at the price P
H
t .
The wealth remaining after these expenditures, the savings, is allocated between
risky stocks and riskless bonds. The flow of wealth from t to t+ 1 is written as:
Wt+1 = (Wt + Yt − Ct + PHt (Ht − EXt))(Rp,t+1) (3.15)
where it is to be noted that Wt+1 is the financial wealth at time t+ 1. The total
wealth will include both the financial welath as well as the housing wealth. As we
care mainly about the optimal risky asset allocation we do not model the wealth
explicitly. We leave this task to the numerical §3.4 of this chapter. Here Rp,t+1 is
the one period return on wealth from time t to time t + 1 and is given as before
by
Rp,t+1 = Rf + αt+1(R1,t+1 −Rf ) (3.16)
For the time being, we do not consider adjustment costs to housing. Following
Cuoco and Liu (2000), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Yogo (2006, 2009) and Joa˜o
F. Gomes et al. (2009) we define the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
(IMRS) as
Mt+1 =
[
β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−1/ψ(v(Ht+1/Ct+1)
v(Ht/Ct)
)1/ρ−1/ψ
R
1−1/κ
p,t+1
]κ
(3.17)
where
v
(Ht
Ct
)
=
[
1− δ + δ
(Ht
Ct
)1−1/ρ]1/(1−1/ρ)
(3.18)
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Mt+1, also known as the Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) or the pricing kernel,
is the discounted ratio of marginal utility tomorrow to marginal utility today.9.
The novelty of Epstein-Zin preferences is that the pricing kernel (SDF) for each
individual asset depends not only on the present and future consumption but
also on the household’s total market return, see Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio
(2003).
Depending on the realized state for labour income Yt, there are two sets of
first order conditions for this intertemporal optimization problem. We derive the
Euler equations in the Appendix. The Euler equation for the employment state
is written as,
1 = Et
{([
pieβe
(Cet+1
Cet
)−1/ψ v(Het+1/Cet+1)
v(Het /C
e
t )
1/ρ−1/ψ
R
1−1/κ
p,t+1
]κ
+ (3.19)[
(1− pie)βr
(Crt+1
Cet
)−1/ψ v(Hrt+1/Crt+1)
v(Het /C
e
t )
1/ρ−1/ψ
R
1−1/κ
p,t+1
]κ)
Ri,t+1
}
(3.20)
and the retired state as
1 = Et
{[
βr
(Crt+1
Crt
)−1/ψ v(Hrt+1/Crt+1)
v(Hrt /C
r
t )
1/ρ−1/ψ
R
1−1/κ
p,t+1
]κ
Ri,t+1
}
(3.21)
where βe = β and βr = (1−pid)β and e, r represents variables in the employment
and retirement states. Both these equations hold irrespective of the number of
tradable assets available. In this chapter, i denotes the riskless bond, the risky
security or the investor’s portfolio p. When i = p, the Euler equations reduce to10
1 = Et
{([
pieβe
(Cet+1
Cet
)−1/ψ v(Het+1/Cet+1)
v(Het /C
e
t )
1/ρ−1/ψ]κ
+[
(1− pie)βr
(Crt+1
Cet
)−1/ψ v(Hrt+1/Crt+1)
v(Het /C
e
t )
1/ρ−1/ψ]κ)
Rκp,t+1
}
(3.22)
and
1 = Et
{[
βr
(Crt+1
Crt
)−1/ψ v(Hrt+1/Crt+1)
v(Hrt /C
r
t )
1/ρ−1/ψ]κ
Rκp,t+1
}
(3.23)
9The derivation of the stochastic discount factor and the Euler equation is given in the
Appendix
10The superscript in consumption C here refers to the employment state. When we begin
our log linearisation we remove this superscript and analyse the two cases separately. The
expectations in those equations are subsumed with an upper script e which refers to expectations
and not employment.
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In the absence of arbitrage and under complete markets, there exists a strictly
positive stochastic discount factor, Mt+1, which satisfies equation’s (3.22) and
(3.23) for any number of tradable assets (see Campbell (2000)).11 These Euler
equations (3.22) and (3.23) reveal that when the utility is not additively separable
in the non-durable and durable consumption goods, marginal utility has an extra
multiplicative term v(H/C)κ(
1
ρ
− 1
ψ
). The effect of the expediture share of the
durable to the non-durable good (H/C) on marginal utility depends on the relative
magnitudes of ψ and ρ. When ψ = ρ, i.e. when utility is additively separable in
durable and non-durable consumption goods, the marginal utility is independent
of the durable consumption. If ψ < ρ, then for a given level of non-durable
consumption, marginal utility decreases in the ratio of stock of durables to non-
durables (see Yogo (2006)).
The Euler equations (3.22) and (3.23) represent equilibrium conditions for a
consumer who holds risky assets and wishes to smooth consumption over time.
Although we have refrained from using borrowing constraints or transaction costs,
we stress that the corresponding Euler equations under the presence of such mar-
ket imperfections will be similar as long as the constraints are not binding between
two given time periods, see Attanasio and Weber (2010).
3.4. An Approximate Analytical
Characterization
Exact closed form solutions for this optimization problem do not exist unless we
restrict our analysis to the retirement state and assume that the investment op-
portunity set is constant, see Merton (1973). Thus, we are left with either solving
it numerically or approximating the non-linear equations with their percentage
deviations from the steady state, that is log-linearizing. We pursue both these
methods. Firstly, we find an approximate analytical solution in the lines of Camp-
bell (1993), Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Viceira (2001). We then extend this
11The more familiar notation of these Euler equations is the form
Et[Mt+1Ri,t+1] = 1, i = f, p
meaning that there are state prices, positive discount factors one for each state and date such
that the state price of any asset is merely the state price weighted sum of future payoffs. This is
the basis for all modern asset pricing models, each one with a specific form of SDF, see Bansal
and Yaron (2004)
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literature to a more realistic life-cycle model with calibrated exogenous variables,
add collateral constraints on housing etc which is then solved numerically.
We derive the approximate analytical solution building on the method pro-
posed by Campbell (1993). Firstly, we log-linearize the Euler equations and the
budget constraints around the stationary steady state. We approximate the Euler
equation using a second order expansion to capture the second moment effects
such as precautionary savings. 12 Then, we characterize the properties of, αt, the
optimal savings allocation on the risky asset in terms of its determinants.
3.4.1. Log Linearized Euler Equations
The first step in the solution method is to log linearize the Euler equations for
the employment eq. (3.22) and the retirement eq. (3.23) states. Appendix (3.C)
details our approach. The log linear Euler equation for the retirement state is
derived as
0 ≈
(
Et
[
κ ln βr − κ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt )−
κδ
ψ
(hrt+1 − hrt ) +
κδ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt ) + κrp,t+1
]
+
1
2
V art
(
κrp,t+1 − κ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt )−
κδ
ψ
(hrt+1 − hrt ) +
κδ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt )
))
(3.24)
where lower case letters denote variables in logs. This equation implies that
there is a linear relationship between expected log consumption growth and the
expected log return on wealth. The retirement state is characterized by no labour
income. Thus, this equation can be considered an extension of the Campbell and
Viceira (1999) log Euler equation with a durable consumption good. As long as
the return on wealth and consumption (both durable and non-durable) growth
is conditionally log normal, this equation will hold exactly. Our assumptions on
return on wealth makes it conditionally log-normal.13
12Precautionary savings comes from σ2, the volatility of consumption. When consumption
is more volatile, consumers are more worried about the low consumption states than they
are pleased by the high consumption states. Therefore, people want to save more bringing
down interest rates. A measure of precautionary savings requires that the utility be third
differentiable, that is to say, Linear-Quadratic preferences exhibit no prudence, see Attanasio
and Weber (2010).
13If X ∼ LN ,X is lognormal, such that logX follows a normal distribution with logX = x ∼
N(µ, σ2). Then, EX = exp(µ+σ2/2) and logEX = E logX+ 12V ar(logX) .The approximation
lnE exp(z) ≈ Ez + σ2z/2 is exact when z is a normal random variable.
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Unlike retirement, while employed the investor faces the risk of being retired
in the next state. Hence, optimal inter-temporal consumption now is weighed for
the possible states of nature. The log linear Euler equation for the employment
state, given by,
1 ≈
∑
s=e,r
piκs
(
Et
[
1 + κ ln βs − κ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet )−
κδ
ψ
(hst+1 − het ) +
κδ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet ) + κrp,t+1
]
+
1
2
V art
(
κrp,t+1 − κ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet )−
κδ
ψ
(hst+1 − het ) +
κδ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet )
))
(3.25)
is equal to the probability weighted sum of the log-linear Euler equations for both
states of nature of the labour income process, the employment and the retirement.
A crucial assumption we made while deriving both these Euler equations is
that the intra-period felicity follows a Cobb-Douglas form with intra-temporal
elasticity of substitution ρ = 1. This assumption is primarily to maintain tractabil-
ity. Also, empirical estimates such as by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) and by Yogo
(2006) find ρ to be very close to 1. Theoretically, if ρ 6= 1, this introduces another
state variable Ht/Ct to the model, and the share of durable consumption varies
with time. Furthermore, as Yang (2011) elaborates, when ρ is not very differ-
ent from one, this generates only small temporal variations in the quantities of
interest.
If we subtract the loglinear Euler equation for the riskless asset (i = f) from
the loglinear Euler equation for the risky asset (i = S), for the retirement case,
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we find that:14
Etri,t+1 − rf + 1
2
V art[ri,t+1] =
κ
ψ
(1− δ)cov(ri,t+1,∆ct+1) + κδ
ψ
cov(ri,t+1,∆ht+1)
+(1− κ)cov(ri,t+1, rp,t+1)
(3.26)
This equation says that the expected excess log return on the risky asset is deter-
mined by its own variance and by a weighted combination of three covariances.
The first covariance is between log return on the risky asset and consumption
growth with weight κ
ψ
(1− δ), the second covariance is between durable consump-
tion growth (housing) and log return on the risky asset with weight κδ
ψ
and the
third one is between log returns on the risky asset and log return on the portfo-
lio with weight (1 − κ). Equation (3.26) is the starting point of our analysis of
optimal portfolio choice.
Following Campbell (1993, 1996) and Viceira (2001) we also log-linearise the
budget constraint for both states around the mean consumption to income ratio,
the wealth to income ratio and the housing wealth to income ratios. For the
employment state we obtain,
wet+1 − yt+1 = ke + ρew(wet − yt)− ρec(cet − yt) + ρeh(pht + ln(1− ν) + het−1 − yt)−∆yt+1 + rep,t+1
(3.27)
where we have suppressed the Expectations operator in the superscript e. The
details of the derivation is given in Appendix. The log-linearisation constants ke
and the ρ’s are endogenous in that they depend on the average log consumption
to income, log wealth to income and log housing wealth to income ratios. The ap-
proximation should hold exactly when these ratios are constant. In the retirement
14For a general risky asset, i = S, we use log-linearized forms of the Euler equation (3.21)
meaning that now we have an extra term in both the expectation and variance operators in eq’s.
(3.24) and (3.25) given by (κ− 1)ri,t+1. Furthermore, while deriving this equation we make use
of the following properties for variance and covariance
V ar(X + Y ) = V ar(X) + V ar(Y ) + 2cov(X,Y )
V ar(X + a) = V ar(X)
cov(X,Y + Z) = cov(X,Y ) + cov(X,Z)
cov(X,Y + a) = cov(X,Y )
cov(X, a) = 0,
where X,Y, Z are random variables and a is a constant. With these results, the derivation is
straight forward and is hence omitted.
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state, there is no labour income (Yt = 0), thus the log linear budget constraint
simplifies to
wrt+1 − wt = kr + ρrh(pht + ln(1− ν) + hrt−1 − wt)− ρrc(crt − wt) + rrp,t+1 (3.28)
where kr and the ρ’s are again log-linearisation constants interpreted as before.
The log-linearised budget constraints took the return on the wealth portfolio
as given, and does not relate it to the returns on individual assets. We can
approximate the log portfolio return on wealth as 15
rp,t+1 − rf = αt(rt+1 − rf ) + 1
2
αt(1− αt)σ2t (3.29)
where αt is the vector of risky asset weights, σt
2 is the vector containing the
diagonal elements of Σt.
We can now use these log-linearised equations to characterise the investor’s
approximate optimal portfolio choice policy in each state of the labour income.
As once the retirement state occurs, the investor cannot revert back to being
employed, the optimal rules in this states are independent of those in the employ-
ment state. On the contrary, in the employment state, the investor must take
into account the off-chance of being retired in the near future when deciding on
asset allocation.
3.4.2. Characterizing the Optimal Portfolio Choice
In the last section, we derived the log excess return on the risky asset for the
retirement state, eq. (3.26), as
Etri,t+1 − rf + 1
2
σ2it =
κ
ψ
(1− δ)σri,t+1,∆ct+1 +
κδ
ψ
σri,t+1,∆ht+1
+(1− κ)σri,t+1,rp,t+1 (3.30)
where V art[ri,t+1] = σ
2
it, covt(ri,t+1,∆ct+1) = σri,t+1,∆ct+1 , covt(ri,t+1,∆ht+1) =
σri,t+1,∆ht+1 and covt(ri,t+1, rp,t+1) = σri,t+1,rp,t+1 . As in the retirement state, with
no labour income, our strategy, following Campbell and Viceira (1999), is to
characterize the covariance terms as functions of the exogenous risky asset return
15The derivation of log approximation to portfolio return is standard in the literature, see for
example Campbell and Viceira (2002).
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and the stationary consumption-wealth ratio. The covariance between log risky
asset return and non-durable consumption growth is written as,
σri,t+1,∆ct+1 = covt(ri,t+1,∆ct+1)
= covt(ri,t+1, (ct+1 − wt+1)− (ct − wt) + ∆wt+1)
= covt(ri,t+1, (ct+1 − wt+1))− covt(ri,t+1, ct − wt) + cov(ri,t+1,∆wt+1)
= covt(ri,t+1, (ct+1 − wt+1)) + covt(ri,t+1,∆wt+1)
= σri,t+1,(ct+1−wt+1) + covt(ri,t+1, rp,t+1)
= σri,t+1,(ct+1−wt+1) + αitvart(ri,t+1)
= σri,t+1,(ct+1−wt+1) + αitσ
2
it (3.31)
where the second equality is trivial algebra, the third uses properties of the covari-
ance operator for random variables, and the rest follows from substituting values
for ∆wt+1 and rp,t+1 from the retirement state log linearised equations (3.28) and
(3.29). In addition to these we also use the fact that cov(xt+1, zt) = 0, see Camp-
bell and Viceira (1999). In similar fashion, the covariance between log risky asset
return and durable (housing) consumption growth is derived as
σri,t+1,∆ht+1 = σri,t+1,(ht+1−wt+1) + αitσ
2
it (3.32)
and finally the covariance between log risky asset return is a direct implication of
equation (3.29):
σri,t+1,rp,t+1 = covt(ri,t+1, rf + α
′
t(rt+1 − rf ) +
1
2
α′tσ
2
t −
1
2
α′tΣtαt)
= αitσ
2
it (3.33)
Now that we have characterized the three covariance terms, we substitute these
terms into (3.30) to get
Etri,t+1 − rf + 1
2
σ2it =
κ
ψ
(1− δ)(σri,t+1,(ct+1−wt+1) + αitσ2it)
+
κδ
ψ
(σri,t+1,(ht+1−wt+1) + αitσ
2
it) + (1− κ)αitσ2it (3.34)
which can be rearranged using the fact that the parameter specifying the timing
of the resolution of uncertainty is κ = (1 − γ)/(1 − 1
ψ
). We substitute to get
the optimal portfolio allocation on the risky assets for the retirement state. The
employment state follows the same procedure. These results are described in the
following Proposition.
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PROPOSITION 1: The optimal portfolio share of risky assets for the
retirement state is 16
αrit =
1
γ
Etri,t+1 − rf + 12σ2it
σ2it
+
( 1
1− ψ
)(1− γ
γ
)((1− δ)σi,(ct+1−wt+1) + δσi,(ht+1−wt+1)
σ2it
)
(3.35)
= αMDrit + α
HDr
it . (3.36)
where V art(ri,t+1) = σ
2
it, cov(ri,t+1, ct+1−wt+1) = σi,ct+1−wt+1 and cov(ri,t+1, ht+1−
wt+1) = σi,ht+1−wt+1.
and for the employment state is
αeit =
1
γ
Etri,t+1 − rf + 12σ2it
σ2it
+
( 1
1− ψ
)(1− γ
γ
)(∑
s=e,r
piκs
[(1− δ)σri,(cst+1−wt+1) + δσri,(hst+1−wt+1)
σ2it
])
(3.37)
= αMDeit + α
HDe
it . (3.38)
where V art(ri,t+1) = σ
2
it, cov(ri,t+1, c
s
t+1−wt+1) = σi,cst+1−wt+1 and cov(ri,t+1, hst+1−
wt+1) = σi,hst+1−wt+1.
Proof : See Appendix (3.E).
The first equation characterizes the optimal portfolio choice for the risky asset
in the retirement state when there is no labour income and the second one with
labour income. These equations have two parts. The first part, αMDit captures
any asset demand induced completely from the current risk premium adjusted
for Jensen’s inequality by adding one half the own variance, called the ”myopic
demand” of risky asset. The myopic demand corresponds to the single-period
16Equation (3.36) gives us valuable information to the determinants of optimal risky asset
allocation, however, it is not a complete solution of the model because the current optimal port-
folio allocation is a function of future portfolio and consumption decisions which are endogenous
in our model. This dependence on future consumption and portfolio decisions operates through
the conditional covariances. The conditional covariances depends on the log non-durable con-
sumption to wealth ratio and log durable housing consumption to wealth ratio. These equations
can be solved forward and expressed in terms of expectations of future consumption and port-
folio returns, see Campbell (1993) equation (3.9).To solve for an exact solution to optimal
consumption and portfolio policies, the method of Campbell and Viceira (1999) can be applied
to guess a functional form for these policies and identify the parameters using the technique of
undetermined coefficients. This analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter and is left for future
work. Instead we characterize the solution as we are only interested in the economic intuition
behind these solutions. The quantitative analysis is left for the numerical section.
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demand for an asset, when there are no changes in the investment opportunity
set, as in the traditional single-period portfolio choice problems. This myopic
component is directly proportional to the risk premium, Etri,t+1 − rf + 12σ2it, and
inversely proportional to the investor’s risk aversion, γ.
The second term, αHDit describes Merton (1969, 1973)’s ”inter-temporal hedg-
ing demand”. The hedge demand corresponds to the additional demand for an
asset, when the changes in the investment opportunity set are incorporated in
the portfolio choice problem, as in the multi-period portfolio choice problem of
Merton (1973). This component arises when the investor seeks to hedge against
future shocks to the investment opportunity set. As investment opportunities are
varying over time, long-term investors care about shocks to investment opportu-
nities. In other words, the productivity of wealth also matters and not just the
wealth itself.
Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1971) state conditions under which a long term
investor finds it optimal to act myopically, choosing the same portfolio as a short
term investor. These include power utility and IID returns. Power utility (also
logarithmic utility) implies constant relative risk aversion nullifying our model of
recursive preferences. Next, if returns are IID no new information arrives between
one period and the next, so there is no reason for the portfolio choice to change
inter-temporally. Thus, both conditions imply that there are no changes in time
over investment opportunities that might induce changes in consumption (durable
and non-durable) relative to wealth. Campbell and Viceira (2001) equate these
conditions to a constant consumption-wealth ratio meaning that
σi,ct+1−wt+1 = 0
σi,ht+1−wt+1 = 0.
(3.39)
Thus, we are left with just the myopic part of risky asset demand,
αrit = α
MDr
it =
1
γ
Etri,t+1 − rf + 12σ2it
σ2it
(3.40)
which is exactly the result of Viceira (2001) for the retirement state. This equation
states that optimal portfolio choice is independent of the level of wealth and is
only optimized over the mean and variance of the risky return. The presence
of a durable good makes no difference to the portfolio rule. In contrast, our
model specifies time varying investment opportunity sets, as expected returns are
state dependent, and hence the hedging component is non-zero meaning that the
presence of the durable good does influence the proportion of wealth invested in
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the risky asset. Unfortunately as we do not have a complete analytical solution
we cannot exactly pin-point the way in which the durable housing good impacts
αt. The only point we make is that housing forms a kind of background risk for
the investor meaning that it is undiversifiable and hence should, all else constant,
bring down αt.
Nevertheless, three important results can be derived from the Proposition.
Firstly, we find that the relative risk aversion parameter γ is inversely related
to αt and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ is directly related to αt.
Both these parameters are thus found to have opposite affects on the optimal
risky equity demanded. The fact that increasing risk aversion decreases risky
asset demand is universal throughout the literature, see Campbell and Viceira
(1999), Barberis (2000), Campbell (2006) etc. This is true even in the presence
of housing, for example Flavin and Yamashita (2002) find decreasing amount of
wealth invested in risky stocks or housing with increasing risk aversion in their
quantitative analysis using PSID data. However, existing literature is conflicted
regarding the effect of the EIS parameter on αt. For example Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) and Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2015) find
that higher EIS motivates more consumption smoothing and thereby higher sav-
ings and risky asset accumulation. However, Vestman (2012) predicts using a
lifecycle portfolio choice model (with housing) that higher EIS lowers risky equity
demand. In this chapter consistent with our analytical prediction, Proposition 1,
our numerical model also shows the same positive relationship between EIS and
αt.
A second result that we can derive from Proposition 1 is that in the absence
of any correlation between consumption, house prices, labour income or risky re-
turns, the optimal portfolio share of savings in the risky asset simplifies to the
myopic demand. In other words there is no hedging component. If we set all the
correlations or covariances to zero, we get αit = α
MD
it . This proposition becomes
very valuable in our numerical analysis where for the benchmark model we set all
correlations to zero. We then impose empirically calibrated covariances or corre-
lations of labour income, housing prices etc with returns so that we can quantify
the hedging demand. It has to be noted that the absence of hedging motives does
not imply that the risky asset demand is fully myopic because investors, specially
when returns are mean reverting, can accrue huge wealth by timing the market.
That is, optimal strategies contains some planning for the future.
A third and final result that we get from Proposition 1 is that risky asset
demand under time varying returns or return predictability can be substantially
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different from the IID case. Importantly, if the factor predicting returns is high
so will be the expected excess returns and hence a higher risky asset is demanded,
refer eq. 3.12 and the subsequent ones. Furthermore, a higher persistence φ of
the return predicting factor also results in an increased share of the risky equity
demanded. A unit root persistence is suggestive of a market bubble implying
under such speculative markets αt goes up. Eraker et al. (2003), Broadie et al.
(2007) and Elkamhi and Stefanova (2015) to name a few finds strong evidence
for jumps in returns during the periods of stock market bubbles. A very low
realization of the factor can arise due to a market crash, alternatively termed as
”rare disaster”, when there is a huge drop in all macroeconomic variables. Hence,
αt is found to be procyclical and as factor processes follow a long run mean growth
rate so will the risky equity demanded. This explains why some recent empirical
studies such as Guiso and Sodini (2013) find that the level of wealth invested in
risky equities has been steadily increasing.
The proof for these three results are fairly obvious from Proposition 1 and
requires no algebraic work, hence omitted from discussion. The analysis in this
section abstracted from realistic arguments such as the presence of transaction
costs, borrowing constraints, etc. Furthermore, the proposition 1 was more intu-
itive, the arguments were not based on an exact solution of either consumption
or portfolio choice.
3.5. A Life-Cycle Exercise - Quantitative
Results
In the last section we derived an analytical expressions for the risky asset alloca-
tion demand, αt, for the two cases of labour income: employment and retirement.
Proposition 1 describes the derived expression for αt. This Proposition gives two
important results. Firstly, the risky equity demanded is inversely proportional to
the risk aversion and directly related to the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion. Secondly, the risky equity demanded is significantly different when returns
are predictable (time varying) compared to the IID case. Importantly for high
factors (such as the dividend-price ratio) the investor increases his holdings of the
risky asset, αt ↑.
The analysis though insightful abstracted from realistic labour income dy-
namics. In this section, we extend the stylized model to a realistic life-cycle one
with short-sales and borrowing constraints, bequest motive, uncertain survival
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probability and importantly an empirically calibrated labour income process. We
then calibrate the parameters and simulate it to get quantitative results. We also
check how our numerical results differ from our analytical characterization in the
previous section.
3.5.1. The Life-Cycle Model
3.5.1.1. Modified Preferences
We extend the preferences to a discrete time life-cycle model where t denotes
adult age and is given by effective age minus 19. Each period corresponds to 1
year and agents live for a maximum of T periods (T = 81). The probability that
a consumer or investor is alive at time t + 1 conditional on being alive at time t
is denoted by pt. This p should not be confused with the price of housing used in
the last section. We will use the superscript h when we refer to housing prices.
The presence of conditional survival probabilities means there is now uncertainty
regarding mortality and hence, this induces the ”precautionary savings” motive
of the investor.
In each period t, a household as before, derives utility from consuming non-
durable goods Ct and durable housing Ht. The household’s modified preferences
are defined by:
Vt =
{
(1− βpt)u(Ct, Ht)1−
1
ψ + βEt
[
ptV
1−γ
t+1 + (1− pt)b
(Wt+1/b)
1−γ
1− ρ
] 1−1/ψ
1−γ
} 1
1−1/ψ
(3.41)
where β is the time discount factor, ψ is the Elasticity of Inter-temporal Substi-
tution, γ is the coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, b determines the strength of
the bequest motive and Wt+1 denotes the wealth at time t+1. β denotes the time
preference, or impatience, inducing conditional survival probabilities multiplica-
tively with β implies that consumers get more and more impatient with age. A
bequest motive is a reason for why households do not run down their wealth faster
during retirement. The terminal condition for the recursive equation is expressed
in terms of the bequest motive and terminal wealth as:
VT+1 = b
(WT+1/b)
1−ρ
1− ρ (3.42)
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The intra-period consumption aggregator as before takes a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) form, see eq. (3.8), reproduced here for convenience.
u(Ct, Ht) =
{
[δC
1−1/ρ
t + (1− δ)H1−1/ρt ]
1
1−1/ρ if ρ 6= 1
CδtH
1−δ
t if ρ = 1.
(3.43)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative importance of housing to non-durable goods
consumption and ρ ≥ 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution.
3.5.1.2. Modified Labour Income Risk
Empirically, it has been found that the flow of labour income is well represented as
a sum of three components: an aggregate component that is subject to economy-
wide fluctuations; an idiosyncratic component, which captures individual specific
shocks; and a deterministic component due to lifecycle predictability in wages,
see Bodie et al. (1992), Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). These three components combine to create a hump-shaped deterministic
lifecycle labour income profile, wages increase with age when workers are young
and then decline when they approach retirement.
We extent our stylized model in §2.2 to now include both persistent and tran-
sitory shocks. Furthermore, instead of having exogenous retirement probability,
we fix the retirement date at K corresponding to actual age 65. The investor
j works for the first K periods of his life supplying labour inelastically in each
period and receive stochastic labour income Yjt against which he cannot borrow.
The investor j’s age t labour income before and after retirement is exogenously
given by:17
log(Yjt) =
{
f(t, Zjt) + νt + ωjt for t ≤ K
λf(K,ZjK) for t > K,
(3.44)
where f(t, Zjt) is a deterministic component of age t:
f(t, Zjt) = β0 + β1agejt + β2age
2
jt/10 + β3age
3
jt/100 (3.45)
Thus, the prior retirement log income is the sum of a deterministic component
that can be calibrated to capture the hump shaped earnings over the life-cycle and
17In reality labour income is not exogenous, individuals must decide how many hours to work
and how much effort to put on the job, decisions that will influence the amount of labor income
received. By having exogenous labour income, we rule out the possibility that an individual
who has had a bad portfolio return can work more hours to compensate for it
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two random components, one transitory and one persistent. Also, νt represents
the aggregate component and ωjt captures idiosyncratic shocks. Following the
literature, we assume that the idiosyncratic labour income risk ωjt is an IID nor-
mally distributed random variable - ωjt ∼ N(0, σ2ω). Furthermore, the aggregate
shock νt follows a random walk:
νt = νt−1 + νt (3.46)
where νt is IIDN(0, σ
2
ν). Retirement is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic
with all households retiring in time period K, corresponding to age 65 (K =
46). Following Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) retirement income is modelled as a
constant fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of permanent labour income in the last working year:
log(Yjt) = log λ+ f(K,ZjK) (3.47)
3.5.1.3. Modified Illiquid Housing with Constraints
In our analytical section, we had several restrictive assumptions on the durable
good, housing. We refrained from any transaction costs which made the house
a liquid asset. In reality, the household has to decide every period if he should
move or not and faces substantial costs when doing so. This can be endogenous or
even exogenous depending on labour income or family specific shocks. We start
by assuming that:
Ht ≥ Hmin ∀t (3.48)
where Hmin is the minimum house size. This constraint basically takes care of the
indivisibility property of the house. As in Yao and Zhang (2004) and Hu (2005),
we assume that in each period t, with probability pih the household is forced to sell
the house and buy an other one. Cocco (2004) calls this an ”involuntary move”.
With probabililty 1 − pih the household is not forced to move, but may still do
so if that is optimal. We use a state variable InvMovet to capture involuntary
house trades which takes the value of 1 if at t the household is in a state where it
if forced to move, and zero otherwise.
The house sale is associated with a monetary cost equal to a proportion Λ of
the house value and instead of assuming that the house depreciates every period,
we assume that there is an annual maintenance cost equal to a proportion mch of
the house value.
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The price of housing fluctuates over time. The price of other goods consump-
tion (the numeraire) is fixed and normalized to one. Let pht denote the real log
price of house. We follow Campbell and Cocco (2003) and assume that the real
house price growth is given by
∆pht = µh + 
h
t (3.49)
a constant µh and an i.i.d normally distributed shock with mean zero and variance
σ2h.
3.5.1.4. Financial Assets and Credit Markets
We improve on our analytical modelling section with the addition of a fixed cost
of equity market participation and the existence of a mortgage. As before, we
assume that there are two assets that the household can invest: a riskless asset
with gross real return Rf = exp[rf ], which we call Bonds, and a risky asset with
gross real return Rt = exp[rt], which we call Stocks. The existing literature that
analyse optimal portfolio choice with housing assume a constant opportunity set
or in other words I.I.D returns. In contrast, we consider two cases for the log
excess return on the risky asset. The excess log return can be either an IID
process as in Cocco (2004), Yao and Zhang (2004) or Hu (2005):18
rt+1 − rf = µS + St+1 (3.50)
or time varying with a single factor, ft, that can predict future excess returns as
in Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012) or Michaelides and Zhang (2015):
rt+1 − rf = ft + zt+1 (3.51)
where
ft+1 = µS + φ(ft − µS) + St+1 (3.52)
Here St+1 and zt+1, the two innovations to excess returns are assumed to be IID
normal random variables with mean zero and variance σ2S and σ
2
z . The factor
ft can capture the widely documented mean-reversion aspect of stock market
returns, see Campbell and Viceira (1999). We calibrate this factor as the log
dividend-price ratio. The dollar amount the investor has in Treasury Bills and
Stocks are represented as Bt and St respectively. We follow Cocco (2004) and
18This is the same equation we use in the analytical section, see eq. (3.12).
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Cocco et al. (2004) and assume that the investor cannot short-sell either of these
assets so that:
St ≥ 0, (3.53)
Bt ≥ 0 ∀ t (3.54)
An implication of these constraints is that the household cannot lever up us-
ing future labour income or retirement wealth to invest in the stock market. It
also means that the allocation of wealth to both stocks and bonds remain non-
negative at all dates.19 Furthermore, there is a fixed cost involved in equity market
participation. This fixed cost can be considered as the cost of opening a broker-
age account, understanding how the market works, the cost of financial literacy
etcetera. Alan (2006) estimate this cost as 2% of annualized labour income while
Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) calibrate this fixed cost as 6% . Following these,
we assume that the investor incurs a fixed one time cost which is a proportion F
of the permanent component of labour income.
In addition to the two financial assets, the investor who is also a homeowner
can borrow against the value of the house, which we call mortgage, at a gross real
fixed rate of RD. The dollar amount the investor owes in mortgage at date t is
denoted as Dt. Following Cocco (2004), the investor can borrow up to the house
value minus a down-payment, which is assumed to be a proportion d of the value
of the house so that:
Dt ≤ (1− d)PtHt, ∀ t (3.55)
3.5.1.5. The Household’s Modified Optimization Problem
The investor maximizes
max
(Ct,Ht,Dt,FCt,Mt)Tt=1
E(V0) (3.56)
where V0 is given by eqn’s 3.41, 3.42, 3.43 and is subject to the Labour Income
Constraints 3.44, 3.45, 3.46 and 3.47, the housing constraint 3.48, the financial
assets constraints 3.50, 3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.54, 3.55 and the budget constraints
19Benzoni et al. (2007) find that the presence of short-sale constraints can limit equity market
participation, specially young and poor investors who have a high incentive to short stocks.
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expressed in terms of cash on hand Xt:
20
St +Bt =
{
Xt − Ct − FCtFYt −mchPtHt−1 +Dt, ∀t
Xt − Ct − FCtFYt −mchPtHt−1 +Dt + (1− Λ)PtHt−1 − PtHt, ∀t
(3.57)
where the first one is the no house trade case and the second one expresses the
house trade case. Here, we define cash in hand, Xt, along the lines of Deaton
(1991) and Carroll (1997), as the sum of liquid or financial wealth and labour
income:
Xt = (RtSt−1 +RfBt−1 −RDDt−1) + Yt (3.58)
Here, αt denotes the level of wealth invested in risky stocks over stocks plus bonds
at any time t. This is akin to αt in our analytical section. Also, FCt is an indicator
variable which is allowed to take the value of 1 if the investor chooses to pay the
fixed cost and zero otherwise. Wealth at date T + 1, the bequeathed wealth after
the terminal period T , is given by
WT+1 = XT+1 −mchHTPT+1 + (1− Λ)HTPT+1 (3.59)
This is the bequeathed wealth which is equal to financial wealth plus housing
wealth net of debt outstanding. The numerical solution method we use is standard
Value function Iteration and is explained in the Appendix (3.G).
3.5.2. Calibration
The parameters for our benchmark model are reported in Table 3.1. We follow
the literature and set standard values for the preference parameters as γ = 5
(risk aversion), ψ = 0.2 (EIS), β = 0.96 (discount factor) and ε = 0.10 (IES).
These values for γ and ψ imply that we are in fact assuming γ = 1/ψ or in other
words CRRA preferences. This is mainly to make our results comparable to the
literature. We do change these values later on to test for the sensitivity of our
results for these parameters.
The investor dies with probability 1 at age 100. Prior to this age, conditional
survival probabilities for other ages have been taken form the National Center
for Health Statistics as in Winter et al. (2012). Following Gomes and Michaelidis
(2005), we set the bequest motive at 2.5. We also present sensitivity analysis for
this parameter. Table 3.1 reports all the calibrated parameters of our model.
20For a detailed discussion on how we construct these budget constraints, refer to Appendix
(3.F).
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Table 3.1. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion γ 5
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution ψ 0.2
Time Discount Factor β 0.96
Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution ρ 0.10
Preference for Housing 1 - δ 0.10
Minimum House Size Hmin 0.20
Maintenance Cost mch 0.01
Transaction Cost Λ 0.08
Probability of Involuntary Move pih 0.03
Mean Growth Rate of House Prices µh 0.012
Standard deviation of house price shocks σh 0.048
Bequest Motive b 2.5
Downpayment d 0.15
Fixed cost of equity participation F 0.025
Riskless rate Rf 1.02
Mortgage rate RD 1.04
Mean Stock return µS 1.06
Persistence of excess stock return φ 0.9
Std of stock returns σz 0.18
Corr. between factor and the return innovation ρz,S -0.6
Innovation to the factor σS 0.007
Notes: This table reports the parameters for the benchmark model. The
minimum house size and fixed costs are expressed as proportions to labour
income.
For labour income we follow Cocco et al. (2004), who estimate the determin-
istic and permanent components of the labour income process using PSID data.
As age profiles differ in shape across education groups, they control for education
by splitting the sample into three groups: those without high school education; a
second group with high school education but no college degree; and finally college
graduates. Estimated parameters for the labour income process are reported in
Table (3.2). The large estimate for the replacement ratio (λ) during retirement
(93% for the college educated) arises from using both social security and private
pension accounts to estimate the benefits in the PSID data and is consistent with
not explicitly modelling the tax-deferred saving through retirement accounts. The
labour income process is deflated with the Consumer Price Index to account for
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inflationary effects.
Table 3.2. Labour Income Process : Coefficients in the Age Polynomial
No High School High School College
Constant -2.1361 -2.1700 -4.3148
Age 0.1684 0.1682 0.3194
Age2/100 -0.0353 -0.0323 -0.0577
Age3/100 0.0023 0.0020 0.0033
λ 0.88983 0.68218 0.938873
σω 0.136 0.131 0.133
σν 0.019 0.019 0.019
Notes: These are values estimated by Cocco et al. (2004) for a third
order age polynomial, λ is the constant fraction for the retirement
period. σω and σν are the standard deviations of the idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks, respectively. The coefficients and the standard
deviations were estimated by fitting eq.’s 3.44 - 3.47 on the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics dataset.
We calibrate several parameters related to housing. We follow Cocco (2004)
and set it at 15%.21 Regarding the house price process in eq. (3.49), we need
to estimate parameters of the random walk with drift process. One approach
could be as in Cocco (2004) who uses self-assessed house values from the PSID
data from 1970-1992 to construct a House Price Index. However, PSID data
on house prices suffer from measurement errors as they are self-assessed values.
Furthermore, PSID surveys are conducted only every two years. In light of these
arguments, Pelletier and Tunc (2015) use the Case-Shiller Index. This is again
not an ideal procedure as the repeat-sales Case-Shiller Index do not control for
changes in quality of the house and gives a higher weightage to expensive houses.
To address these concerns, we use the seasonally adjusted constant quality
house price index brought out by the U.S. Bureau of Census for the years 1970 -
2014. We first deflate the house prices using the Consumer Price Index to get real
prices and then estimate for values of the real growth rate µh and the standard
deviation σh. Our estimates reveal that µh = 0.012 and σh = 0.048, we set them
accordingly.
Regarding the financial assets and credit market parameters, we set the mean
equity premium µS at 4.00%, a level considered reasonable by Mehra and Prescott
(1985); Mehra (2012). The risk free rate is fixed at 2% and the annual mortgage
rate is set at 4% following Campbell and Cocco (2015). As a proxy for a factor to
predict stock returns we use the log dividend yield. This is widely considered as
21Yao and Zhang (2004) and Hu (2005) set the required downpayment rate at 20% of the
house value.
157
one of the most important predictors of stock returns based on OLS regressions
over long horizon data, see Campbell and Shiller (1988).
For the rest of the return predictability parameters, we follow Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2012) and Michaelides and Zhang (2015) who use an annual fre-
quency CRSP stock return data to estimate time varying excess return variables.
They find a high persistence parameter of φ = 0.9 and the unconditional stock
market volatility, σz given by the unconditional standard deviation of stock re-
turns is found to be equal to 0.18. The correlation between the factor and the
return innovation, ρz,S , is an important parameter as this along with factor pro-
cess determines whether the stock returns exhibit the attractive property of mean
reversion. A negative correlation coupled with an AR(1) factor process implies
mean reversion, see Choe et al. (2007). Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012) estimate
this parameter to be -0.6. Furthermore, the factor innovation is seen to be smooth
in the literature and we set it as σS = 0.007 for the baseline model. When we
report our results we compare this values with the case of a more volatile factor
innovation (σS = 0.017).
3.6. Life-Cycle Portfolio Choice - Simulated
Results
In the following subsections, we discuss our simulated results for the optimal port-
folio choice over the life-cycle from the policy functions obtained from our Value
Function Iteration procedure. We start with the case of IID returns, followed
by return predictabiity. We finish this section with a discussion on the reported
levels of stock market participation with and without housing and quantify the
impact of preference heterogeneity.
3.6.1. Asset Allocation over the Life-Cycle - IID Returns
The theoretical and the empirical literature provide counterfactual evidence re-
garding the portfolio share invested in stocks vis-a-vis age. The theoretical lit-
erature predicts that as long as labour income is uncorrelated with risky stocks
the proportion of wealth invested in stocks is decreasing over life (see Heaton and
Lucas (1997) and Cocco et al. (2004)) while the empirical literature has found
that this risky share is actually increasing over life-cycle, see Ameriks and Zeldes
(2002). Our results reported in Table 3.1, assuming that the excess returns on
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the risky asset is independent and identically distributed, IID, complement those
of Cocco (2004) in that we provide an explanation to this puzzle.
Table 3.1. Portfolio shares by age predicted by the model - I.I.D Returns
Liquid Assets Financial Assets Total Assets
Asset <35 35-50 50-65 ≥ 65 <35 35-50 50-65 ≥ 65 <35 35-50 50-65 ≥ 65
Stocks 0.023 0.348 0.612 0.740 0.009 0.075 0.310 0.102 0.004 0.035 0.121 0.088
Bonds 0.977 0.652 0.388 0.260 0.035 0.035 0.045 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.020 0.009
Liquid Assets 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.044 0.110 0.355 0.122 0.009 0.040 0.141 0.097
House Value 0.956 0.890 0.645 0.878 0.145 0.168 0.304 0.820
Financial Assets 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.154 0.208 0.445 0.917
Human Capital 0.846 0.792 0.555 0.083
Total Assets 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Debt 0.702 0.502 0.345 0.625 0.101 0.099 0.188 0.488
Stock Mkt. P. 0.025 0.245 0.680 0.800
Notes: This table reports mean portfolio shares of various assets relative to liquid assets, financial assets and total assets when our
model was simulated under the calibrations specified in Table (3.1) for 10,000 agents and when the returns are assumed to be IID.
We report the results only for the college educated income group. Qualitatively similar results were obtained for the other two
groups. We follow Cocco (2004) in defining the composition of the various asset classes, consistent with our model specification.
Hence, Liquid Assets are defined as the sum of risky stocks and riskless treasury Bills. Financial assets are liquid assets plus house
value and Total Assets are financial assets plus human capital. Debt is reported relative to financial assets and total assets. Stock
Market Participation (Stock Mkt. P. in the Table) is the proportion of investors who decide to participate in the stock market.
The investors are categorized by 15 year age groups. These results assume no correlation between labour income to house prices
or risky stock returns.
The first four columns in Table 3.1 reports the change in the share of wealth
invested in the risky stocks and the riskless bonds predicted by the model. It
is clear that our model which incorporate housing predicts an increasing share
of stock investments, starting from 2.3% in the <35 age group to almost 74%
in the retirement period (≥ 65). The presence of an illiquid asset in the form
of housing implies that in the early part of adult life, the investor is liquidity
constrained (depicted by the high level of debt) and thus chooses not to pay the
fixed cost for participating in the stock market. Inspecting values for the stock
market participation rate, which is the proportion of households who participate
in equity markets, it is clear that only 2.5% of all investors enter the stock markets
in the early life period. In fact, for this 20-35 lower age group liquid assets form
only 4.44% of financial assets, all the rest of the wealth is held as real estate
(housing).
With rising age, the level of other asset holdings in the form of labour income
and house value becomes large enough to entice more and more investors to pay
the fixed cost. Thus the market participation rate increases and so does the level
of wealth invested in risky stocks. Investors accumulate enough wealth to both
afford their mortgage and also to partake in risky investments. This explains
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why old investors are more willing to accept risk in their portfolio of liquid assets
since future consumption is less correlated with the return on the liquid assets
portfolio. It is noteworthy that a large proportion of wealth relative to financial
assets is held in housing and this varies between 95% in the 20-35 age group to
64% in the 50-65 age group. This result confirms almost all existing studies that
a majority of wealth of households is held in the form of real estate, see Mian and
Sufi (2009).
The last four columns report the level of assets relative to total assets, where
total assets comprises both financial wealth and human capital. We define human
capital following Heaton and Lucas (2000) as the expected value of future labour
income discounted at the annual interest rate of 5%. It is apparent that human
capital, equivalently labour income, is an important determinant of wealth at all
ages. Particularly for the young investors, in the 20-35 category for whom 84%
of total assets comprises human capital. As investor’s age, there is decreasing
importance of labour income which explains the increasing share of wealth in
housing relative to total assets.
The reported results in Table 3.1 are identical to those of Cocco (2004) which
was expected as our model is built on his and we also used similar calibrations.
Although Cocco (2004) uses CRRA preferences, our benchmark calibration values
implicity meant that the relative risk aversion is equal to the reciprocal of the
relative risk aversion.
One of the main contributions of this chapter over related literature is jointly
modelling time-varying risky stock returns in the presence of non-diversifiable
labour income risk when the investor is liquidity constrained from investment in
risky housing. Table 3.1 reported our simulated results when the log returns on
the risky asset is I.I.D. Now we proceed to the case of time varying returns (return
predictability).
3.6.2. Asset Allocation Over the Life-Cycle - Time Varying Re-
turns
As the effects of time varying equity premium or return predictability on risky
portfolio choice is best seen through a graphical illustration, we plot the results
rather than tabulating it. We modelled the return predictability through the log
dividend-price ratio, see eq.’s (3.51) and (3.52). The expected excess return on
risky stocks is positively correlated with this dividend-price ratio. Hence, high
dividend-price ratio implies high stock returns and as we learned from Proposition
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1 this implies a higher level of risky asset demanded. This effect is exactly what
we observe in our numerical simulation results validating our analytical charac-
terization. Figure 3.1 plots the risky asset allocation over the life-cycle under two
different realizations of the log dividend-price ratio. To better understand our
results, we also plot the IID case.
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Figure 3.1. Risky Asset Allocation (αt) over Life-Cycle: IID vs Time Varying
Expected Returns (TVR) Under Different Factor Realisations. This figure plots the
simulated mean asset allocation for three cases. The constant investment opportunity set or
the IID case and for two different realisations when the expected excess returns on the risky
stocks are time varying - a high factor realisation and a low factor realisation. The dashed
plots are two extreme possibilities of the log dividend-yield. The horizontal axis describes the
adult age which is actual age - 19 and the vertical axis represents the share of wealth in stocks
(αt ∈ [0, 1]). Results are calculated by taking the average value over 10,000 simulated investors,
using the derived optimal policy functions and for each investor simulating a different path for
the exogenous stochastic processes.
The IID case in Figure 3.1 is a graphical illustration to the tabulated results
in Table 3.1. As reported in the Table, mean share of wealth invested in risky
stocks is very low, close to zero, in the first part of the life-cycle as households are
liquidity constrained for two reasons: (i) from investing in the house and (ii) low
earnings due to higher time discounting of labour income. As the investors grow
older (and richer with increasing human capital) and accumulate wealth, they
start investing more and more into the risky asset expecting high returns. This is
also motivated by the fact that in midlife, saving for retirement becomes a crucial
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determinant of the agent’s behaviour. The risky asset investment reaches its peak
around the age of 65 when the investor retires. Here around 80% of the total
wealth is being invested in the risky asset. This hump-shaped profile of αt that
we predict is consistent with the findings of other lifecycle portfolio models (IID)
with housing such as Cocco (2004), Yao and Zhang (2004), Davis et al. (2006)
and Vestman (2012) among others. Davis et al. (2006) do not include housing in
their analysis but as our tabulated results showed, housing is a deterrent only in
the initial years of an agent’s life.
Retirement brings with it a fall in labour income, and hence a fall in wealth
allocated to financial assets. The optimal allocation is then determined by the
speed of the fall in wealth. This depends both on the discount factor which is
adjusted for mortality risk (conditional survival probability) and the strength of
the bequest motive. It is noticeable that the pace of decline in risky investment
during the last years (ages 65-100) is slow which is primarily because agents have
a motive to bequeath their wealth when they die. This is why unlike models
without the bequest motive, see Davis et al. (2006) and Cocco et al. (2004) for
example, we do not have a steep negative slope in the retirement period.
The two dashed lines represent the time varying returns cases. When returns
are independent and identically distributed (IID), there is no added information
between periods or in other words the future looks exactly like the past. However
in reality, information changes all the time and the investors can use this to
re-optimize before the end of their investment horizon. Time varying expected
returns is equivalent to return predictability, that is φ 6= 0. In our calibration,
we followed the literature (see Campbell and Shiller (1988)) and chose the log
dividend-price ratio as a factor that can be used to predict future returns.
The two time varying return curves indicate two different realizations, high
and low, of the return predictable factor- the log dividend-price ratio. This factor
describes the investment opportunity set. When the factor realizations are high,
there is a favourable investment environment for the household. Equivalently,
when the factor realizations are high, the expected excess returns on the risky
asset is also high.22 Higher expected excess returns does not necessarily mean
high αt. This is easily seen through our analytical characterization, see Lemma
(1), where we split the optimal share of asset allocation into the expected excess
return (myopic) component and an intertemporal hedging component. Thus,
22This is not always true. Despite the overwhelming literature that argue for return pre-
dictability, some recent studies such as Goyal and Welch (2008) question their poor out-of-sample
predictions.
162
there can be a scenario where the investor decides to increase his investment in
the risky asset to take advantage of the higher returns, especially, in the initial
years and thus ↑ αt. The investor can also realize that with the higher expected
returns, he needs less money to achieve the same dollar return and thus ↓ αt.
Essentially, change in αt depends on the hedging and the market timing motive
of the investor.
The reported results in Figure 3.1 are for our benchmark calibrations where
we abstracted from any type of correlations. Thus, there are no intertemporal
hedging motives, refer Lemma 1. However the investor can aggressively time
the market. As the two TVR cases significantly departures from the IID line,
we can say that our model predicts aggressive timing strategies by the investors
concurrent with the results of Michaelides and Zhang (2015). However, unlike
Michaelides and Zhang (2015) we have included housing which provides an ad-
ditional wealth component and also a risk component. These components mean
that the divergence from the IID case is much larger.
Higher factor realizations mean higher expected stock returns and an almost
parallel upward shift in the mean share of liquid wealth allocated to stocks. The
difference is much more pronounced in the initial stages of the life-cycle. Between
the ages of 20-35 whereas the IID returns predict only 2.3% allocation of liquid
wealth in stocks, under high expected returns it is almost 10 times that- averaging
at well over 20%. The intuition behind this is that although the presence of
housing makes agents liquidity constraint, the attraction of high expected excess
returns entices household to pay the fixed cost and venture into equity markets.
This is true as long as the return on equity (Rt+1) is significantly higher than the
mortgage rate (RD). Our benchmark calibration ensures that this is always true.
Also, the equity market participation rates, as we later find, is also much higher
even among the constrained young households.
Similarly, if investors expect very low risky returns, the share of wealth in-
vested in stocks drops down substantially. However, it is observable that the fall
in αt is strong in the retirement ages of 65-100. This is expected as households
in this stage of their life would rather invest in riskless bonds as they anticipate
the returns on stocks to be very near to that of bonds but without any risk,
Etrt+1 − rf u 0. There is no reward for holding the risky asset. Furthermore,
as Michaelides and Zhang (2015) argue factors such as the log dividend yield are
highly persistent and thus it takes a substantial amount of time for a change (in
αt) to happen and when it does happen like in the retirement period the portfolio
moves relatively quickly.
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It is noteworthy that the speed at which investors run down their wealth after
retirement (65-100) is marginally higher in both the time varying return processes.
This is because investors are more sensitive to uncertainty in the later years of
their life. The presence of mortality risk coupled with extra risk from the factor
(dividend-price ratio) process and the absence of any hedging motive imply that
investors would desire to divest his liquid wealth from risky stocks to riskless
bonds. In the last years of the agent’s life, the bequest motive kicks in and the
slope stabilizes.
An important contribution that we can make from Figure 3.1 is that the
impact of a low factor realization on αt is much more pronounced than a high
factor one. The huge drop in the financial factor is indicative of a market crash
or in the words of Rietz (1988) a ”rare disaster”. The recent financial crisis is one
example. Barro (2006, 2009) and others have been successful in explaining several
asset market puzzles by incorporating such a disaster. Our result here contribute
to this literature in that we observe that these rare events can also explain the
limited risky asset allocation puzzle. As we see, a very low factor suggestive of a
disaster event results in a significant decline in risky assets demanded and, as we
later find out, in the rate of stock market participation. As Figure 3.1 shows, there
is also marked heterogeneity in the αt profile. In the possibility of a disaster risk,
old and retired households rebalance their portfolio more towards risk free assets
than young and employed ones. Retired households have low levels of human
capital, fast depreciating, and thus prefer risk free investment.
It has to be emphasized here that we do not explicitly model the probability
of an event risk as is the norm in the disaster literature. Instead the probability
is implicitly contained in the discretization process. The continuous time returns
process in eq. 3.51, for computation, was discretized into 15 Markov states of
nature. Each state has a probability attached with it. An extremely high or
extremely low factor states of nature are associated with low probabilities. Hence,
these probabilities can be considered as indicative of an event risk. These are
qualitatively equivalent to assuming that each date the investor faces a constant
exogenous probability of a drop in returns.
An additional way to assess the impact of rare events such as a market crash
on life-cycle asset allocation is through the volatility of the factor process. High
volatility is an observed phenomenon in such disasters, see Wachter (2013). A high
volatility in the log dividend yield process makes investment in stocks riskier. The
expected excess returns for low factor realizations, a disaster, could be negative.
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A rational investor should thus rebalance his portfolio towards riskless bonds or
even not participate in the stock market at all.
Our simulated results reveals that αt is sensitive to the conditional volatility
of the factor process and are thus consistent with the above reasoning. Figure
3.2 shows the effect of different factor volatilities relative to the IID model. The
deviation from the IID model is found to be larger when the factor is perceived
to be more volatile (σS = 0.017) than for the benchmark moderate volatility
(σS = 0.007).
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Figure 3.2. Risky Asset Allocation (αt) over Life-Cycle: IID vs Time Varying
Expected Returns (TVR) Under Different Factor Volatilities. This figure plots the
simulated mean asset allocation for three cases. The constant investment opportunity set or
the IID case and for two different factor volatilities, high (σS = 0.017) and low (Benchmark
σS = 0.007), when the expected excess returns are time varying. The horizontal axis describes
the adult age which is actual age - 19 and the vertical axis represents the share of wealth in
stocks (αt ∈ [0, 1]). Results are calculated by taking the average value over 10,000 investors,
using the derived optimal policy functions and for each investor simulating a different path for
the exogenous stochastic processes.
A high factor volatility suggestive of a rare disaster in the economy shifts
down the risky asset allocation curve. Importantly, the response in αt to a higher
risk in stocks are heterogenous over the life-cycle. Unlike the factor realizations
scenario, see Figure 3.1, the effect on young investors is insignificant, see Figure
3.2. Until the age of 30, investment in risky assets is almost the same. The effect
is more visible in the middle age group, specifically between the ages of 35-55.
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Retirement ages and then on until death also do not exhibit any marked changes
vis-a-vis the IID case. This is because when faced with higher volatilities most
younger workers do not react much since they have several decades to adjust
before they retire but as they get older they realise that they have little time to
adjust their wealth. Hence, they aggressively hedge such risks through bonds.
Our results agree with that of Chai et al. (2011) who estimates a life-cycle
model with return predictability, flexible labour income and finds that financial
risk/stock market shocks have little or no effect on young households but the
older and retired households invest more in equities. However, Michaelides and
Zhang (2015) finds that the average share of wealth in risky assets is substantially
lower among the young households compared to the older ones. This is mainly
because of the absence of housing in their model. Their simulated αt counter-
factually predicts almost a 100% allocation in stocks in the 20-35 age group. For
expositional clarity, we plot the change in financial wealth over the life-cycle under
high factor volatilities or disaster risks.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Benchmark - IID
TVR - Benchmark Factor Volatility
TVR - High Factor Volatility
Adult Age
Figure 3.3. Mean Normalized Financial Wealth over Life-Cycle: IID vs Time
Varying Expected Returns under different factor risks. This figure plots the simulated
mean financial wealth normalized by the permanent component of labour income (total labour
income net of transitive component) for heterogenous households over the lifecycle under the
baseline parameters and assuming that there is a fixed cost of equity participation. The dashed
lines represent the TVR cases when the volatility of the factor process is 0.007 and 0.017. The
vertical axis displays the normalized wealth and the horizontal axis the adult age. Results are
calculated by taking the average value over 10,000 investors, using the derived optimal policy
functions and for each investor simulating a different path for the exogenous stochastic processes
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Figure 3.3 plots the life-cycle financial wealth normalized by the permanent
component of labour income for different factor volatilities. The continuous line
represents the IID case with no factor volatility while the dashed lines represent
a small (0.007) and a high (0.017) volatility case, respectively.
It is apparent from Figure 3.3 that the financial wealth which is the sum of
liquid wealth and housing wealth increases with increasing dividend-price volatil-
ity. This is despite the fact that the share of wealth invested in risky stocks has
gone down, see Figure 3.2. The logical explanation in this circumstance is that
the housing wealth rose enough to more than make up for the decline in liquid
wealth. This means that households anticipating a market crash hedged this risk
by the illiquid housing asset. This result although agreeing with Michaelides and
Zhang (2015) is not consistent with empirical studies.
For instance, Barro (2006, 2009) and Wachter (2013) associate a market crash
or a rare disaster with almost 25% drop in consumption with equivalent levels in
household wealth. There are several reasons for our counter-factual result. Chief
among them is the assumption we made in our calibration that the stock and
housing markets are not correlated. This implies that as long as households can
afford to pay the transaction costs they are freely able to hedge any such risks
through the housing asset. In reality, housing is highly procyclical meaning that
disasters will almost certainly be accompanied by a drop in house prices nullifying
any sort of hedging strategies by the investors.
Nevertheless, the hump shaped profile of life-cycle financial wealth is consistent
with recent empirical work on micro data (Survey of Consumer Finances). For
instance, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) finds that households keep on
accumulating wealth from the beginning of their lives until retirement, at which
point they start running down their wealth.
It is a stylized fact that the log dividend-yield is highly persistent. A value of
zero persistence in the factor, φ = 0, implies no influence of the factor process or in
other words no return predictability or simply IID. As the value of the persistence
rises, so does the ability to predict returns. Our benchmark specification for φ
was set at 0.9. This value is representative of mean reversion in returns. Our
benchmark calibration also set a negative correlation between innovations to the
stock return and the factor, log dividend-price ratio. A direct implication of this
parametrization, along with the assumed AR(1) process for the factor, is that
stock returns exhibit the property of mean reversion. Mean reversion in stock
returns reduces long-term risk relative to short-term risk, that is, stocks are less
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risky in the long run. Hence, mean reversion makes stocks attractive to a life-cycle
investor.
Highly persistent stock returns (i.e. the persistence parameter is greater than
or equal to one, φ ≥ 1) will generate abnormal returns for the investor. Such
an explosive process is indicative of an ”asset price bubble”. Although there has
been several studies that examine the impact of mean reversion on risky asset
allocation, cases of bubbles have never been examined. Intuitively if φ affects the
risky returns, it is natural then that the risky asset allocation decision is affected
as well. To test this, we compute the optimal risky portfolio shares for a grid of
persistence values. The results are graphically illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Risky Asset Allocation (αt) over Life-Cycle and over Persistence of
the Factor Process. This figure plots the simulated mean asset allocation for the life-cycle
when the persistence, φ, of the log dividend-price ratio vary from zero corresponding to the IID
case to an explosive process, φ = 1.2. The x-axis describes the adult age which is actual age -
19, the y-axis shows the range of values for φ and the z-axis represents the share of stocks in
wealth (αt ∈ [0, 1]). Results are calculated by taking the average value over 10,000 investors,
using the derived optimal policy functions and for each investor simulating a different path for
the exogenous stochastic processes. To get a smoothed continuous curve, we first evaluated αt
for a grid of values for the persistence parameter which was then plotted.
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It is clear from Figure 3.4 that as the persistence parameter, φ, has a monotonic
increasing relationship with risky asset allocation. This holds even for young
liquidity constrained investors. For example, when φ = 0 returns are IID and
the level of αt is almost 2.5% at the age of 25. However at the same age when
φ = 1.2, risky asset share is close to 18%. As we discussed before a value of φ ≥ 1
indicates the possibility of a bubble in the stock market. Our results predict that
if investors have self-fulfilling price expectations they would invest more in risky
assets even if it entails paying a substantial amount to participate in the equity
markets.
We will examine this result by parts. First we will talk about the non-bubble
case, φ < 1. When the coefficient of the factor is positive and strictly less than
unity, stock returns are mean reverting. Mean reversion boosts demand for risky
assets. This is consistent with our predictions in Figure 3.4. It also agrees with
several important studies in the literature. For example, Campbell and Viceira
(1999) consider an infinitely lived investor with Epstein-Zin utility defined over
consumption. They estimate the parameters of the model from post-war U.S.
data and find that the estimated mean reversion dramatically increases the aver-
age optimal equity allocation of a conservative long-term investor. Lynch (2001)
also find that the predictive persistence parameter, φ, has a large impact on the
optimal risky asset allocation. For example, he predicts that varying the param-
eter from 0.85 to 0.96 raises the average share of wealth allocated to risky assets
by 6%. Both these papers are highly stylized and unlike ours do not consider non-
tradable labour income or risky housing and is not designed to explain life-cycle
dynamics.
More recently Benzoni et al. (2007) uses a rich life-cycle portfolio choice model
assuming a cointegration between aggregate labour income and stock market re-
turns (dividends) and also considering return predictability find that young agents
should short the risky stock. That is, the young agent chooses to sell the mar-
ket portfolio short to hedge the risk associated with her human capital position.
They also find that as they decrease φ to zero, results approach the IID case.
In the presence of short sales constraints, agents do not participate in the stock
market at all. However, at even small increases in φ such as 0.08 to 0.10, young
agents (20) invest all of their wealth in risky stocks due to the hedging demand
contrasting empirical evidence. This is mainly because of the lack of an illiquid
good that can restrict consumption smoothing abilities.
In essence, our prediction of increasing wealth allocated to risky stocks (αt)
with increasing persistence of the return predicting factor (φ) for the no-bubble
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mean reverting case is consistent with the literature. However, the case of unit
root φ = 1 and explosive roots φ > 1 is not clear. When the factor process follows
a random walk, returns are not predictable implying all else constant the share of
risky assets should go down. Our results contradict this finding. We find that αt
is strictly increasing even at such non-stationary values. This increase is apparent
uniformly at all ages of the agent’s life-cycle. This is mainly because we find an
upward drift in the level of households participating in equity markets as soon as
φ reaches unity. In other words, the arrival of bubble brings with it an increased
participation in equity markets, see Figure 3.7. As more investors participate the
average risky share of liquid wealth invested in stocks goes up. This is a realistic
argument as it is observed in general that stock market bubbles are characterized
by a large volume of trades and increased participation, see Basak and Makarov
(2014).
High persistence in the log dividend-yield is not necessarily indicative of a
stock market bubble. For example, it is widely documented that abrupt changes
in the form of structural breaks or regime shifts can induce non-stationarity in
the persistence parameter. However, we argue that even if that is the case, our
results would still hold. Firstly, the presence of high quality structural break
tests have only been recently available in the public domain. They have not
been available long enough to allow an investor to utilize these new techniques
in real time to search for structural breaks to rebalance their portfolio allocation
decisions. Secondly, the identification of structural breaks is a purely statistical
exercise mostly unrelated to predictable or observable economic events. For these
reasons, we can safely justify our result that on an average, households invest
more of their liquid wealth in risky stocks in the presence of a bubble.
Of interest is the fact that we do not observe any shift of wealth from stocks
to housing when we analysed the wealth profiles (not reported). The so called
”wealth effect” hence is absent in a stock market boom unlike a housing market
boom. Fischer and Stamos (2013) argues based on impulse response analysis that
a housing market boom raises the value of the home in which the household lives
and substantially increases its housing wealth. Both owners and renters decrease
their equity and bond holdings as an immediate reaction to a housing market
boom. In the long run, however, both bond and equity holdings are higher, due
to the positive wealth effect resulting from the housing market boom. Motivated
by their study, we analyse the impact of several parameters related to housing in
forming the optimal asset allocation. We do this exercise in the next subsection.
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3.6.3. Asset Allocation over the Life-Cycle - House Price Risk and
Hedging Motives
To analyse and measure the effects of housing on portfolio allocation, we compare
the results of the benchmark model which incorporates housing with a model
excluding housing. The no housing model includes all the features of the existing
one discarding everything related to housing: there is no durable good in the
utility function (δ = 1) and no collateral in the investment set (Dt = 0, p
h
t = 0).
Essentially, this model simplifies to the Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) one.
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Figure 3.5. Risky Asset Allocation (αt) over Life-Cycle: Housing versus No
Housing Model. This figure plots the simulated mean asset allocation for the benchmark
model with housing against a no housing model. The horizontal axis describes the adult age
which is actual age - 19 and the vertical axis represents the share of wealth in stocks (αt ∈ [0, 1]).
Results are calculated by taking the average value over 10,000 investors, using the derived
optimal policy functions and for each investor simulating a different path for the exogenous
stochastic processes.
It is clear from Figure 3.5 that the life-cycle profile of risky equity demanded
is substantially different in both cases. The difference is marked in the initial
years of the household. In the absence of housing, agents are no more liquidity
constrained. Thus, household invests their entire liquid wealth (100%) in risky
stocks to take advantage of the high equity premium. Around the age of 35 - 40,
as the value of human capital starts decreasing and financial wealth grows, the
household starts rebalancing its portfolio towards riskless bonds. This explains the
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downward slope between the age of 35-65. In contrast, the housing model shows
an upward sloping αt curve. This is largely because the presence of housing
increases the total wealth that the investor holds. The housing wealth offsets
changes in labour income. At the age of retirement, the portfolio share invested
in risky stocks in the presence of housing is significantly higher at 80% compared
to 62% without housing. The intuition is that as soon as the agent retires, around
adult age 46, the household starts dissaving. If the investor owns a house, he has
more savings that can be invested in stocks.
The no housing model, consistent with Cocco et al. (2004), Gomes and Michae-
lidis (2005), Benzoni et al. (2007), Michaelides and Zhang (2015), predicts very
large portfolio risky shares for young households. This prediction is counterfac-
tual. For instance, in the last wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
only 12% of participating young households have a share of risky assets that
exceed 80%, see Guiso and Sodini (2013). The predictions of our benchmark
housing model, hence, are more in line with empirical results. Housing initiates
a crowding out effect keeping liquid assets low and young agents from investing
in risky stocks. As we have seen that housing plays a major role in constructing
the life-cycle profile of risky portfolio shares, it is intuitive that shocks to housing
prices should affect the level of αt. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence
that house prices are correlated with aggregate labour income shocks. These are
investigated and the simulated results are plotted in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6. House Price Risk on αt over the Life-Cycle: IID versus TVR. This
figure illustrates the change in the level of risky equity demanded over the life-cycle from the
Benchmark model when the returns are (i.) IID and when they are (ii.) time varying and return
predictable. To initiate the change in αt we jointly assume that the aggregate labour income
shocks are positively correlated with the log house prices, ρν,h = 0.553, and that there is an
increasing in house price volatility from σh = 0.048, the Benchmark specification, to 0.14. The
right graph plots the intertemporal hedging demand relative to the Benchmark model. The
hedging demand is computed in terms of percentage deviations, hedge = 100 ∗ α′−αBenchmarkαBenchmark
where α′ is the new portfolio risky share. The horizontal axis describes the adult age which is
actual age - 19 and the vertical axis represents the proportion of liquid wealth in stocks.
To understand the impact of house price risk on risky asset allocation, αt,
we first impose a positive correlation between aggregate labour income shocks
and log house price, a realistic assumption which we ignored in our benchmark
calibration.23 The correlation between income shocks and house prices is set at
a value of ρν,h = 0.553 consistent with other studies, see Cocco (2004). Next we
increase the level of house price volatility, σh from the benchmark value of 0.048
to 0.14. We examine the change in αt when returns are (i.) IID and when they are
(ii.) time varying and predictable (TVR). The continuous line in the left panel
of Figure 3.6 represents the Benchmark case and the other dashed lines represent
the new risky share when returns follow the two different processes.
Two results can be derived from the above figure. Firstly, under higher riski-
ness in housing, the αt curve shifts down and thus the risky portfolio share is lower
throughout the life of the investor. Secondly, the change in αt is higher (more neg-
ative) when the returns are IID than when they are time-varying meaning that
investors hedge the housing risk better under the TVR case.
23We emphasize here that imposing a positive correlation between labour income and house
prices brings no qualitative change to any of the results that we discussed in the preceding
sections.
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As characterized in Proposition 1, the absence of any correlation between any
of the variables implies that there are no hedging effects. Hence, the two dashed
curves, which are in the presence of correlations can be called as the hedging effect,
the benchmark model being the myopic one. The right panel of the above figure
depicts the intertemporal hedging demand, which is nothing but the percentage
deviation from the benchmark model.
The divergence (zero represents the benchmark model) is very high when the
investor is young, close to 100% in absolute terms at the age of 20. There are two
forces at play here. The increased volatility means that investment in housing is
now risky. The positive correlation with labour income shocks means that housing
is no more a good hedge against labour income risk. Both these effects combine
to force investors to tilt their financial portfolio toward liquid financial assets, in
the form of bonds, and away from the risky illiquid housing bringing down αt.
As these shocks are positively correlated with labour income, the effect lasts until
retirement. This explains why the divergence is close to zero and remains that
way from the age of 65.
The results for the IID case is consistent with other papers in the literature.
For instance, Cocco (2004) finds using data simulated from a similar model that
the portfolio share of stocks relative to financial assets is 13% lower for young
households and 9% for older ones. Curcuru et al. (2004) and Kullmann and
Siegel (2005) use regression models to investigate the role of housing wealth for
both stock market participation and equity shares conditional on participation.
Curcuru et al. (2004) report a negative effect of the house value to financial wealth
on participation. Kullmann and Siegel (2005) finds that housing price risk is as-
sociated with lower stock market participation and, conditional on participation,
lower equity investments.
The more interesting and a contributory result that we get is the variation be-
tween IID returns and time varying returns (TVR). A look at the right hand panel
of Figure 3.6 reveals that the deviations from the benchmark model is substan-
tially lower when returns are predictable compared to the case of no predictability.
In fact, the hedging demand for the IID case is almost double (negative) at all
ages until retirement. The fact that returns are predictable, under the TVR case,
means that investors can strategize and time the market. Market timing implies
that substantial gains can be made by investing in risky stocks. Hence, despite
the rise in background risks (labour income) investors are able to hedge these risks
so that the fall in risky portfolio shares is limited. However, when the returns are
IID no such predictability can happen.
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Cocco et al. (2004) and Calvet et al. (2009) finds that substantial welfare losses
are incurred by households who move away from stocks. Hence, a normative
implication of our result is that if households can reasonably predict returns by
following a factor such as the log dividend yield, they can safeguard themselves
from cycles (risks) prevalent in the housing market.
3.6.4. The Stock Market Participation Rates Over the Life-Cycle
In this section, we attempt to shed light on the limited equity market participation
puzzle. The predicted levels of participation over the life-cycle and over different
levels of the factor persistence, φ, is plotted in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7. Stock Market Participation over the Life-Cycle and over Factor
Persistence. This figure illustrates the proportion of households that participate in the equity
market over the life-cycle and over a grid of values for the persistence of the log dividend-price
ratio. The case of φ = 0 represent the Benchmark model with IID stock returns; when 0 < φ < 1,
returns are mean reverting and time varying predictable; and unit root and above indicate a
possible bubble in the stock market. The x-axis describes the adult age which is actual age -
19, the y-axis describes the persistence of the dividend-price ratio and the z-axis represents the
proportion of households that participate in the equity market in the range - [0, 1].. Results
are calculated by taking the average value over 10,000 investors, using the derived optimal
policy functions and for each investor simulating a different path for the exogenous stochastic
processes.
Participation rates are monotonically increasing throughout the life-cycle. It
is no coincidence that the shape of the curve is similar to the risky equity share,
αt plotted in Figure 3.4. Several related studies, Gomes and Michaelidis (2005)
and Guiso and Sodini (2013), have found that the participation decision is an
increasing function of wealth and the optimal share of wealth invested in the
risky assets. The decision to invest in equity markets involves paying a fixed
cost of participation. Thus, it is natural to find that only 52.8%, on an average,
of households decide to venture into stock markets. The rate of participation is
very low in the beginning of the life-cycle, increasing through the middle ages
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and reaching its peak around the age of retirement. From then on until death,
households deem participation too risky considering the low level of human capital
and thus there is a slow but steady decline. This result is consistent with the
literature that model housing in life-cycle portfolio allocation, see Cocco (2004)
and Vestman (2012).
An interesting contribution that we derive from Figure 3.7 is when the persis-
tence of the factor, φ is at or above a unit root. This imply an explosive process
for the dividend-price ratio indicating a ”major event” such as a bubble. When
such an event happens, there is a marked upward shift in the participation rate
even at the initial stages of the life-cycle. Young households despite being liq-
uidity constrained from investing in the house still pay the fixed cost of market
participation enticed with an abnormally high expected returns to risky stocks.
The money illusion aspect associated with market frenzies, as argued by Brunner-
meier and Julliard (2007), exacerbates this phenomena. This also explains why
in Figure 3.4 we found a big upward shift when the persistence transitioned from
a mean reverting to a unit root process.
Major market events, such as the Dot-Com bubble of 1995-1999, will draw
immediate attention from all investors, wherein agents who can observe the time-
varying investment opportunities can strategize (buy and hold for example) and
stand to benefit relative to IID investors. Thus, fixed information costs of partic-
ipation can effectively be diluted. In effect, this means that households following
an IID process are committing a financial mistake (Calvet et al. (2009) and von
Gaudecker (2015)) and are losing out on substantial wealth gains
A unit root is a permanent effect. Thus, our results give a theoretical expla-
nation to the fact that several empirical studies based on SCF data have found
that participation rates have been steadily increasing over the years. For exam-
ple, Poterba (2002) argue that baby boomers are participating more heavily in
the stock market. Furthermore, Ameriks and Zeldes (2002), Curcuru et al. (2004)
and Guiso and Sodini (2013) attribute this steady increase to changes in expected
returns, steady growth of stock market and low cost mutual funds.
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Figure 3.8. Stock Market Participation over the Life-Cycle: Comparative Statics.
This figure illustrates a comparative statics exercise for the equity market participation rate for
households over the lifecycle. Panel A compares the benchmark model incorporating risky
housing with a no-housing model. Panel B shows how the participation rate varies as the
importance of housing represented by the parameter 1 - δ is increased from the benchmark
value 0.1 to 0.15 and when it is lowered to 0.05. Panel C shows the impact of changes in the
fixed cost of equity market participation (F ), low 1.5% and high 3.5% relative to the Benchmark
F of 2.5%. Panel D plots the impact of a high discount factor, β = 0.99 . The horizontal axis
describes the adult age which is actual age - 19 and the vertical axis represents the level of
stock market participation. The continuous line in all the four panels illustrate the Benchmark
calibrations.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the level of market participation when we change several
underlying parameters of the model. We compare the changes relative to the
Benchmark Case.
Panel A and B illustrate the importance of housing wealth for agents. As we
expected and in line with our results in Figure 3.5, we find that when households
are no longer constrained by investment in housing (Panel A) there is 100% partic-
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ipation in equity markets at a relatively young age of 35. In contrast, the presence
of housing prevents a substantial portion of agents from investing in equities. The
effect is more apparent in Panel B of the figure where we both increased and de-
creased the importance of housing (1 - δ) to 0.15 and 0.05, respectively. More
households participated under lower housing and vice-a-versa. Interestingly, the
equivalent change in participation was more with higher housing than when it
was lowered.
For our benchmark calibration, we imposed a fixed cost of equity participation,
F , which was exogenously set as a proportion of the permanent component of
labour income following Gomes and Michaelidis (2005). This proportion, 2.5%
of households annual income, reflects both the monetary cost associated with the
initial investment in the stock market as well as the opportunity cost involved
in obtaining the necessary information for making such an investment. If the
average household has an annual labour income of $35,000, then this fixed cost
would come up to about $875. It is intuitive that any change in this fixed cost
would affect the participation decision in the opposite direction. Consequently,
we find in Panel C that a high F (3.5%) brings down the rate of participation
and a low F (1.5%) shifts up the rate.
Panel D, shows the effect of raising the discount factor β from the benchmark
value of 0.96 to 0.99. A high discount factor means that investors save more
and are more willing to pay the costs of equity participation agreeing with Cocco
(2004).
3.6.5. Preference Heterogeneity and the Puzzles
In the introduction and the modelling sections, we stressed the importance of
preference heterogeneity. In other words how the CRRA preference assumption
that tie both the risk aversion and the intertemporal substitution parameters to
be reciprocals of each other is too restrictive. In our analytical characterization
in Lemma 1, we found that both EIS and RRA affect the level of risky asset
allocation in opposite directions. αt was found to be inversely proportional to
risk aversion and directly proportional to the EIS (inverse with a negative sign).
Our benchmark preference values were ρ = 5 and ψ = 0.2, thus we implicitly
assumed CRRA preferences. We now keep one of the parameter constant and
change the other to see how these influence the asset allocation and participation
decisions. The results are reported in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. Stock Market Participation and Stock Holdings
Stock Mkt. Participation (%) α (%)
Survey of Consumer Finances 51.94% 54.76%
Benchmark Model (ρ = 5 and ψ = 0.2) 52.8% 50.8%
Model (Case I - ρ = 5 and ψ = 0.3) 54.2% 54.1%
Model (Case II - ρ = 7 and ψ = 0.2) 50.2% 48.9%
Notes: This table reports the stock market participation rates and the risky stock holdings (α), in percentages.
These are obtained by taking the average value from all the simulated agents. The first row reports the
statistics estimated by Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) based on the 2001 wave of the Survey of Consumer
Finances. The second row reports the simulated results for our Benchmark model. The third and fourth rows
report values when we change the benchmark preference parameters, the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ψ.
The first row of Table 3.2 reports estimated levels of stockholding and partici-
pation from the 2001 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), reproduced
from Gomes and Michaelidis (2005). Validating our approach, our benchmark
model with homogeneous preferences, second row in the Table, predicts an aver-
age stock market participation rate of 52.8% and conditional on participation an
average risky stock holdings share of 50.8% which matches very well the Survey
data.
This finding contrasts with both the theoretical and empirical literature that
argue for preference heterogeneity. Using microeconomic data, Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002) estimate the level of risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion accounting for limited market participation. They find that loosening the link
between EIS and risk aversion and offer risk aversion estimates for stockholders at
around 5-10 and EIS estimates around 1. In a partial equilibrium life-cycle port-
folio choice model much like ours with recursive preferences, but without housing,
Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) simultaneously matches stock market participation
rate and risky asset allocation conditional on participation when they allow for
preference heterogeneity. By considering a 50% split between investors with low
risk aversion (ρ = 1.2) and low EIS (ψ = 0.2); and investors with moderate risk
aversion (ρ = 5) and moderate EIS (ψ = 0.5), they predict a participation rate of
52.1% and an equity share of 54.5% in line with the empirical evidence (row 1).
As our benchmark results showed, we do not need such heterogeneity in pref-
erences (Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2015)) to match the data. In fact when we
assume preference heterogeneity, as the third and fourth rows of the Table 3.2
indicate, the levels of asset holdings in particular are found to be much worse.
The third row of Table 3.2 reports simulated results when 50% of investors fol-
lowed the Benchmark specification and the rest 50% had the same risk aversion
(ρ = 5) but a higher EIS (ψ = 0.3). We find that the participation rate as well
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as the share of equity holdings went up. This is expected as consistent with our
analytical characterization, see Lemma 1, higher levels of EIS imply more desire
to smooth consumption and the investors accumulate more wealth. This means
increased participation and increased equity share. Conversely, when we consider
a 50% separation between benchmark calibrated agents and a 50% with higher
risk averion (ρ = 7) but the same EIS we find higher participation and equity
allocation. These results are consistent with Vestman (2012) who incorporates
housing in the portfolio allocation model and consequently find lower participa-
tion and asset allocation with higher EIS (0.33) and higher participation with
lower ρ.
It is to be noted that the presence of housing amplifies the effective risk aver-
sion for the investor. This effect has recently been documented by Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008) and Zanetti (2014). This explains why our model gives a rela-
tively lower stock holding value compared to the SCF data, 50.8% against 54.76%.
In our analysis in Table 3.2, we used SCF data from the 2001 wave while
we incorporated recent data when estimating the moments of the house price
process. This is not an ideal approach when there is substantial evidence that
both participation rates and stock holdings have been rising throughout the years,
see Guiso and Sodini (2013). However, the fact that recent studies have been
concentrated in Scandinavian countries and not the United States forces us to use
the 2001 data.
3.7. Discussion
To summarize the results section, we find five main results. Firstly we were able
to find a hump-shaped profile of lifecycle risky asset allocation concurrent with
the empirical literature. Secondly, we found that the risky asset share is highly
sensitive to factor realizations when returns are time varying and predictable.
High factor realizations or high dividend-yield shifts up the αt curve at all ages.
Extremely low factor realizations or very high factor volatility can indicate a rare
disaster in the sense of Barro (2006, 2009) and this adversely affects the level of
equity demanded. Thirdly, a unit root or explosive roots in the dividend-yield
process indicative of a bubble significantly increases both the participation rate as
well as the equity share conditional on participation. Fourthly, if investors have
the option of return predictability they can hedge risks associated with housing
cycles better compared to no predictability- the IID case. Finally, the presence of
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housing can resolve both the limited asset allocation and the limited participation
puzzles without resorting to preference heterogeneity.
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) demonstrate that consumer durables
are crucial to explain the life cycle profiles of consumption and savings. House-
holds begin their economic life without a stock of durables and they are pre-
cluded from building this stock immediately because of the presence of limited
intertemporal markets. As a consequence, during the first part of their life cy-
cle, households are forced to progressively accumulate durables and compromise
on their consumption of nondurables and accumulation of financial assets. This
phenomenon can explain why we observe that empirical life cycle consumption
profiles, both of durables and nondurables, are hump shaped, even after control-
ling for demographics characteristics and why most households do not hold any
substantial financial wealth until they enter into their forties.24
Before we conclude, some important caveats are worth mentioning. In our
theoretical model we made two assumptions that can alter some of the major
results. Firstly, we imposed short sales constraints on the investor meaning in that
in the presence of rare disaster in the economy, investors/market participants are
unable to hedge these risks by shorting the risky asset. For example Munk and
Sørensen (2010) finds that in the absence of short-sales constraints, in the very
early years (20-25), stocks are so attractive that the investor typically has 100% in
stocks, but after a few years the long-term bond enters due to its hedging qualities.
Secondly, we imposed the condition that every household has to own a house.
This is why the participation rates are very low in the 20-25 age group. This
forced homeownership meant that younger and poorer households have no option
to rent. This explains why Yao and Zhang (2004) and Li and Yao (2007) find
relatively higher levels of participation and risky asset allocation in the early years.
Thirdly, several studies have found that the parameters in the time varying return
predictable process is highly uncertain. In an influential paper, Stambaugh (1999)
finds that the optimal buy-and-hold stock allocation can be higher at low values
of the current dividend yield than at high values, even though the long-horizon
stock return has a lower mean at the low dividend yield and can have at least
as high a variance. This result can be traced to skewness in long-horizon stock
returns arising from uncertainty about parameters, particularly the autoregressive
coefficient of dividend yield. The skewness in the predictive distribution of returns
is positive at low dividend yields and negative at high yields, and the effect of this
24The original version of this article was published as a working paper in 2001 and was the
harbinger of multiple papers in this literature.
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skewness can be strong enough to produce a textitnegative association between
the optimal stock allocation and dividend yield.
3.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we combine two important streams of literature in financial eco-
nomics, the return predictability of stocks and the portfolio choice in the presence
of risky illiquid housing, to examine patterns of risky asset allocation and stock
market participation through the life-cycle. We successfully resolve two important
puzzles observed in household data, the limited stock allocation puzzle and the
limited equity market participation puzzle. We also looked at how these puzzles
behave when there is a rare event in financial markets such as a bubble or when
there is a disaster such as the recent economic crisis. Our results contribute to
the literature in multiple ways.
The models closer to ours in the literature are Campbell and Viceira (1999),
Cocco (2004), Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) and Michaelides and Zhang (2015).
Campbell and Viceira (1999) solves for optimal αt analytically but assumes a
highly stylized model with no labour income or durable housing. In the analytical
section of this chapter, we extended their work to include both housing and labour
income. As in Gomes and Michaelidis (2005) we have recursive preferences and
a calibrated labour income process in a lifecycle context to which we add the
durable housing good. Cocco (2004) is perhaps the closest model to ours in that
it models housing both as part of the utility function and allows collateralized
borrowing. However, Cocco assumes that the returns are IID. We nest the IID
as special case of expected returns which can be time varying and predictable.
Michaelides and Zhang (2015) analyses return predictability in a lifecycle context
but without housing.
The main result we find is that portfolio choice and market participation
profiles are much different in the return predictability case relative to the IID
case. We find the when returns are predictable from a factor such as the log
dividend-price ratio, the optimal risky share of liquid wealth invested in the risky
asset varies largely depending on the factor’s: realization, persistence and volatil-
ity. High realizations and high persistence of the factor, specifically unit root or
above, substantially shifts up both the risky equity allocated as well as the rate
of stock market participation. Likewise, a huge dip in the factor or a high volatil-
ity suggesting a ”rare disaster” in the economy brings down the liquid wealth
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invested in risky stocks. Unlike the bubble scenario, a rare disaster such as a
market crash was found to have a heterogenous response over the life-cycle with
older and retired households (65-100) being more affected (adversely).
Furthermore, investors are able to hedge background risks, such as labour
income or house price volatilities, better when they can predict expected excess
returns implying that substantial welfare losses can be avoided vis-a-vis the IID
case. Finally, the presence of housing predicted a hump-shaped profile for risky
asset allocation and participation with simulated rates very close to the Survey
of Consumer Finances estimates without any preference heterogeneity.
There are several interesting extensions to our model which are worth pur-
suing. We only considered three financial assets, ignoring assets such as cash,
which also acts as a medium of exchange and with it comes the risk of interest
rate changes. Another possible area of future research is incorporating ideas of
parameter or model uncertainty in the time varying regression framework, see
Michaelides and Zhang (2015).
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3.A. The Euler Equations
We follow Bansal and Yaron (2004) and simplify the portfolio choice problem
through a change of variables in order to utilize the arguments made by Epstein
and Zin (1991). Each period the household invests available wealth after the
labour income is realized in the financial assets, the households savings in period
t is :
2∑
i=0
Bit = Wt + Yt − Ct − PHt EXt (3.60)
Given that, the intertemporal budget constraint can be expressed as
Wt+1 =
2∑
i=0
BitRi,t+1 (3.61)
where Bit represents all the financial assets that the household owns at time t.
The Euler equations that we derive hold for any number of assets that the investor
owns, however for tractability, we only consider two financial assets. The risky
stocks and the riskless bonds who have a time varying equity premium. Housing in
our model is considered as a liquid asset which can be costlessly traded without
incurring any transaction cost. Defining the gross rate of return from housing
from period t to t+ 1 after accounting for depreciation ν as
RH,t+1 =
(1− ν)PHt+1
PHt
, (3.62)
B3,t = P
H
t Ht, (3.63)
W˜t = Wt + Yt + (1− µ)PHt+1Ht. (3.64)
where W˜t is the redefined wealth, comprising the financial wealth, labour income
and the housing wealth.25 The fact that we include labour income inside the new
wealth variable implies that the two states of nature for inome process will now
25It has to be noted that RH,t+1 is the gross return on housing which is given by
RH,t+1 = 1 + simple return, where
Simple return =
Pt+1(1− ν)− Pt
Pt
=
Pt+1(1− ν)
Pt
− 1
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translate into two states for the wealth process, one for retirement and the other
for employment. The intraperiod budget constraint can be defined as
3∑
i=0
Bit = Wt + Yt − Ct + PHt (Ht − EXt) = W˜t − Ct (3.65)
and the intertemporal flow of wealth is
Wt+1 =
3∑
i=0
BitRi,t+1. (3.66)
Then following Yogo (2006) when the portfolio weight αit = Bit/(W˜t − Ct), we
end up with the equation in the wealth return form that we follow in the main
text:
Wt+1 = (W˜t − Ct)
3∑
i=0
αitRi,t+1 (3.67)
The Bellman equation for the household’s intertemporal optimization problem in
the employment state takes the form
V et (W ) = max
Ce,αe1,α
e
2,α
e
3
{
(1− β)u(Ct, Ht)1−
1
ψ + βEt
[
V 1−γt+1
]1/κ} 11−1/ψ
(3.68)
where the continuation value Vt+1 is a weighted sum over the probability of em-
ployment pie and retirement (1 − pie). When the agent is employed, he faces
uncertainty in the next period.
Vt+1(Wt+1) = pi
eV et+1(Wt+1) + (1− pie)V rT+1(Wt+1) (3.69)
As in Epstein and Zin (1991), the homogeneity of the value function imply that
the optimal value can be written as a function of only wealth
V et (W˜t) = φtW˜
e
t (3.70)
Since PHt Ht = α3,t(W˜t − Ct), Ht can be substituted out of intraperiod utility as
u(Ct, Ht) = Ct
[
1− δ + δ
(α3,t(W˜t/Ct − 1)
Pt
)1−1/ρ]
(3.71)
= v˜
(W˜t
Ct
, α3,t
)
(3.72)
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We simplify the notation v˜
(
W˜t
Ct
, α3,t
)
≡ V˜t and let Θ = v˜1−1/ρt , Ξ ≡ W˜t/Ct − 1.
Using the intertemporal budget constraint (3.67) the first order condition of the
Bellman equation (3.68) w.r.t consumption can be written as
(1− β)(Ctv˜t)−1/ψ
(
v˜t − ϑ
1
1−1/ρ−1Ξ−
1
ρ δ
(α3,t
PHt
)1− 1
ρ
(W˜t
Ct
))− β(W˜t − C∗t )− 1ψEt[φ1−γt+1 ] 1κ = 0.
(3.73)
Let Et[φ
1−γ
t+1R
1−γ
p,t+1]
1
κ ≡ µ∗. Noticing that
Ξ−
1
ρ δ
(α3,t
PHt
)1− 1
ρ (W˜t
C∗t
)
=
v˜t
1− 1
ρ
−(1−δ)
W˜t
C∗t
− 1
(3.74)
and ϑ1/(1−1/ρ)−1 ≡ v˜t−1/ρ yields
(1− β)(1− δ)(C∗t )−
1
ψ v˜t
1
ρ
− 1
ψ W˜t − (1− β)(C∗t )1−
1
ψ v˜t
1− 1
ψ = β(W˜t − C∗t )1−
1
ψµ∗
(3.75)
Substituting optimal consumption C∗t to the Bellman equation (3.68) and using
(3.70) we get
φtW˜t =
[
(1− β)(C∗t v˜t)1−
1
ψ + β(W˜t − C∗t )1−
1
ψµ∗
] 1
1−1/ψ
(3.76)
Plugging (3.75) to (3.76) gives
φt =
[
(1− β)(1− δ)v˜t
1
ρ
− 1
ψ
] 1
1−1/ψ(C∗t
Wt
) 1
1−ψ
(3.77)
Yogo (2006) shows that using the arguments made by Epstein and Zin (1991) one
gets the set of FOC’s w.r.t Ct and portfolio choice αi,t for i = 1, . . . , 3
Et[M
∗
t+1R
∗
p,t+1] =
(
1− α3,tuH
PHt uC
)κ
, (3.78)
Et[M
∗
t+1(Ri,t+1 −Rf,t+1)] = 0, i = 1, . . . , 3 (3.79)
Et[M
∗
t+1(Rf,t+1 −R3,t+1)] =
uH
PHt uC
(
1− α3,tuH
PHt uC
)κ−1. (3.80)
which together imply that
Et[M
∗
t+1Ri,t+1] =
(
1− α3,tuH
PHt uC
)κ−1
. (3.81)
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After normalization, we get the standard Euler equations in the text. The case
of retirement and employment affects only the discount variable and hence it
is straightforward. For the employment state, we write the expectations as a
probability weighted average of the two values while under retirement there is no
uncertainty.
3.B. Intratemporal Optimization
Following Yogo (2006) and Bednarek (2014) the marginal rate of substitution
between the durable and the non-durable housing consumption good is
uH
uC
=
δ
1− δ
(H
c
)−1/ρ
. (3.82)
where uC is the marginal utility with respect to consumption and uH with Hous-
ing. The optimal consumption of the durable housing requires an intratemporal
first order condition in the form
uHt
uCt
= PHt − (1− ν)Et[Mt+1PHt+1] = Qt (3.83)
Qt here is interpreted as the user cost of the service flow for the housing good.
As the durable good in our model is a house, the user cost is nothing but the
rent. This equation simply says that the marginal rate of substitution between
the durable good and nondurable good consumption goods must equal the relative
price of the durable good. When the depreciation rate ν = 1 and the intratemporal
substitution ρ = 1, this equation reduces to δ/(1 − δ) = PH/C, meaning that δ
can be interpreted as the expenditure share of the durable good.
3.C. Log Linear Euler Equations
We first derive the log linearized version of the highly non-linear Euler equations
for the retirement state. We can write equation (3.22) as
1 = (pie)κEt
[
exp
{
κ
(
ln βe − 1
ψ
ln(Cet+1/C
e
t ) + (
1
ρ
− 1
ψ
) ln(v(Cet+1, H
e
t+1)/v(C
e
t , H
e
t )) + lnRi,t+1
)}]
+(1− pie)κEt
[
exp
{
κ
(
ln βe − 1
ψ
ln(Crt+1/C
e
t ) + (
1
ρ
− 1
ψ
) ln(v(Crt+1, H
r
t+1)/v(C
e
t , H
e
t )) + lnRi,t+1
)}]
(3.84)
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Denoting log variables with lower case letters
1 = (pie)κEt
[
exp
{
κ
(
ln βe − 1
ψ
(cet+1 − cet ) + (
1
ρ
− 1
ψ
)(v(cet+1, h
e
t+1)− v(cet , het )) + ri,t+1
)}]
+(1− pie)κEt
[
exp
{
κ
(
ln βe − 1
ψ
(crt+1 − cet ) + (
1
ρ
− 1
ψ
)(v(crt+1, h
r
t+1)− v(cet , het )) + ri,t+1
)}]
(3.85)
Assuming intraperiod utility as a Cobb-Douglas form with ρ = 1,
u(Ct, Ht) = C
δ
tH
1−δ
t (3.86)
= Ct
(Ht
Ct
)δ
(3.87)
= Ctv(Ct, Ht) (3.88)
implying
vt(Ct, Ht) =
(Ht
Ct
)δ
(3.89)
Taking logs,
ln(vt) = δ(ht − ct) (3.90)
Plugging this into the Euler equation we get
1 = (pie)κEt
[
exp
{
κ
(
ln βe − 1
ψ
(cet+1 − cet )−
δ
ψ
((het+1 − het ) + (cet+1 − cet )) + ri,t+1
)}]
+(1− pie)κEt
[
exp
{
κ
(
ln βe − 1
ψ
(crt+1 − cet )−
δ
ψ
((hrt+1 − het ) + (crt+1 − cet )) + ri,t+1
)}]
(3.91)
Following Viceira (2001), we can write this Euler equation in two variables
1 = piκEt[exp{xt+1}] + (1− pi)κEt[exp{yt+1}] (3.92)
where xt+1 is the first term and yt+1 is the second term on the right hand side.
Taking a second order Taylor expansion of exp{xt+1} and exp{yt+1} around x¯t =
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Et[xt+1] and y¯t = Et[yt+1], we get
1 ≈ piκEt
[
exp{x¯t}
(
1 + (xt+1 − x¯t) + 1
2
(xt+1 − x¯t)2
)]
+(1− pi)κEt
[
exp{y¯t}
(
1 + (yt+1 − y¯t) + 1
2
(yt+1 − y¯t)2
)]
(3.93)
≈ pi exp{x¯t}
(
1 +
1
2
V art(xt+1)
)
+ (1− pi) exp{y¯t}
(
1 +
1
2
V art(yt+1)
)
(3.94)
A first order Taylor expansion around zero, as in Viceira (2001), gives the result
1 ≈ piκ
(
1 + x¯t +
1
2
V art(xt+1)
)
+ (1− pi)
(
1 + y¯t +
1
2
V art(yt+1)
)
(3.95)
Substituting the values of xt, xt+1, yt, yt+1 to eq. (3.91) we get the log linear euler
equation for the employment state
1 ≈
∑
s=e,r
piκs
(
Et
[
1 + κ ln βs − κ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet )−
κδ
ψ
(hst+1 − het ) +
κδ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet ) + κri,t+1
]
+
1
2
V art
(
κri,t+1 − κ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet )−
κδ
ψ
(hst+1 − het ) +
κδ
ψ
(cst+1 − cet )
))
(3.96)
for i = p. The corresponding equation for the retirement state is straightforward
when we notice that under the retirement state the labour income is zero and
furthermore there is no uncertainty, that is, it is an irreversible state. The log
linear euler equation for the retirement state is thus
0 ≈
(
Et
[
κ ln βr − κ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt )−
κδ
ψ
(hrt+1 − hrt ) +
κδ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt ) + κri,t+1
]
+
1
2
V art
(
κri,t+1 − κ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt )−
κδ
ψ
(hrt+1 − hrt ) +
κδ
ψ
(crt+1 − crt )
))
(3.97)
3.D. Log-Linear Budget Constraint
The wealth-return intertemporal budget constraint for the employment state is
given by
Wt+1 =
(
Wt + Yt − Ct + PHt (Ht − EXt)
)
Rp,t+1 (3.98)
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Following Campbell (1993, 1996) and Viceira (2001) we start the log-linearization
by dividing with the labour income and express it as
Wt+1
Yt+1
=
(
1 +
Wt
Yt
− Ct
Yt
+
PHt (Ht − EXt)
Yt
)( Yt
Yt+1
)
Rp,t+1 (3.99)
As PHt (Ht−EXt) is nothing but the net housing wealth after accounting for any
expediture (EXt), we denote this by a new variable W
H
t .Taking logs
wt+1 − yt+1 = ln
(
1 + exp(wt − yt)− exp(ct − yt) + exp(wht − yt)
)
−∆yt+1 + rp,t+1
(3.100)
where lower case letters as usual denote log variables and ∆ is the first difference
operator. The first term in the right hand side, ln(1+exp(wt−yt)−exp(ct−yt)+
exp(wht − yt)), is non-linear. We linearise this term by taking a first order Taylor
expansion around the stationary log consumption-income, log wealth-income and
log housing wealth-income ratios. That is, the equation
ln(1 + exp(wt − yt)− exp(ct − yt) + exp(wht )− yt)) (3.101)
is linearized around (wt − yt) = E[wt − yt], (ct − yt) = E[ct − yt] and wht −
yt = E[w
h
t − yt]. For simplicity, we represent mt = wt − yt, nt = ct − yt and
ot = w
h
t − yt and then log-linearize around m¯t = E[mt], n¯t = E[nt] and o¯t = E[ot]
we approximate the non-linear equation (3.101) as
ln(1 + exp(mt)− exp(nt) + exp(ot)) ≈ ln
(
1 + exp(m¯t)− exp(n¯t) + exp(z¯t))
+ ρw(mt − m¯t)− ρc(nt − n¯t) + ρh(ot − o¯t)
(3.102)
where
ρw =
exp(m¯t)
1 + exp(m¯t)− exp(n¯t) + exp(o¯t) , (3.103)
ρc =
exp(n¯t)
1 + exp(m¯t)− exp(n¯t) + exp(o¯t) , and (3.104)
ρh =
exp(o¯t)
1 + exp(m¯t)− exp(n¯t) + exp(o¯t) (3.105)
Plugging this log linearized equation in (3.100) and substituting the values for
mt, nt and ot we get,
wet+1 − yt+1 = ke + ρew(wet − yt)− ρec(cet − yt) + ρeh(whet − yt)−∆yt+1 + rep,t+1
(3.106)
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where we have added the superscript e to differentiate from the retirement state.
The constant ke is given by
ke = ln(1 + exp(m¯t)− exp(n¯t) + exp(o¯t))− ρwm¯t + ρcn¯t − ρho¯t (3.107)
We also have
Ht = (1− ν)Ht−1 + EXt (3.108)
that is
Ht − EXt = (1− ν)Ht−1 (3.109)
implying
PHt (Ht − EXt) = PHt (1− ν)Ht−1 (3.110)
In logs
ln(PHt (Ht − EXt)) = pHt + ln(1− ν) + ht−1 (3.111)
or
wht = p
h
t + ln(1− ν) + ht−1 (3.112)
Plugging this into eq. (3.106) we get the log linear intertemporal budget constraint
for the employment state,
wet+1 − yt+1 = ke + ρew(wet − yt)− ρec(cet − yt) + ρeh(pht + ln(1− ν) + het−1 − yt)−∆yt+1 + rep,t+1
(3.113)
For the retirement state, there is no labour income, hence,
Wt+1 =
(
Wt − Ct +WHt
)
Rp,t+1 (3.114)
Dividing through Wt,
Wt+1
Wt
=
(
1− Ct
Wt
+
WHt
Wt
)
Rp,t+1 (3.115)
The rest of the derivation is in similar fashion as the employment state (above).
Taking logs and then linearizing around stationary log endowment wealth to hous-
ing wealth ratio, wht − wt = E[wht − wt] and log consumption to wealth ratio,
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ct − wt = E[ct − wt] we arrive at the log linearized intertemporal budget con-
straint for the retirement state,
wrt+1 − wt = kr + ρrh(whrt − wt)− ρrc(crt − wt) + rrp,t+1 (3.116)
where we have added the superscript r to indicate retirement state. Expressing
housing wealth in price form,
wrt+1 − wt = kr + ρrh(pht + ln(1− ν) + hrt−1 − wt)− ρrc(crt − wt) + rrp,t+1 (3.117)
Here the constant kr is
kr = ln(1 + exp(E[whrt − wt])− exp(E[crt − wt]))− ρrHE[wht − wt] + ρrcE[crt − wt]
(3.118)
and
ρrh =
exp(E[whrt − wt])
1 + exp(E[whrt − wt])− exp(E[crt − wt])
, (3.119)
ρrc =
exp(E[crt − wt])
1 + exp(E[whrt − wt])− exp(E[crt − wt])
. (3.120)
3.E. Optimal Portfolio Choice in the
Employment State
The result for the retirement state follows directly from the discussion in the
text. In what we follows we detail the derivation for the employment state. In
the employment state, the log Euler equation for a general risky asset (stocks or
house) is given by
1 =
∑
s=e,r
piκs
(
Et
[
1 + κ ln βs +
κ
ψ
∆cst+1(δ − 1)−
κδ
ψ
∆hst+1 + (κ− 1)rp,t+1 + ri,t+1
]
+
1
2
V art
(
ri,t+1 + (κ− 1)rp,t+1 + κ
ψ
∆cst+1(δ − 1)−
κδ
ψ
∆hst+1
))
and for a risk free asset i = f is:
1 =
∑
s=e,r
piκs
(
Et
[
1 + κ ln βs +
κ
ψ
∆cst+1(δ − 1)−
κδ
ψ
∆hst+1 + (κ− 1)rp,t+1 + rf
]
+
1
2
V art
(
(κ− 1)rp,t+1 + κ
ψ
∆cst+1(δ − 1)−
κδ
ψ
∆hst+1
))
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Subtracting the second equation from the first and simplifying we get,
Et[ri,t+1]− rf +
∑
s=e,r
piκs
1
2
V art(ri,t+1) =
∑
s=e,r
piκs
(
(1− κ)cov(ri,t+1, rp,t+1) +
κ
ψ
(1− δ)cov(ri,t+1,∆cst+1) + κ
δ
ψ
cov(ri,t+1, δh
s
t+1)
)
(3.121)
We make an assumption that piκe + (1 − pie)κ u 1. This approximation is exact
under CRRA preferences , that is when κ = 1. Equation (3.121) simplifies to
Et[ri,t+1]− rf + 1
2
V art(ri,t+1) =(1− κ)cov(ri,t+1, rp,t+1)
+
∑
s=e,r
piκs
( κ
ψ
(1− δ)cov(ri,t+1,∆cst+1) + κ
δ
ψ
cov(ri,t+1, δh
s
t+1)
)
(3.122)
We derived expressions for the three covariance terms as functions of wealth and
portfolio choice for the retirement state:
cov(ri,t+1, rp,t+1) =α
e
itσ
2
it
cov(ri,t+1,∆c
s
t+1) =cov(ri,t+1, c
s
t+1 − wt+1) + αeitσ2it
cov(ri,t+1,∆h
s
t+1) =cov(ri,t+1, h
s
t+1 − wt+1) + αeitσ2it
These will hold for the employment state as well. Substituting these values and
rearranging for αeit using the fact that κ =
1−γ
1− 1
ψ
:
αeit =
1
γ
Etri,t+1 − rf + 12σ2it
σ2it
+
( 1
1− ψ
)(1− γ
γ
)(∑
s=e,r
piκs
[(1− δ)σi,(cst+1−wt+1) + δσi,(hst+1−wt+1)
σ2it
])
(3.123)
where V art(ri,t+1) = σ
2
it, cov(ri,t+1, rp,t+1) = σri,t+1,rp,t+1 , cov(ri,t+1, c
s
t+1 − wt+1) =
σi,cst+1−wt+1 and cov(ri,t+1, h
s
t+1 − wt+1) = σi,hst+1−wt+1 .
3.F. Constructing the Budget Constraints
For any time period t > 1, the consumption Ct of other non-durable goods for
the investor or the household can be written as:
Ct = Financial Wealtht + Labour Incomet − Expensest − Asset Allocationt
(3.124)
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That is, at each period t the investor can consume what is left of once he allocates
his income and wealth towards expenses and accumulating assets. The financial
wealth at time t is the gross returns from the three assets, Stocks, Bills and
Mortgage, he held in period t− 1:
Financial Wealtht = RtSt−1 +RfBt−1 −RDDt−1 (3.125)
Also,
Labour Incomet = Yt (3.126)
At every period the investor can choose to spend the fixed cost involved in equity
market participation (if he has not done so before). We let FCt take the value of
1 if the investor chooses to pay the fixed cost of equity market participation in
period t and zero otherwise and F the monetary value involved in the participa-
tion. Furthermore, at every period the investor has to spend money on housing
maintenance. The total expenses is, thus given by:
Expensest = FCtFYt + δPtHt−1 (3.127)
The investor allocates the remaining wealth after expenses into the three financial
assets:
Asset Allocationt = St +Bt −Dt (3.128)
Plugging the four expressions into the budget constraint:
Ct = (RtSt−1 +RfBt−1 −RDDt−1) + Yt−
(FCtFYt +mchPtHt−1)− (St +Bt −Dt) (3.129)
We define cash on hand, Xt, in the lines of Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997),
as the sum of liquid or financial wealth and Labour Income:
Xt = (RtSt−1 +RfBt−1 −RDDt−1) + Yt (3.130)
Expressing the budget constraint in terms of cash on hand and rearranging we
get the date t inter-temporal budget constraint for the investor:
St +Bt =
{
Xt − Ct − FCtFYt − δPtHt−1 +Dt, ∀t
Xt − Ct − FCtFYt − δPtHt−1 +Dt + (1− Λ)PtHt−1 − PtHt, ∀t
(3.131)
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Also, consumption must be non-negative at all dates:
Ct ≥ 0, ∀ t (3.132)
and we define M as the proportion of liquid assets held in stocks over stocks plus
bills:
Mt =
St
St +Bt
∀ t, Mt∈ [0, 1] (3.133)
Wealth at date t+ 1 is given by
WT+1 = XT+1 −mchHTPT+1 + (1− Λ)HTPT+1 (3.134)
3.G. Numerical Solution
The life-cycle constrained optimisation problem cannot be solved analytically.
The setup of the model with discrete choice of stock market investment, fixed
costs and the presence of borrowing constraints imply that we cannot rely on
the existence of smooth first order conditions that could otherwise have used to
solve the model efficiently. Hence, we resort to Value Function Iteration, a robust
method of optimization based on the Contraction Mapping Theorem.26
As this is a finite time optimization problem, a solution exists and is deduced
by the Backward Induction Algorithm. At the terminal period, the value function
reduces to the bequest function. Iterating each period backwards, we get the
optimal policies for consumption, housing, debt and asset allocation. The stock
market participation decision is made based on comparing the value functions
conditional on having paid the fixed cost with the no fixed cost value function.
Similarly, the decision to move house is based on choosing the action that gives
the maximum value function conditional on no movement against movement.
Shocks to the equity premium, house prices and labour income were approx-
imated using Gaussian-Hermite Quadrature. Optimization over different choices
were implemented using grid search. We reduce the state-space dimensionality
through standardizing by the permanent component of labour income for faster
computation.
26According to the Contraction Mapping Theorem, there is an operator T [.] that maps the
value function into itself, v = T [v]. Under particular conditions, T [.] has a unique fixed point,
say v∗, such that v∗ = T [v∗], and that a sequence of v’s, vn+1 = T [vn], initiated at any v0
converges to this fixed point if the state space is a complete metric space.
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3.H. Recursive Utility
In this section we explore the construction of recursive utility used in this chap-
ter and detail the implications for the temporal behaviour of consumption and
portfolio allocation. Epstein and Zin (1989) analytically prove (i) the existence
of recursive intertemporal utility functions, and (ii) the existence of optima to
corresponding optimization problems.
Epstein and Zin (1989) follow Kreps and Porteus(1978) and define the con-
sumption space in terms of temporal lotteries to model the way in which consump-
tion uncertainty is resolved over time. Each temporal lottery d can be pictured
as an infinite probability tree in which each branch corresponds to a determin-
istic consumption stream y ∈ R∞+ . The lottery d can be identified with a pair
(c0,m) where c0 ≥ 0 denotes the nonstochastic period 0 level of consumption and
m, a probability measure over the set of t = 1 nodes in the tree, represents the
uncertain future.
To understand the structure of recursive utility, consider V as a utility function
defined as
V (c0, c1, . . .) = W (c0, V (c1, c2, . . .)) (3.135)
for some function W , termed as an aggregator as it combines current consumption
and future utility to determine current utililty. In the presence of stochastic terms,
future utility is random and thus it is natural to compute a certainty equivalent
for random future utility and then to combine the certainty equivalent utility level
with c0 via an aggregator. The utility function V is recursive if it satisfies the
following equation on its domain:
V (c0,m) = W (c0, µ(V [m])) (3.136)
for some increasing aggregator function W : R2+ → R+ and some certainty equiv-
alent µ. For the existence of utility functions in the form of eq 3.136 requires that
the aggregator W has the Constant Elasticity of Substitution form given by
W (c, z) = [cρ + βzρ]1/ρ, 0 6= ρ < 1, 0 < β < 1 (3.137)
with elasticity of substitution σ = (1 − ρ)−1. Thus, ρ is a parameter that is
understood to reflect substitutability. Assuming that the certainty equivalent
form is in the Kreps and Porteus (1978) class,
µ(p) = (Epx˜
α)1/α, p ∈M(R+), (3.138)
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where 0 6= α < 1 can be considered as the risk aversion parameter, consequently
V follows
V (c,m) = [cρ0 + β(EmV
α(.))ρ/α]1/ρ (3.139)
Regarding the attitudes towards the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, given
the functional form of eq. 3.139, early (late) resolution is preferred if α < (>)ρ. it
is noteworthy that the timing of this uncertainty differs between different classes
of utility functions, the von-Nuemann - Morgenstern Expected Utility form gives
indifference towards any kind of resolution of uncertainty.
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